152 research outputs found
Equilibrium concepts for social interaction models
equilibrium analysis;public choice
Characterizing distributions by quantile measures
Statistical Distribution;statistics
Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed âbattlefieldsâ. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out-comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.conflict, contest, battlefield, Colonel Blotto Game, auction, lottery
Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed "battlefields." In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out- comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.Con
ict, Contest, Battleeld, Colonel Blotto Game, Auction, Lottery
Stigma and Social Control
Social interactions provide a set of incentives for regulating individual behavior. Chief among these is stigma, the status loss and discrimination that results from the display of stigmatized attributes or behaviors. The stigmatization of behavior is the enforcement mechanism behind social norms. This paper models the incentive effects of stigmatization in the context of undertaking criminal acts. Stigma is a flow cost of uncertain duration which varies negatively with the number of stigmatized individuals. Criminal opportunities arrive randomly and an equilibrium model describes the conditions under which each individual chooses the behavior that, if detected, is stigmatized. The comparative static analysis of stigma costs differs from that of conventional penalties. One surprising result with important policy implications is that stigma costs of long duration will lead to increased crime rates.Crime, Stigma, Social norms
Slacktivism
Many countries have introduced e-government petitioning systems, in which a petition that gathers enough signatures triggers some political outcome. This paper models citizens who choose whether to sign a petition. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the petition's chance of bringing change. The number of citizens approaches infinity, while the cost of signing is positive but low, falling within certain bounds. In the limit, participation is increasing in the required quota of signatures. Social welfare is decreasing in the quota. Information aggregation may fail if individual signals are sufficiently uninformative
Slacktivism
Many countries have introduced e-government petitioning systems, in which a petition that gathers enough signatures triggers some political outcome. This paper models citizens who choose whether to sign a petition. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the petition's chance of bringing change. The number of citizens approaches infinity, while the cost of signing is positive but low, falling within certain bounds. In the limit, participation is increasing in the required quota of signatures. Social welfare is decreasing in the quota. Information aggregation may fail if individual signals are sufficiently uninformative
- âŠ