On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

First-order modal logic in the necessary framework of objects

I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamson’s argument

The decision problem of modal product logics with a diagonal, and faulty counter machines

In the propositional modal (and algebraic) treatment of two-variable first-order logic equality is modelled by a `diagonal' constant, interpreted in square products of universal frames as the identity (also known as the `diagonal') relation. Here we study the decision problem of products of two arbitrary modal logics equipped with such a diagonal. As the presence or absence of equality in two-variable first-order logic does not influence the complexity of its satisfiability problem, one might expect that adding a diagonal to product logics in general is similarly harmless. We show that this is far from being the case, and there can be quite a big jump in complexity, even from decidable to the highly undecidable. Our undecidable logics can also be viewed as new fragments of first- order logic where adding equality changes a decidable fragment to undecidable. We prove our results by a novel application of counter machine problems. While our formalism apparently cannot force reliable counter machine computations directly, the presence of a unique diagonal in the models makes it possible to encode both lossy and insertion-error computations, for the same sequence of instructions. We show that, given such a pair of faulty computations, it is then possible to reconstruct a reliable run from them

Modal Logics of Topological Relations

Logical formalisms for reasoning about relations between spatial regions play a fundamental role in geographical information systems, spatial and constraint databases, and spatial reasoning in AI. In analogy with Halpern and Shoham's modal logic of time intervals based on the Allen relations, we introduce a family of modal logics equipped with eight modal operators that are interpreted by the Egenhofer-Franzosa (or RCC8) relations between regions in topological spaces such as the real plane. We investigate the expressive power and computational complexity of logics obtained in this way. It turns out that our modal logics have the same expressive power as the two-variable fragment of first-order logic, but are exponentially less succinct. The complexity ranges from (undecidable and) recursively enumerable to highly undecidable, where the recursively enumerable logics are obtained by considering substructures of structures induced by topological spaces. As our undecidability results also capture logics based on the real line, they improve upon undecidability results for interval temporal logics by Halpern and Shoham. We also analyze modal logics based on the five RCC5 relations, with similar results regarding the expressive power, but weaker results regarding the complexity

Cut-elimination for the modal Grzegorczyk logic via non-well-founded proofs

We present a sequent calculus for the modal Grzegorczyk logic Grz allowing non-well-founded proofs and obtain the cut-elimination theorem for it by constructing a continuous cut-elimination mapping acting on these proofs.Comment: WOLLIC'17, 12 pages, 1 appendi

A new problem of descriptive power

No abstract available