Personal and sub-personal: a defence of Dennett's early distinction

Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub‐personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used ‘sub‐personal’ very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit‐’ ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti‐physicalistic, anti‐dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub‐personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level. People lose sight of Dennett’s personal/sub-personal distinction because they free it from its philosophical moorings. A distinction that serves a philosophical purpose is typically rooted in doctrine; it cannot be lifted out of context and continue to do its work. So I shall start from Dennett’s distinction as I read it in its original context. And when I speak of ‘the distinction’, I mean to point not only towards the terms that Dennett first used to define it but also towards the philosophical setting within which its work was cut out

Crossing the symbolic threshold: a critical review of Terrence Deacon's The Symbolic Species

Terrence Deacon's views about the origin of language are based on a particular notion of a symbol. While the notion is derived from Peirce's semiotics, it diverges from that source and needs to be investigated on its own terms in order to evaluate the idea that the human species has crossed the symbolic threshold. Deacon's view is defended from the view that symbols in the animal world are widespread and from the extreme connectionist view that they are not even to be found in humans. Deacon's treatment of symbols involves a form of holism, as a symbol needs to be part of a system of symbols. He also appears to take a realist view of symbols. That combination of holism and realism makes the threshold a sharp threshold, which makes it hard to explain how the threshold was crossed. This difficulty is overcome if we take a mild realist position towards symbols, in the style of Dennett. Mild realism allows intermediate stages in the crossing but does not undermine Deacon's claim that the threshold is difficult to cross or the claim that it needs to be crossed quickly

Why the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate about Rational Choice Rests on a Mistake

Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim

Sellars, Scientific Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind

My thesis is an analysis and application of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy of science. Twenty years after his death, his philosophical significance remains only partly understood. This is acutely true in the philosophy of mind, where Sellars’ proposals have directly shaped the contemporary problem space. I will show how the competing views of Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Jerry Fodor all find their conceptual and historical roots in Sellars’ work. Sellars is the source and watershed for their various conceptions of mind in the world. First, they all share a commitment to scientific realism (SR). The ways that the doctrine of SR impacts the philosophy of mind were first explored by Sellars in his famous Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956). In chapter one, I give a detailed account of SR and examine some empiricist alternatives to that view. I argue that Sellars’ view of science and theoretical explanation provides a comprehensive defense of SR’s central commitments. In chapter two, I highlight two important methodological claims inherited from Sellars. The first is that that the mind-body problem is “the problem of formulating a philosophically adequate account of the various mental phenomena within the context of the ontology provided by theoretical science.” (Loux, 1977) The second claim is that our knowledge of mind is theoretical knowledge. This groundbreaking claim stands in stark contrast to the Cartesian legacy which takes our knowledge of mind as immediate and incorrigible. In chapter three, I employ Sellars’ framework to analyze contemporary philosophy of mind. The methodological commitments of Sellars’ SR provide a rich philosophical model for evaluating various theories of mind. This conceptual apparatus casts into sharp relief the extent to which Churchland’s eliminative materialism, Dennett’s inter- pretivism, and Fodor’s intentional realism each betray and embody Sellars’ fundamental proposals

The relevance of ontological commitments

In this introductory note, I describe my particular view of the notion of ontological commitments as honest and pragmatic working hypotheses that assume the existence (out there) of certain entities represented by the symbols in our theory. I argue that this is not naive, in the sense that it does not entail the belief that the hypotheses could ever be proved to be true (or false), but it is nevertheless justified by the success and predictive power of the theory that contains the concepts assumed to exist. I also claim that the ontological commitments one holds (even if tacitly so) have a great influence on what kind of science is produced, how it is used, and how it is understood. Not only I justify this claim, but I also propose a sketch of a possible falsification of it. As a natural conclusion, I defend the importance of identifying, clarifying and making explicit one's ontological commitments if fruitful scientific discussions are to be had. Finally, I compare my point of view with that of some philosophers and scientists who have put forward similar notions.Comment: Submitted for peer-revie

Adaptationism, Deflationism, and Anti-Individualism

An examination of the externalist theories of Tyler Burge, Daniel Dennett and Ruth Millikan

Mind Re-ascribed

This paper is a reply to commentaries on Mind Ascribed. My response is organised into three parts. In the first part I describe the relationship between folk psychology and the scientific study of the mind. The second part replies to objections to the central tenets and presuppositions of the ascription theory. I clarify the distinction between the nature and the possession of mental states and the notion of a pleonastic entity. I explain why the ascription theory is a version of interpretivism, and not a species of instrumentalism or fictionalism. I also argue that canonical ascription should not be spelled out in terms of the ideal interpreter. The third part deals with comments on miscellaneous topics such as normativity, self-knowledge, the necessity of the brain and the proper understanding of intentional patterns

Mind Re-ascribed

This paper is a reply to commentaries on Mind Ascribed. My response is organised into three parts. In the first part I describe the relationship between folk psychology and the scientific study of the mind. The second part replies to objections to the central tenets and presuppositions of the ascription theory. I clarify the distinction between the nature and the possession of mental states and the notion of a pleonastic entity. I explain why the ascription theory is a version of interpretivism, and not a species of instrumentalism or fictionalism. I also argue that canonical ascription should not be spelled out in terms of the ideal interpreter. The third part deals with comments on miscellaneous topics such as normativity, self-knowledge, the necessity of the brain and the proper understanding of intentional patterns

As If: Idealization and Ideals, by Kwame Anthony Appiah

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from OUP via the DOI in this recordBook review of As If: Idealization and Ideals by Kwame Anthony Appiah. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.Kwame Anthony Appiah’s engaging and insightful new book focuses on idealisation. Based on three Carus Lectures delivered at the 2013 Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, the book takes its inspiration from the German philosopher Hans Vaihinger and his The Philosophy of ‘As If’ (1911). Long neglected, Vaihinger’s work has recently been revisited by philosophers of science interested in scientific modelling, most notably Arthur Fine. Vaihinger’s own interests were much broader, however, taking in metaphysics, mathematics, ethics, law, theology and economics. Appiah’s range is equally impressive and his discussion applies Vaihinger’s ideas across a wide range of areas, including philosophy of mind, economics, moral and political philosophy. In doing so, it offers a striking and extremely valuable insight into the pervasive role of idealisation in human thought. [...

Extended Modal Realism — A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-existence

This thesis argues that we should consider extended modal realism as a new player in the debate about non-existence. The primary aim is to show that extended modal realism is a viable theory when it comes to solving problems of non-existence. At times I will argue that extended modal realism has advantages over Lewisian modal realism when it comes to examining the problems of non-existence, not only in the case of problems relating to thought but also problems concerning truth as well. However, I do not intend for the proposed advantages of extended modal realism to be presented as knockdown arguments against other strategies. Not only do I argue that extended modal realism is viable when it comes to solving these problems, but I also make adjustments and additions to the theory that supports the conclusion of this thesis, and I argue that these are improvements to the modal realist theory. I include arguments for a new theory of existence that removes the need for the extended modal realist to rely on set-theoretic notations to understand existence, which I consider problematic. I argue for the revival of the Lewis-Rosen proposal for truth-making and a semantic instrumentalist theory of thought, both of which naturally accompany extended modal realism. Throughout this thesis, I will comment on the proposals and strategies of other authors, and some of these comments will be critical. At this very early stage, I want to clarify that this thesis's success does not rest on showing that all other competitor theories fail. I only include critical comments to situate extended modal realism within the landscape of viable positions that are available for one to occupy