Lawyers Not in Love, The Defenders and Sixties TV

This essay offers a social history and examination of The Defenders as a popular, criti- cally acclaimed television text that negotiated anxieties regarding crime, law, justice, lib- eralism, and masculinity in the 1960s and 1990s. Both The Defenders television series (1961–1965) and the Showtime motion picture series (1997–1998) by the same name rearticulated enduring tensions between law’s formalism and just desires for compassion and mercy, depicting defense attorneys as men who work both inside and outside of “law” to ensure justice and confront the lack of humanism in “the rule of law.” Such discourses are understood and appreciated in different ways in different times, particularly as the cultural politics of nostalgia are engaged. The Defenders offers clear illustrations of the ways in which popular narratives not only depict juridical roles but also perform them, specifying when and where “law” begins and ends

The Role of Anti-Money Laundering Law in Mobile Money Systems in Developing Countries

This Article explains that the application of anti-money laundering (AML) regulation, supervision, and enforcement is relevant to financial inclusion, but is not, in itself, necessarily determinative of the success or failure of financial inclusion initiatives or their impact on economic growth. Successful payments system innovation, particularly payment tools targeting underserved markets, requires effective entrepreneurship operating in an environment of good governance and rational economic policies. AML safeguards help to deter corruption and other forms of financial crime, which helps to establish and maintain economic stability and preserve the rule of law, creating a supportive environment for innovation and financial inclusion. This Article explains that the revised Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, the international standard for AML practices, promote a risk-based approach to implementation, allowing countries flexibility in order to encourage the widest possible participation in the regulated and supervised financial system

Coprivacy : an introduction to the theory and applications of co-operative privacy

We introduce the novel concept of coprivacy or co-operative privacy to make privacy preservation attractive. A protocol is coprivate if the best option for a player to preserve her privacy is to help another player in preserving his privacy. Coprivacy makes an individual's privacy preservation a goal that rationally interests other individuals: it is a matter of helping oneself by helping someone else. We formally define coprivacy in terms of Nash equilibria. We then extend the concept to: i) general coprivacy, where a helping player's utility (i.e. interest) may include earning functionality and security in addition to privacy; ii) mixed coprivacy, where mixed strategies and mixed Nash equilibria are allowed with some restrictions; iii) correlated coprivacy, in which Nash equilibria are replaced by correlated equilibria. Coprivacy can be applied to any peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol. We illustrate coprivacy in P2P anonymous keyword search, in content privacy in social networks, in vehicular network communications and in controlled content distribution and digital oblivion enforcement

