Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less isknown about the second-order case. The attainment of second-order false-belief mastery seems to mark a cognitively signifi-cant stage, but what is its status? Is it an example of complex-ity only development, or does it indicate that a more funda-mental conceptual change has taken place? In this paper weextend Bra ̈uner’s hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks (Bra ̈uner, 2014, 2015) to the second-order case,and argue that our analysis supports a version of the concep-tual change position

(Mind)-Reading Maps

In a two-system theory for mind-reading, a flexible system (FS) enables full-blown mind-reading, and an efficient system (ES) enables early mind-reading (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). Efficient processing differs from flexible processing in terms of restrictions on the kind of input it can take and the kinds of mental states it can ascribe (output). Thus, systems are not continuous, and each relies on different representations: the FS on beliefs and other propositional attitudes, and the ES on belief-like states or registrations. There is a conceptual problem in distinguishing the representations each system operates with. They contend that they can solve this problem by appealing to a characterization of registrations based on signature limits, but this does not work. I suggest a solution to this problem. The difference between registration and belief becomes clearer if each vehicle turns out to be different. I offer some reasons in support of this proposal related to the performance of spontaneous-response false belief tasks.Fil: Velazquez Coccia, Fernanda Maria Soledad. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht

Theory of mind development and executive functioning in elementary school children

The following study explored the role of verbal ability and executive functioning in theory of mind understanding in elementary school children. Scores on measures of language comprehension, verbal ability (sentence memory, and forward digit span), matrix completion, executive functioning (backward digit span), and second-order theory of mind tasks were obtained. Partial correlations of the measures controlling for age revealed verbal ability to be significantly correlated with theory of mind comprehension. A regression analysis demonstrated that auditory language comprehension was the only variable, in addition to age, that explained unique variance in performance on a recursive thinking task. Possible explanations are explored and future directions are recommended

Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in an Ultimatum Game: Judgments, Offers, and Decisions in School-Aged Children

The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8-10 years, the present study shows that children's beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal no influence of theory of mind on children's decision-making behavior