Philosophy of Science and Democracy. Some reflections on Philipp Frank"s "Relativity – a richer truth".

Philipp Frank"s book Relativity – a richer truth1 shows something we do not find very often after World War 2: a philosopher of science acting as a public intellectual. Taking part in the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Philipp Frank intervened in the public debate about the causes of Nazism and how to defend democracy and liberalism against totalitarian ideas and politics. Could philosophy of science contribute to such a struggle? Philipp Frank thought it could, he even thought that Philosophy of Science should play a crucial role in it. It"s obvious that this position should be of some interest for philosophers in Austria and Europe today. Of course, any serious analysis of Frank"s position would have to take the whole historical constellation into account. Between the beginning of the conference in 1940 and the publication of the book in 1951 the historical situation had dramatically changed. And therefore one has to distinguish several political dimensions in Frank"s arguments. Let me just make a short remark on the plurality of political perspectives Frank"s discourse opened up. Philipp Frank defined the role science should play in democracy not only in contrast to the role of science as it was conceived by totalitarian governments. Of course he criticised the Nazis" and Soviets" �philosophies of science� several times (see for instance p. 73, 98, 103p.). But he also made very clear that in the 40ies and 50ies not even the majority of scholars and university teachers in the US supported the specific view of science which Frank thought was so important to the advancement of democracy (for instance 59pp.). His rather critical comments on the teaching of science in the post war / cold war period show what he thought the really important political impact of science was. As far as I can see, these comments did not loose their significance

Ought Cats Be Tuesday? Reflections on the Neutrality of Philosophers

Should walls be brown. or white? The question is ridiculous because, as it stands, it is unanswerable. Why should walls be brown rather than white, or white rather than brown? On what basis can we decide that one color is more fitted than another for walls? In order for the question to become truly intelligible and answerable, its context needs to be specified. Tell me whether you are talking about the walls of a house or the walls of an industrial plant, whether the industry is a clean one or a dirty one, whether you have in mind the walls of an office or the walls of a shop. … Then we will be in business. Ought philosophers be neutral or committed? I am afraid that this question may sound to some ears as unanswerable and, therefore, as ridiculous as the question about walls. As I happen to be the one who proposed it as the subject for our colloquium, I feel that the least I owe you and myself is to place the question in a context in which it becomes answerable and to share with you for further discussion my answer to it

Is There an Ethics for Historians?

How should historians treat one another? More generally, what are the ethical obligations that go with belonging to the profession of history? And more generally still, in what ways and in what sense is history a profession and how are professional ethics manifested in the profession? These are the questions I will canvass in this essay. In his introduction to The Historian’s Conscience, Stuart Macintyre observes that in the recent ‘public dispute over Australian history … there is surprisingly little attention to the ethical dimensions of historical scholarship’. I will suggest that this lack of attention is a problem, and I will try to clarify the nature of the problem

Management Knowledge and Knowledge Management: Realism and Forms of Truth

This paper addresses the issue of truth and knowledge in management generally and knowledge management in particular. Based on ideas from critical realism and critical theory, it argues against the monovalent conceptualization of knowledge implicitly or explicitly held by many authors and aims instead to develop a characterization that recognises the rich and varied ways in which human beings may be said “to know”. It points out and conceptualises a fundamental dimension of knowledge that is generally ignored or cursorily treated within the literature, that is, “truth”. It identifies four forms of knowledge – propositional, experiential, performative and epistemological – and explores their characteristics, especially in terms of truth and validity. It points out some implications for knowledge management

ON THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE [abstract]

There is very little study of Latin American philosophy in the English-speaking philosophical world. This can sometimes lead to the impression that there is nothing of philosophical worth in Latin American philosophy or its history. The present article offers some reasons for thinking that this impression is mistaken, and indeed, that we ought to have more study of Latin American philosophy than currently exists in the English-speaking philosophical world. In particular, the article argues for three things: (1) an account of cultural resources that is useful for illuminating the fact of cultural differences and variations in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the conclusion that there is demonstrable value to Latin American philosophy and its study

Public Participation Organizations and Open Policy:A Constitutional Moment for British Democracy?

This article builds on work in Science and Technology Studies and cognate disciplines concerning the institutionalization of public engagement and participation practices. It describes and analyses ethnographic qualitative research into one “organization of participation,” the UK government–funded Sciencewise program. Sciencewise’s interactions with broader political developments are explored, including the emergence of “open policy” as a key policy object in the UK context. The article considers what the new imaginary of openness means for institutionalized forms of public participation in science policymaking, asking whether this is illustrative of a “constitutional moment” in relations between society and science policymaking

Theorising disability: a practical and representative ontology of learning disability

This article contributes to the ongoing development of the theorisation of learning disability, focusing on the value of the ontological turn. We argue that while social theory has influenced understandings of disability within academia, particularly within disability studies, it has had a limited impact on the discursive and practical use of the term ‘learning disability’. How ‘learning disability’ is constructed is of direct consequence to the lives of people with learning disabilities. Owing to this, we present a practical and representative ontology of learning disability in order to progress the ontological turn into everyday understandings of disability. To do this, disability theory is discussed, critically appraised and progressed. We then outline how this new theorisation could be re-contextualised within policy, with a view to further re-contextualisation into practice and the everyday. It is hoped that this article will spark discussion regarding how the ontological turn can be used for change

Multiculturalism: A Challenge to Two Myths of Liberalism

This paper sketches a brief account of multiculturalism in order to distinguish it from other positions that have been under attack recently. Following this, we address two prevalent and diametrically opposed criticisms of multiculturalism, namely, that multiculturalism is relativistic, on the one hand, and that it is absolutist, on the other. Both of these criticisms, we argue, simply mask liberal democratic theory's myth- begotten attempt to resolve the tension between the one and the many. Multiculturalism challenges the myths of meritocracy and abstract individualism which underlie liberalism; properly understood, it evades the criticisms often hurled at it