With special reference to GDPR

학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 법과대학 법학과(지식재산전공), 2021. 2. 정상조.The prolonged exposure and retention of a massive amount of personal information on the Internet, as well as the frantic pursuit of data by companies and individuals in the age of big data, have created a new privacy crisis. As a legal response to the eternal memory of the Internet, the European Union has proposed The Right to Be Forgotten to tackle the privacy crisis by empowering individuals to take down ones information from the Internet in certain circumstances. Regarding such a right, what kind of attitude should the Chinese legal system adopt? Should it follow the European footsteps or maintain a more cautious stance on this right? As an emerging right originated from Europe, the study of the EUs attempts to construct and implement the right to be forgotten could provide a clear lens of the new right. Thus, the article will carefully study the EUs legislation in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the implementation of the right to be forgotten. It attempts to analyze the connotation, the value conflict, and enforcement dilemmas of the new right. And on this basis, the article will explore whether there is room for localization of the right to be forgotten in China based on chinas national conditions. The paper consists of seven chapters: Chapter 1 examines the rationale of the right to be forgotten, revealing the foundation for the generation and growth of the right in Europe. Chapter 2 tracks back the legislative history of the right to be forgotten in the EU. It reveals how the right has been conceptualized over time and attempts to clarify the underlying values in the right to be forgotten. Chapter 3 attempts to delineate the scope of the right to be forgotten and explore what kinds of data are worth forgetting. Chapter 4 discusses the enforcement dilemma of the right to be forgotten, especially the role of search engines in the context of the right to be forgotten, and its ensuing obligations as a data controller. Chapter 5 turns the focus back to China. By sketching the framework of privacy and data protection law in china with a comparison to the right to be forgotten in the EU, it attempts to assess whether such legislative actions imply the right to be forgotten. Chapter 6 introduces the judicial practice of the right to be forgotten in China: Renjiayu v Baidu, which is called the First case of the right to be Forgotten in china. Through the interpretation of the judgments of the two trials, it can clarify the path of protecting the right to be forgotten under the existing Chinese law and the reject reasons, as well as the judges attitude to the right. The last Chapter 7 analyzes the possibility of Chinas introduction of the right to be forgotten from the perspective of necessity and the obstacles based on chinas national status.인터넷상에서의 수많은 개인정보의 장기간 노출과 보유, 또 빅데이터 시대에 회사와 개인들이 데이터에 열광하면서 새로운 프라이버시 위기가 찾아오고 있다. 유럽 연합은 인터넷의 영원한 기억에 대한 법적 대응으로 '잊혀질 권리'를 내세웠고, 개인에게 특정 상황에서 자신의 정보를 인터넷에서 삭제하도록 권한을 부여함으로써 이번 프라이버시 위기를 해결할 수 있도록 했다. 이러한 권리에 대해 중국의 법 제도는 어떤 태도를 취해야 하는가? 유럽을 따라야 하는가, 아니면 이 문제에 대해 좀 더 신중한 입장을 유지해야 하는가? 잊혀질 권리는 유럽에서 새롭게 생겨난 권리이다. 잊혀질 권리를 구축하고 정착 시키려는 EU의 시도를 연구함으로써 이 새로운 권리에 대해 명확한 시각에서 이해해 볼 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 EU의 개인정보보호규정(GDPR)의 입법 및 잊혀질 권리 실행에 대해 면밀하게 탐구함으로써 잊혀질 권리의 함의를 정의하고, 법의 가치 충돌 및 현실적 집행 딜레마에 대한 분석을 시도하였다. 또한 이를 바탕으로 본 논문은 중국의 실정에 맞추어 잊혀질 권리의 중국에서의 도입 가능 여부를 검토하였다. 본 논문은 총 7장으로 이루어져 있다. 제1장에서는 잊혀질 권리의 원리에 대해 탐구하고, 유럽에서의 잊혀질 권리의 탄생과 발전 기반에 대해 살펴보았다. 제2장에서는 역사 분석을 통해 EU의 잊혀질 권리 관련 입법 과정을 살펴보고, 잊혀질 권리의 기본 가치를 규명하였다. 제3장에서는 잊혀질 권리의 가치의 갈등에 대해 다루고, 어떠한 데이터가 잊혀질 만 한지에 대해 탐구하였다. 제4장에서는 잊혀질 권리의 실행 딜레마, 특히 검색엔진의 역할과 데이터 통제자로서의 의무에 대해 논하였다. 제5장에서는 중국에 주안점을 두어, 중국의 프라이버시와 데이터 보호법의 틀을 개략적으로 서술하였다. 또한 EU의 잊혀질 권리와의 비교를 통해 입법 동향에 잊혀질 권리가 내재되어 있는지 평가하였다. 제6장에서는 중국의 '잊혀질 권리 제1 사건'으로 불리는 '런지아위 바이두 고소 사건'에 대해 분석하였다. 판결문 해석을 통해 중국 현행법의 잊혀질 권리 보호 경로와 거부 사유, 그리고 판결 배후의 법관 고려 사항과 태도 등을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 마지막으로 제7장에서는 중국의 잊혀질 권리 도입의 필요성과 현실적인 장벽 등의 관점에서 중국의 잊혀질 권리 도입의 실행 가능성을 분석하였다.Introduction 1 1. Background: Perfect Memory of the Internet 1 2. Purpose and Research Question 1 3. Review of the Scholars' Opinions on the Localization of RTBF 3 3.1. Positive Attitude 3 3.2. Negative Attitude 5 3.3. Analysis of Above Opinions 7 4. Outline 8 5. Methodology 9 Chapter 1 The Rationale of the Right to Be Forgotten 11 1. The Right to Be Forgotten in Dignity: Forgetting and Forgive 11 1.1. The Right to Oblivion 12 1.2. Privacy Protection in Europe 13 2. The Right to Be Forgotten in Data Protection 15 2.1. Informational Self-determination: Control 15 2.2. The Fundamental Right to Protect Personal Information 16 3. Summary 18 Chapter 2 The Right to