A Minimalist Framework for Thought Experiment Analysis

Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis

An Enduring Philosophical Agenda. Worldview Construction as a Philosophical Method\ud

Is there such a thing as a philosophical method? It seems that there are as many philosophical methods as there are philosophies. A method is any procedure employed to achieve a certain aim. So, before proposing a method, we have to tackle the delicate question: “what is the aim of philosophy?”. At the origin of philosophy, there is a questioning about the world. The worldview approach developed by Leo Apostel elegantly explicit those fundamental questions. As we answer them, we come up with a worldview. Using this framework, this paper consider answering this enduring philosophical agenda as the primary aim of philosophy. We illustrate the approach by pointing out the limitations of both a strictly scientific worldview and a strictly religious worldview. We then argue that philosophical worldviews constitute a particular class of possible worldviews. With the help of three analogies, we give guidelines to construct such worldviews. The next step is to compare the relative strength of philosophical worldviews. Precise evaluation standards to compare and confront worldviews are proposed. Some problems for worldview diffusion are then expounded. We close with basic hypotheses to build a comprehensive philosophical worldview

An Enduring Philosophical Agenda. Worldview Construction as a Philosophical Method

Is there something like a philosophical method? It seems that there are as many methods as there are philosophies. A method is any procedure employed to attain a certain end. So, before going to a method, we have to ask: what is the aim of philosophy? At the origin of philosophy, there is a questioning about the world. Leo Apostel and Jan Van der Veken made more precise and explicit those fundamental questions (Apostel, Van der Veken 1991). The primarily aim of philosophy can be seen as answering this philosophical agenda; with the answers, one come up with a worldview. We'll argue that the philosophical worldviews constitute a particular class of the possible worldviews. With the help of three analogies, we'll give some guidelines to construct such worldviews. But, what are the best philosophical worldviews? We'll see how we can compare and confront them; and also some problems for their diffusion. The last section will propose some basic hypotheses to build such integrative worldviews

Causality in concurrent systems

Concurrent systems identify systems, either software, hardware or even biological systems, that are characterized by sets of independent actions that can be executed in any order or simultaneously. Computer scientists resort to a causal terminology to describe and analyse the relations between the actions in these systems. However, a thorough discussion about the meaning of causality in such a context has not been developed yet. This paper aims to fill the gap. First, the paper analyses the notion of causation in concurrent systems and attempts to build bridges with the existing philosophical literature, highlighting similarities and divergences between them. Second, the paper analyses the use of counterfactual reasoning in ex-post analysis in concurrent systems (i.e. execution trace analysis).Comment: This is an interdisciplinary paper. It addresses a class of causal models developed in computer science from an epistemic perspective, namely in terms of philosophy of causalit

Moral aspirations and ideals

My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral concepts such as duty, virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal for moral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility

Inconsistency and the dilemma of intuitionistic research in generative syntax

The paper is a contribution to the current debate on linguistic data and evidence. It raises two questions: (a) What kinds of inconsistency do emerge in generative syntax? (b) How are these kinds of inconsistency to be evaluated with respect to the workability of the syntactic theory at issue? As a first step, a system of paraconsistent logic is introduced which distinguishes between weak and strong inconsistency. While weak inconsistency is harmless, strong inconsistency is destructive. Second, a case study demonstrates that in generative syntax weak inconsistency may be a useful tool of problem solving. Third, two further case studies show that intuition as a data source triggers the emergence of strong inconsistency in generative syntax. Finally, this results in a methodological dilemma with far-reaching consequences

Emerging infectious diseases: coping with uncertainty

The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its centre and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this paper, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health

Human knowing and perceived complexity: implications for systems practice

Complexity has been understood in different ways since its (re) introduction into scientific discourse. Therefore, instead of proposing a definition of complexity, we group the existing explanations about it into two distinct categories: descriptive and perceived complexity. The main features of these categories are described and how they arise as the result of the adoption of contrasting epistemologies is discussed. These categories together with their implications for our doing in the world are explored under the rubric of the 'epistemological problem of complexity'. The practical significance of the issues we address, especially as they relate to building capacity for systems practice, understood as a way of managing in situations of complexity, is also of concern. "Even when the individual trees are highly interesting and picturesque, it has use to see what the forest looks like in the large" (Rescher, 199S; xvii)