Responsibility for believing

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one's take on the world and one's place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. © 2006 Springer Science+Business Media B.V

Santa Clara Magazine, Volume 39 Number 1, Spring 1997

6 - BLUE SKY INVASION Searching for the American Dream, aerospace workers transform the Santa Clara Valley. By David Beers \u2779, Illustrations by Dug Waggoner 15 - SEEING IS BELIEVING Professor Sally Wood develops software to help students visualize basic engineering concepts. By Laura Trujillo \u2792 18 - CONFRONTING THE SCARS OF CENTURIES A legal challenge to California\u27s Proposition 209 is the latest round in a long- running debate over affirmative action. By Margaret M. Russell 26 - SHADOWY ALLIANCE A recent expose alleging CIA links to the crack cocaine epidemic in California\u27s inner cities raises questions about responsibility and truth in journalism. By Peter Kornbluhhttps://scholarcommons.scu.edu/sc_mag/1063/thumbnail.jp

WHO IS MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE MEAT WE EAT IS SAFE?

We report results of an analysis of the attribution of relative responsibility across the stages of the food chain for ensuring food safety. Specifically, we identify perceptions of the share of the overall responsibility that each stage in the food chain has to ensure that the meat people cook and eat at home does not cause them to become ill. Results are reported for two groups of stakeholders: consumers and farmers, and for two types of meat: chicken and beef. The stakeholders’ opinions regarding the relative degrees of responsibility of the sequential food chain stages (feed supplier, farmer, livestock transportation, abattoir,… consumer) are elicited via surveys using the Maximum Difference technique (best-worst scaling). The data are analyzed using mixed logit models estimated via Bayesian techniques. We find that consumers and farmers both tend to allocate a relatively low share of responsibility to their own food safety role. So, consumers tend to think farmers are more responsible for ensuring meat safety than farmers do. Similarly, farmers tend to think consumers have a greater degree of responsibility than consumers themselves believe. Thus, there is a consistent pattern of downplaying the extent of one’s own responsibility. Further, consumers tend to allocate the highest shares of responsibility to the middle stages of the meat food chain. This contrasts with farmers who tend to allocate the highest shares of responsibility to the latter stages of the chain towards consumers, believing that the earlier stages of the chain (until the livestock arrive at the abattoir) have a relatively low share of responsibility. The analysis is currently being extended to a third group of food chain actors: abattoir workers.Maximum Difference, Best Worst Scaling, Responsibility, Food Safety, Perception, Agricultural and Food Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Q18, Q51, D03, D12,

Zacchaeus: For the Lord He Wanted to See

Zacchaeus: For the Lord He Wanted to See turns the old adage seeing is believing” around toaccord with the words of Jesus: Believing is seeing. The play tells the story of the wee little man, Zacchaeus, who climbs a sycamore tree to see Jesus (Luke 19-1-10). After the Lord greets him by name and announces that he will dine at his house, Zacchaeus’ life is forever changed. Hemakes a commitment to give half of his possessions to the poor and to pay back four times overanyone whom he may have defrauded. In our play, Zacchaeus escorts jesus from his house to the Jerusalem road where jesus tells the parable in which a noble man divides ten pounds among his servants (Luke 19:11-27). He returns to his house where he tells this parable to his wife, Sarah, and his servant Sirius. Zacchaeus’ retelling of the story is interrupted by visits froma Romancenturion from Capernaum (Luke 7:2-10), a widow and her son from Nain (Luke 7:11-15), and a Samaritan leper (Luke 17:11-19). To each of these people in need, Zacchaeus gives some of his possessions. As he does so, he comes to understand the meaning of Jesus’ parable: to those who have, more will be given – more resources and more responsibility. He abruptly leaves his house to follow Jesus all the way to Calvary

Getting Told and Being Believed

The paper argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological light, concentrating on just how the recognition of the speaker's self-reflexive intention is supposed to count for his audience as a reason to believe P. This is understood as the speaker's explicitly assuming responsibility for the truth of his statement, and thereby constituting his utterance as a reason to believe.Philosoph

Whose Fault is It? Externalizing Academic Responsibilities is Associated With Lower GPA

A core tenet of Bandura’s (1986) Social Cognitive Theory is that cognitive factors motivate human behavior. For instance, believing that earning high grades will result in a desirable job will motivate one to earn higher grades. Here, we suggest that externalizing the responsibility of one’s college education are more likely to struggle academically. As part of a larger study, college students (N = 396) from three universities reported their externalized academic responsibility (Chowning & Campbell, 2009), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1985), narcissism (Gentile et al. 2013), and GPA. It was hypothesized that externalized academic responsibility would be negatively associated with GPA. In an exploratory follow-up analysis, we examined whether narcissism or self-esteem moderated this association. There was a negative correlation between externalized academic responsibility and GPA (r = -.37,

AN ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL VALUES OF THE NOVEL “ SILENT PATIENT ” BY ALEX MICHAELIDES

The low interest in reading in Indonesia threatens the quality of the young generation who hold Indonesia's future. Stimulating interest in reading can be done through reading materials that are popular among students, such as psychological thriller novels. Thus, researchers must encourage students to use English novels as reading material. This study aimed to determine the workability of the novel The Silent Patient by Alex Michaelides as reading material for EFL students. This study of "The Silent Patient" by Alex Michaelides used a qualitative descriptive research method. Moreover, the data collection technique used literature study techniques. The results of this study showed that from the reflection of educational values for EFL students in the following ways: first, the value of truth: mental, physical, and social well-being; second, the value of beauty in terms of creativity and uniqueness; third, religious values in terms of believing in God, believing in the hereafter; fourth, moral values in terms of always helping, perversion, and responsibility; The Silent Patient novel by Alex Michaelides is suitable as reading material for EFL students

Riggs on strong justification

In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified beliefs be truth conducive (likely to be true) is not always compatible with the requirement that they be epistemically responsible (arrived at in an epistemically responsible manner)1. He supports this claim by criticising Alvin Goldman's view that if a belief is strongly justified, it is also epistemically responsible. In light of this, Riggs recommends that we develop two independent conceptions of justification, one that insists upon the requirement that beliefs be truth conducive and another that insists that they be epistemically responsible. It will then, on his view, be possible to properly evaluate beliefs with regard to each conception of justification. Riggs, however, is mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are independent. If a belief is responsibly arrived at, it is therefore likely to be true. He is thus also mistaken in supposing that the two epistemic requirements are incompatible. This mistake arises because Riggs assumes that justification is possible or, at least, that it involves standards that are akin to our own. Moreover, once this assumption is made explicit, we can see why a notion of justification that connects epistemic practice with likely truth is significant

Why responsible belief is blameless belief

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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief

ABSTRACTThe contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be voluntary in nature. It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic ‘control’ at all. However, Miriam McCormick has recently argued that doxastic responsibility does in fact require quasi-voluntary doxastic control: “guidance control,” a complex, compatibilist form of control. In this paper, I pursue a negative and a positive task. First, I argue that grounding doxastic responsibility in guidance control requires too much for agents to be the proper targets for attributions of doxastic responsibility. I will focus my criticisms on three cases in which McCormick's account gives the intuitively wrong verdict. Second, I develop a modified conception of McCormick's notion of “ownership of belief,” which I call Weak Doxastic Ownership. I employ this conception to argue that responsibility for belief is possible even in the absence of guidance control. In doing so, I argue that the notion of doxastic ownership can do important normative work in grounding responsibility for belief without being subsumed under or analyzed in terms of the notion of doxastic control