From decay of correlations to recurrence times in systems with contracting directions

Classic results by L.-S. Young show that the decay of correlations for systems that admit inducing schemes can be obtained through the recurrence rates of the inducing scheme. Reciprocal results were obtained for non-invertible systems (without contracting directions). Here, we obtain reciprocal results also for invertible systems (with contracting directions).Comment: Title correctio

Social Preferences and Relational Contracting Performance: An Experimental Investigation

We examine how social preferences affect behavior and surplus in relational contracts. Experimental subjects participate in a contracting environment similar to Brown, Falk, and Fehr [Brown, M., Falk, A. & Fehr, E., “Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions, Econometrica, 72 (2004):747-780] and in social preference experiments adapted from Charness and Rabin [Charness, G. & Rabin, M. “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(2002): 817-869]. Subjects’ behavior during the Charness and Rabin experiment is a significant predictor of behavior and outcomes observed during the subsequent multi-period, finite-horizon, relational- contracting environment, which features market power, unenforceable performance, reputation formation and endogenous matching of trading partners. Compared to subjects who respond to the Charness-Rabin games in a fashion consistent with purely self-interested, competitive or reciprocal social preferences, buyers and sellers with alternative social preference structures engage in contracts with substantially higher quality and price, which leads to greater surplus for both parties. A key difference is that self-interested, competitive and reciprocal buyers respond to early-period shirking by extending subsequent offers that are less generous to the seller, while buyers with other social preferences extend subsequent offers that are more generous. Reciprocal and competitive sellers and, to a lesser extent, self-interested sellers, deliver sub-contractual levels of quality more often, which substantially lowers buyer and total welfare. We conclude that intentional or ‘cold’ measures of social preferences have considerable predictive power in dynamic, interactive (or ‘hot’) economic settings.Contracts; relational contracts; implicit contracts; market interaction; experimental economics; repeated transaction; social preferences.

Adjustment to Hardship Caused by Imports: The New Decisions of the Tariff Commission and the Need for Legislative Clarification

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as GATT, embodies the commitments of its contracting parties, now numbering eighty countries, to enter into reciprocal and mutual advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce

Countertrade and the choice of strategic trading form

Reciprocal trade agreements, usually known under the generic name of countertrade (CT) have been traditionally seen as a form of bilateralism, and thus as an inefficient form of international exchange. Although contemporary trade theories do not fully explain the increasing prevalence of CT transactions, we will argue that it is possible to construct and use a third (hybrid) institutional form, which is congruent with the transaction-cost theories, and we will show how — under market imperfections — countertrade can reduce transaction costs while conserving the efficiency gains generated by these specific arrangements.Publicad

On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games

This paper provides a set of mechanisms that we refer to as emph{reciprocal mechanisms. }These mechanisms have the property that every outcome that can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in a competing mechanism game can be supported as an equilibrium in reciprocal mechanisms. In this sense, reciprocal mechanisms play the same role as direct mechanisms do in single principal problems. The advantage of these mechanisms over alternatives like the universal set of mechanisms is that they are conceptually straightforward and no more difficult to deal with than the simple direct mechanisms used in single principal mechanism design.competing mechanisms, revelation principle

The European Common Market and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Study in Compatability

Gotland is famous around the world for its unique nature. The agriculture here has always been an important source of income and part of the identity of the island. But today the profession has low status and hard to survive. How can the interest for farming be increased? Gotlandsgården is an investigation about how the agriculture could develop. It strives to re-establish the status of the farmer profession and to become the node for the Gotland's farmers, inhabitants and the tourists.  an investigation about how the agriculture could develop. It strives to re-establish the status of the farmer profession and to become the node for the Gotland's farmers, inhabitants and the tourists.Gotland är känt för sin fantastiska natur. Lantbruket här har alltid varit en viktig inkomskälla och har alltid varit en viktig del i Gotlands identitet. Idag har inte bondeyrket samma rykte som förr och det är svårt att få tillräckligt med elever till lantbruksskolan i Roma. Hur kan man öka intresset för yrket och Gotlands landsbygd. Det här projektet är en undersökning i hur man genom arkitektoniska tillägg kan skapa en grön nod för Gotlands gröna näringar och lantbruksskola och på det sättet blåsa nytt liv i landsbygden på Gotland