Detecting and correcting errors in ruled-based expert systems : an integration of empirical and explanation-based learning

In this paper, we argue that techniques proposed for combining empirical and explanation-based learning methods can also be used to detect errors in rule-based expert systems, to isolate the blame for these errors to a small number of rules and suggest revisions to the rules to eliminate these errors. We demonstrate that FOCL, an extension to Quinlan's FOIL program, can learn in spite of an incorrect domain theory (e.g., a knowledge base of an expert system that contains some erroneous rules). A prototype knowledge acquisition tool, KR-FOCL, has been constructed that can utilize a trace of FOCL to suggest revisions to a rule base

A Rational and Efficient Algorithm for View Revision in Databases

The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In this paper, we argue that to apply rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first of all, it should allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented, along with the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for Horn knowledge bases. We show that Horn knowledge base dynamics has interesting connection with kernel change and abduction. Finally, we also show that both variants are rational in the sense that they satisfy certain rationality postulates stemming from philosophical works on belief dynamics

Renewing the link between cognitive archeology and cognitive science

In cognitive archeology, theories of cognition are used to guide interpretation of archeological evidence. This process provides useful feedback on the theories themselves. The attempt to accommodate archeological data helps shape ideas about how human cognition has evolved and thus—by extension—how the modern form functions. But the implications that archeology has for cognitive science particularly relate to traditional proposals from the field involving modular decomposition, symbolic thought and the mediating role of language. There is a need to make a connection with more recent approaches, which more strongly emphasize information, probabilistic reasoning and exploitation of embodiment. Proposals from cognitive archeology, in which evolution of cognition is seen to involve a transition to symbolic thought need to be realigned with theories from cognitive science that no longer give symbolic reasoning a central role. The present paper develops an informational approach, in which the transition is understood to involve cumulative development of information-rich generalizations

Tarski's influence on computer science

The influence of Alfred Tarski on computer science was indirect but significant in a number of directions and was in certain respects fundamental. Here surveyed is the work of Tarski on the decision procedure for algebra and geometry, the method of elimination of quantifiers, the semantics of formal languages, modeltheoretic preservation theorems, and algebraic logic; various connections of each with computer science are taken up

Social Categories are Natural Kinds, not Objective Types (and Why it Matters Politically)

There is growing support for the view that social categories like men and women refer to “objective types” (Haslanger 2000, 2006, 2012; Alcoff 2005). An objective type is a similarity class for which the axis of similarity is an objective rather than nominal or fictional property. Such types are independently real and causally relevant, yet their unity does not derive from an essential property. Given this tandem of features, it is not surprising why empirically-minded researchers interested in fighting oppression and marginalization have found this ontological category so attractive: objective types have the ontological credentials to secure the reality (and thus political representation) of social categories, and yet they do not impose exclusionary essences that also naturalize and legitimize social inequalities. This essay argues that, from the perspective of these political goals of fighting oppression and marginalization, the category of objective types is in fact a Trojan horse; it looks like a gift, but it ends up creating trouble. I argue that objective type classifications often lack empirical adequacy, and as a result they lack political adequacy. I also provide, and in reference to the normative goals described above, several arguments for preferring a social ontology of natural kinds with historical essences