340 research outputs found
216 Jewish Hospital of St. Louis
https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/bjc_216/1055/thumbnail.jp
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their
preferences. It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course
allocations and residency matches. In some cases, several `items' are given to
each participant. Without having any information on the underlying cardinal
utilities, arguing about fairness of allocation requires extending the ordinal
item ranking to ordinal bundle ranking. The most commonly used such extension
is stochastic dominance (SD), where a bundle X is preferred over a bundle Y if
its score is better according to all additive score functions. SD is a very
conservative extension, by which few allocations are necessarily fair while
many allocations are possibly fair. We propose to make a natural assumption on
the underlying cardinal utilities of the players, namely that the difference
between two items at the top is larger than the difference between two items at
the bottom. This assumption implies a preference extension which we call
diminishing differences (DD), where X is preferred over Y if its score is
better according to all additive score functions satisfying the DD assumption.
We give a full characterization of allocations that are
necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to this assumption.
Based on this characterization, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for
finding a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation if it exists. Using
simulations, we show that with high probability, a necessarily-proportional
allocation does not exist but a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation exists,
and moreover, that allocation is proportional according to the underlying
cardinal utilities. We also consider chore allocation under the analogous
condition --- increasing-differences.Comment: Revised version, based on very helpful suggestions of JAIR referees.
Gaps in some proofs were filled, more experiments were done, and mor
Washington University Record, November 16, 1995
https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/record/1706/thumbnail.jp
Something New in Medical Residency Matching Markets
Worldwide medical residency markets commonly employ variants of the two-sided central clearinghouse designed by Roth and Peranson in 1999. In the NSW physiotherapy residency matching market, a one-sided and computationally efficient matching mechanism is used – the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm. The mechanism is new for medical matching markets, with no publicly known application and no existing literature. A crucial contribution of the thesis is presenting the algorithm and starting a discussion around the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm in matching. The thesis models the iterative working of the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm. I show that the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm is rank-efficient, outcome unfair, procedurally fair and not strategy-proof. Comparing the Roth-Peranson and Kuhn-Munkres algorithms on efficiency, fairness and incentive properties, the thesis concludes that there is no settled winner
between the two algorithms. The competition eventually comes down to the trade-off between cost reductions and market complexities
The Communicator, October 21, 1971
The Communicator newspaper published on October 21, 1971
Lanthorn, vol. 48, no. 49, March 17, 2014
Lanthorn is Grand Valley State\u27s student newspaper, published from 1968 to the present
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