Be Forgotten in GDPR 19 1. Lack of uniformity in the conception of the right to be forgotten 19 1.1. Unique Meaning 20 1.2. Binary Meanings 20 1.3. Multiple Meanings 20 2. The Evolution of the Right to Be Forgotten in GDPR 22 2.1. Proposal of the Right to Be Forgotten: Withdraw Information Published by the Data Subject 22 2.2. Google Spain Case 25 2.2.1. Search Engines as a Data Controller 27 2.2.2. Expand to Information Legally Published by Third Parties 29 2.2.3. Delisting and Contextual Integrity 32 2.3. Integration in the GDPR: Article 17 33 3. Summary: Value of the Right to Be Forgotten 35 Chapter 3 Value Conflict: What is worth forgetting 39 1. Digital footprint and digital shadow 39 2. Conflicting interests and rights 41 2.1. Freedom of Expression 41 2.2. Public interest 43 3. Balancing mechanism 44 3.1. Principle of Proportionality in data protection 44 3.2. Specific criteria 45 3.2.1. Data Subject's role in public life 47 3.2.2. Nature of information 47 3.2.3. Source 49 3.2.4. Time 50 3.2.4.1. Time and Data Quality 51 3.2.4.2. Information value and the information lifecycle 52 3.2.5. Harm: A Level of Severity and Pervasiveness 53 4. Balancing scenario 54 4.1. Against Search engines: NT1 & NT2 54 4.2. Against Original Website: ML and WW v Germany 57 5. Summary 59 Chapter 4 Effectiveness: Enforcement Dilemma 61 1. Search Engines and ensuing obligations as data controller 61 1.1. Assess the validity of the request 61 1.2. Notification 62 1.2.1. To the Other Controllers 63 1.2.2. To the Original Website 63 1.2.3. To the Public 64 2. Issues: 65 2.1. Role of Google: A Data Controller or Neutral Intermediary 65 2.1.1. Passive role or Active role 66 2.1.2. Algorithm as Speech 68 2.2. Fair Balancing: An Illusion 68 2.2.1. Difficulty in Striking A Balancing 68 2.2.2. Over-Compliance: Uncertainty and Stick 69 2.2.3. Heavy Burden 69 2.2.4. Due Process 70 2.3. Limited Effect 70 3. Summary 72 Chapter 5 China's Privacy and Data Protection Framework 73 1. Online privacy protection 73 1.1. Cultural backdrop 73 1.2. Legislation on the right to privacy 75 1.2.1. Concept of the right to privacy 78 1.2.2. Comparison with the right to be forgotten 80 1.3. ISP Responsibility 83 2. Personal data protection in the PRC 85 2.1. Recent initiatives 86 2.2. Protection Approach: Growing Independent from Privacy 89 2.3. Principles and conditions for lawful processing 92 2.4. Public disclosure of personal information 98 2.5. Right to Erasure 104 3. Summary 109 Chapter 6 Judicial practice of The Right to Be Forgotten in China: Renjiayu vs Baidu 111 1. Fact 111 1.1. Claim of Mr. Ren: Substantial Damage 111 1.2. Defense of Baidu: No knowledge, No intent, No human intervene 113 2. Judgement 113 2.1. Trial at first instance 114 2.2. Trial at second instance 117 3. Comment 117 3.1. The legal basis of the "Right to Be Forgotten" in china: Comment on the general personality right approach 117 3.1.1. The approach is reasonable 118 3.1.2. Limitation of the approach 121 3.2. Worthy of Forgetting 124 3.2.1. Data quality and the effect of time 124 3.2.2. Ren Jiayu's role in society and the right to know 125 3.3. Baidu's liability: Safe card of "Technology Neutrality" 125 3.4. Judicial attitude to the right to be forgotten 128 Chapter 7 Reflection on the localization of the right to be forgotten in china 130 1. Basic attitude 130 1.1. Necessity: Fulfill the contemporary needs 130 1.1.1. The need to maintain digital personality 130 1.1.2. The need for the free development of personality 131 1.1.3. The need to manage online content 132 1.1.4. Public interest in published information does not always outweigh an individual's privacy interest 133 1.2. Obstacles of the localization of the right to be forgotten in china 133 1.2.1. The inherent Obstacle: impact on openness of public opinion 134 1.2.2. The external obstacle: challenges in implementation 135 1.2.2.1. Contradiction with the development of information industry 135 1.2.2.2. Potential litigation will occupy judicial resources 137 1.3. Summary 138 2. Insights from the European's right to be forgotten 140 2.1. Reflection of the informational self-determination: control 140 2.2. Reflection to the protection of published information: flexible balancing mechanism 143 2.3. Reflection of Obligations of search engines 144 2.4. Specific implementation method 147 2.4.1. Principle of proportionality 147 2.4.2. Differentiation should be made on the data subjects 147 2.4.2.1. Natural person and legal entities 148 2.4.2.2. Public figures and ordinary citizens 148 2.4.2.3. Special treatment of minors and victims 149 2.4.3. Coordinate Alternative manners other than erasure 150 3. Restore the virtue of forgetting beyond the law 150 3.1. Market 150 3.2. Technology 151 3.3. Culture 151 Conclusion 153 References 156 Korean Abstract (요약문) 167Maste

Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right To Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere

The 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in Google Spain controversially held that the fair information practices set forth in European Union (EU) Directive 95/46/EC (Directive) require that Google remove from search results links to websites that contain true information. Google Spain held that the Directive gives persons a “right to be forgotten.” At stake in Google Spain are values that involve both privacy and freedom of expression. Google Spain badly analyzes both. With regard to the latter, Google Spain fails to recognize that the circulation of texts of common interest among strangers makes possible the emergence of a “public” capable of forming the “public opinion” that is essential for democratic self-governance. As the rise of American newspapers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrates, the press underwrites the public sphere by creating a structure of communication both responsive to public curiosity and independent of the content of any particular news story. Google, even though it is not itself an author, sustains the contemporary virtual public sphere by creating an analogous structure of communication. With regard to privacy values, EU law, like the laws of many nations, recognizes two distinct forms of privacy. The first is data privacy, which is protected by the fair information practices contained in the Directive. These practices regulate the processing of personal information to ensure (among other things) that such information is used only for the specified purposes for which it has been legally gathered. Data privacy operates according to an instrumental logic, and it seeks to endow persons with “control” over their personal data. Data subjects need not demonstrate harm in order to establish violations of data privacy. The second form of privacy recognized by EU law is dignitary privacy. Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects the dignity of persons by regulating inappropriate communications that threaten to degrade, humiliate, or mortify them. Dignitary privacy follows a normative logic designed to prevent harm to personality caused by the violation of civility rules. There are the same privacy values as those safeguarded by the American tort of public disclosure of private facts. Throughout the world, courts protect dignitary privacy by balancing the harm that a communication may cause to personality against legitimate public interests in the communication. The instrumental logic of data privacy is inapplicable to public discourse, which is why the Directive contains derogations for journalistic activities. The communicative action characteristic of the public sphere is made up of intersubjective dialogue, which is antithetical both to the instrumental rationality of data privacy and to its aspiration to ensure individual control of personal information. Because the Google search engine underwrites the public sphere in which public discourse takes place, Google Spain should not have applied fair information practices to Google searches. But the Google Spain opinion also invokes Article 7, and in the end the decision creates doctrinal rules that are roughly approximate to those used to protect dignitary privacy. The Google Spain opinion is thus deeply confused about the kind of privacy it wishes to protect. It is impossible to ascertain whether the decision seeks to protect data privacy or dignitary privacy. Google Spain is ultimately pushed in the direction of dignitary privacy because data privacy is incompatible with public discourse, whereas dignitary privacy may be reconciled with the requirements of public discourse. Insofar as freedom of expression is valued because it fosters democratic self-government, public discourse cannot serve as an effective instrument of self-determination without a modicum of civility. Yet the Google Spain decision recognizes dignitary privacy only in a rudimentary and unsatisfactory way. If it had more clearly focused on the requirements of dignitary privacy, Google Spain would not so sharply have distinguished Google links from the underlying websites to which they refer. Google Spain would not have blithely outsourced the enforcement of the right to be forgotten to a private corporation like Google

Reflexive transnational law : the privatisation of civil law and the civilisation of private law

The author examines the emergence of a transnational private law in alternative dispute resolution bodies and private norm formulating agencies from a reflexive law perspective. After introducing the concept of reflexive law he applies the idea of law as a communicative system to the ongoing debate on the existence of a New Law Merchant or lex mercatoria. He then discusses some features of international commercial arbitration (e.g. the lack of transparency) which hinder self-reference (autopoiesis) and thus the production of legal certainty in lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal system. He then contrasts these findings with the Domain Name Dispute Resolution System, which as opposed to Lex Mercatoria was rationally planned and highly formally organised by WIPO and ICANN, and which is allowing for self-reference and thus is designed as an autopoietic legal system, albeit with a very limited scope, i.e. the interference of abusive domain name registrations with trademarks (cybersquatting). From the comparison of both examples the author derives some preliminary ideas regarding a theory of reflexive transnational law, suggesting that the established general trend of privatisation of civil law need to be accompanied by a civilisation of private law, i.e. the constitutionalization of transnational private regimes by embedding them into a procedural constitution of freedom

Notes on the salient features of tax liens under Ethiopian law

MIZAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 7 No.1, September 201