2,460 research outputs found

    The AFHSC-Division of GEIS Operations Predictive Surveillance Program: a multidisciplinary approach for the early detection and response to disease outbreaks

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    The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System Operations (AFHSC-GEIS) initiated a coordinated, multidisciplinary program to link data sets and information derived from eco-climatic remote sensing activities, ecologic niche modeling, arthropod vector, animal disease-host/reservoir, and human disease surveillance for febrile illnesses, into a predictive surveillance program that generates advisories and alerts on emerging infectious disease outbreaks. The program’s ultimate goal is pro-active public health practice through pre-event preparedness, prevention and control, and response decision-making and prioritization. This multidisciplinary program is rooted in over 10 years experience in predictive surveillance for Rift Valley fever outbreaks in Eastern Africa. The AFHSC-GEIS Rift Valley fever project is based on the identification and use of disease-emergence critical detection points as reliable signals for increased outbreak risk. The AFHSC-GEIS predictive surveillance program has formalized the Rift Valley fever project into a structured template for extending predictive surveillance capability to other Department of Defense (DoD)-priority vector- and water-borne, and zoonotic diseases and geographic areas. These include leishmaniasis, malaria, and Crimea-Congo and other viral hemorrhagic fevers in Central Asia and Africa, dengue fever in Asia and the Americas, Japanese encephalitis (JE) and chikungunya fever in Asia, and rickettsial and other tick-borne infections in the U.S., Africa and Asia

    101 Puppy Mills: A Sampling of Problem Puppy Mills in the United States

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    The goal of the report is to inform consumers about widespread problems with puppy mills before they make an uninformed purchase that could potentially support animal cruelty. The report includes puppy mills from 22 states, but because most of the dealers sell online or to pet stores, their puppies could be available to unwary consumers in all 50 states and beyond. The breeders and sellers on this list represent common issues with puppy mills and puppy mill brokers. This report is not a complete list of all puppy mills, nor a list of all problematic facilities. For more information on the methodology used in preparing this report, please see the Methodology section on page 29

    Environ Health Perspect

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    BackgroundBecause of complex interactions of climate variables at the levels of the pathogen, vector, and host, the potential influence of climate change on vector-borne and zoonotic diseases (VBZDs) is poorly understood and difficult to predict. Climate effects on the nonvector-borne zoonotic diseases are especially obscure and have received scant treatment.ObjectiveWe described known and potential effects of climate change on VBZDs and proposed specific studies to increase our understanding of these effects. The nonvector-borne zoonotic diseases have received scant treatment and are emphasized in this paper.Data sources and synthesisWe used a review of the existing literature and extrapolations from observations of short-term climate variation to suggest potential impacts of climate change on VBZDs. Using public health priorities on climate change, published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, we developed six specific goals for increasing understanding of the interaction between climate and VBZDs and for improving capacity for predicting climate change effects on incidence and distribution of VBZDs.ConclusionsClimate change may affect the incidence of VBZDs through its effect on four principal characteristics of host and vector populations that relate to pathogen transmission to humans: geographic distribution, population density, prevalence of infection by zoonotic pathogens, and the pathogen load in individual hosts and vectors. These mechanisms may interact with each other and with other factors such as anthropogenic disturbance to produce varying effects on pathogen transmission within host and vector populations and to humans. Because climate change effects on most VBZDs act through wildlife hosts and vectors, understanding these effects will require multidisciplinary teams to conduct and interpret ecosystem-based studies of VBZD pathogens in host and vector populations and to identify the hosts, vectors, and pathogens with the greatest potential to affect human populations under climate change scenarios

    The role of climate change, wildfire and human interference in the potential spread of Sin Nombre Hantavirus in North America

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    Sin Nombre hantavirus is a rare rodent-borne pathogen that causes Hantavirus Cardiopulmonary Syndrome (HCPS), a disease with a 35% fatality rate in humans. The main rodent host of Sin Nombre hantavirus is the deer mouse (Peromyscus maniculatus), one of the most prolific, best studied and highly adaptable rodent species in North America. Deer mice are hyper-reservoirs, carrying Sin Nombre virus, plague (Yersinia pestis) and the Peromyscus species carry Lyme disease. Although deer mice have been shown to react positively to wildfire, current assessments of Sin Nombre hantavirus risk to humans and climate change do not consider increasing fire risk. In order to assess the effects of wildfire, human interference and climate change on the human-pathogen risk of Sin Nombre hantavirus in North America, a cross-disciplinary literature review was performed. Climate change and human interference has already increased wildfire incidents, extended wildfire seasons, and intensified drought; all of which are expected to worsen as climate change progresses. Deer mice population’s positive reaction to increased fire and preference for burned areas was found to be significant enough to warrant better monitoring of wildfire incidents across the United States, especially in areas of fragmentation and ecosystem disruption as these conditions may lead to increased incidence of Sin Nombre hantavirus. Future pathogenic hotspots may be determined by creating a comprehensive monitoring system using remote sensing of total fire (wildfire and agricultural burning) across North America which currently does not exist. Expansion of public health and increased testing in North America is recommended to reduce risk

    A tackle box guide to: common saltwater fishes of southwest Florida

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    There are well over 150 species of fish caught by hook and line in local waters. The 86 species included in this book were selected by the author and editors because they are the most frequently encountered. For eachspecies, important informationabout distinguishing features, biology/habitat, and fishing methods is provided. The often confusing common nicknames applied to each fish are noted, as well as the fish's preferred common name. (56pp.

    Data mining techniques on satellite images for discovery of risk areas

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    The high rates of cholera epidemic mortality in less developed countries is a challenge for health fa- cilities to which it is necessary to equip itself with the epidemiological surveillance. To strengthen the capacity of epidemiological surveillance, this paper focuses on remote sensing satellite data processing using data mining methods to discover risk areas of the epidemic disease by connecting the environ- ment, climate and health. These satellite data are combined with field data collected during the same set of periods in order to explain and deduct the causes of the epidemic evolution from one period to another in relation to the environment. The existing technical (algorithms) for processing satellite im- ages are mature and efficient, so the challenge today is to provide the most suitable means allowing the best interpretation of obtained results. For that, we focus on supervised classification algorithm to process a set of satellite images from the same area but on different periods. A novel research method- ology (describing pre-treatment, data mining, and post-treatment) is proposed to ensure suitable means for transforming data, generating information and extracting knowledge. This methodology consists of six phases: (1.A) Acquisition of information from the field about epidemic, (1.B) Satellite data acquisition, (2) Selection and transformation of data (Data derived from images), (3) Remote sensing measurements, (4) Discretization of data, (5) Data treatment, and (6) Interpretation of results. The main contributions of the paper are: to establish the nature of links between the environment and the epidemic, and to highlight those risky environments when the public awareness of the problem and the prevention policies are absolutely necessary for mitigation of the propagation and emergence of the epidemic. This will allow national governments, local authorities and the public health officials to effective management according to risk areas. The case study concerns the knowledge discovery in databases related to risk areas of the cholera epidemic in Mopti region, Mali (West Africa). The results generate from data mining association rules indicate that the level of the Niger River in the wintering periods and some societal factors have an impact on the variation of cholera epidemic rate in Mopti town. More the river level is high, at 66% the rate of contamination is high

    Biological Terrorism, Emerging Diseases, and National Security

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    Examines the extent to which bioterrorist attacks have proven or may prove difficult to distinguish from outbreaks of emerging diseases. Makes recommendations for how the U.S. could better prepare to meet the threat of biological terrorism

    National aviation resource manual for quarantinable diseases

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    Manual Overview and Scope -- Introduction -- Purpose -- Scope and Assumptions -- Clarifications -- Manual Production -- -- Section 1: Lead Authority -- Introduction -- CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine -- CDC Quarantine Stations -- Quarantinable Diseases -- DGMQ Partnerships -- HHS Partnerships -- -- Section 2: Communicable Disease Awareness at Airports -- Introduction -- Legal Requirement for Notification of Ill Passenger(s) -- Disease Surveillance -- Disease Alerts -- Travel Notices -- Triggers -- -- Section 3: Pre-Incident Preparation -- Introduction -- Authorities -- Roles and Responsibilities -- Worker Protection -- Pre-Incident Preparation: In-Flight Response -- Pre-Incident Preparation: On-Arrival Response -- Pre-Incident Preparation: Post-Arrival Response -- Pre-Incident Preparation: Recovery -- -- Section 4: Incident Response: Roles and Responsibilities -- Introduction -- Conveyance Operators -- Airport Operators -- State/Local Governments -- Local Healthcare Facilities and Support Organizations -- Federal Government -- -- Section 5: Incident Response: In Flight -- Introduction -- Notifications: Airports with an On-Site CDC Quarantine Station -- Notifications: Airports without an On-Site CDC Quarantine Station -- Other Notification Considerations -- Preparation for the Arrival of the Aircraft -- -- Section 6: Incident Response: On Arrival -- Introduction -- Planeside Response -- Treatment of Ill People -- Treatment of Exposed People -- -- Section 7: Incident Response: Post-Arrival -- Introduction -- Hospitalization of the Ill Persons -- Quarantine -- Authority to Quarantine -- Quarantine Planning -- Quarantine Planning Considerations -- Ending Quarantine -- -- Section 8: Incident Response: Recovery -- Introduction -- What is Recovery? -- Objectives of Recovery -- -- Section 9: Airport Communicable Disease Incident Response Planning -- Introduction -- Contents of an Airport Communicable Disease Response Plan -- Important Considerations for an Airport Communicable Disease Response Plan -- -- Appendix A. CDC Quarantine Stations -- Appendix B. Travel Notices -- Appendix C. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) -- Appendix D. Fact Sheet: Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine -- Appendix E. Executive Orders on Quarantinable Diseases -- Appendix F. Quarantinable Disease Information -- Appendix G. Airport Quarantine Plan Example -- Appendix H. Incident Command/Unified Command -- Appendix I. Abbreviations -- Appendix J. AcknowledgementsProduced by the Office of the Secretary, United States Department of Transportation in coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States Department of Health and Human Services; prepared by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education."OST-X0167"Title from title screen (viewed February 7, 2007)."December 2006."Mode of access: Internet from the DHS web site an Acrobat .pdf file (3.66 MB, 144 p.)
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