Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly:Part 1

We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would quote without knowing the transmission qualities of its competitors' channels. Each secondary buys a channel depending on the price and the transmission quality a channel offers. We formulate the price selection problem as a non co-operative game with primaries as players. In the one-shot game, we show that there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium(NE) strategy profile and explicitly compute it. Our analysis reveals that under the NE strategy profile a primary prices its channel to render high quality channel more preferable to the secondary; this negates the popular belief that prices ought to be selected to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their qualities. We show the loss of revenue in the asymptotic limit due to the non co-operation of primaries. In the repeated version of the game, we characterize a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a payoff arbitrarily close to the payoff it would obtain when primaries co-operate.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 41 pages single column format.Conference version is available at arXiv:1305.335

Spectrum sharing models in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum scarcity demands thinking new ways to manage the distribution of radio frequency bands so that its use is more effective. The emerging technology that can enable this paradigm shift is the cognitive radio. Different models for organizing and managing cognitive radios have emerged, all with specific strategic purposes. In this article we review the allocation spectrum patterns of cognitive radio networks and analyse which are the common basis of each model.We expose the vulnerabilities and open challenges that still threaten the adoption and exploitation of cognitive radios for open civil networks.L'escassetat de demandes d'espectre fan pensar en noves formes de gestionar la distribució de les bandes de freqüència de ràdio perquè el seu ús sigui més efectiu. La tecnologia emergent que pot permetre aquest canvi de paradigma és la ràdio cognitiva. Han sorgit diferents models d'organització i gestió de les ràdios cognitives, tots amb determinats fins estratègics. En aquest article es revisen els patrons d'assignació de l'espectre de les xarxes de ràdio cognitiva i s'analitzen quals són la base comuna de cada model. S'exposen les vulnerabilitats i els desafiaments oberts que segueixen amenaçant l'adopció i l'explotació de les ràdios cognitives per obrir les xarxes civils.La escasez de demandas de espectro hacen pensar en nuevas formas de gestionar la distribución de las bandas de frecuencia de radio para que su uso sea más efectivo. La tecnología emergente que puede permitir este cambio de paradigma es la radio cognitiva. Han surgido diferentes modelos de organización y gestión de las radios cognitivas, todos con determinados fines estratégicos. En este artículo se revisan los patrones de asignación del espectro de las redes de radio cognitiva y se analizan cuales son la base común de cada modelo. Se exponen las vulnerabilidades y los desafíos abiertos que siguen amenazando la adopción y la explotación de las radios cognitivas para abrir las redes civiles

Uncertain Price Competition in a Duopoly with Heterogeneous Availability

We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers. Sellers seek to select a price that will be attractive to the buyers and also fetch adequate profits. The selection will in general depend on the number of units available with the seller and also that of its competitor - the seller may only know the statistics of the latter. The setting captures a secondary spectrum access network, a non-neutral Internet, or a microgrid network in which unused spectrum bands, resources of ISPs, and excess power units constitute the respective commodities of sale. We analyze this price competition as a game, and identify a set of necessary and sufficient properties for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The properties reveal that sellers randomize their price using probability distributions whose support sets are mutually disjoint and in decreasing order of the number of availability. We prove the uniqueness of a symmetric NE in a symmetric market, and explicitly compute the price distribution in the symmetric NE.Comment: 45 pages, Accepted for publication in IEEE Transaction on Automatic Contro

Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Antitrust

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of current economic knowledge and use that knowledge to critically assess central features of antitrust policy. Our objective is to foster the improvement of legal regimes and also to identify topics where further analytical and empirical exploration would be useful.

Secondary user pricing strategies in a cognitive radio environment

There has been a growing demand for spectrum availability due to inefficient management of the radio frequency spectrum and underutilization of all spectrum bands. Spectrum has been managed with the same approach for over the last decade and only recently due to the phenomenal growth in mobile and broadband communications has attention been given to it. Intelligent communication systems such as cognitive radio have been identified in assisting the need for the limited resource, wireless spectrum. If spectrum trading becomes commercially successful, it can provide great economic and social benefits for the service provider, primary and secondary users. In order to maintain viability of spectrum trading, a pricing strategy is necessary for secondary users, it is also imperative to find a game theory model that minimally impacts the primary users in terms of their service, however it should aid in decreasing the cost to the primary users. Game theory along with economic theory is used to analyse the relationships/cooperation between the users and service provider. This work contributes to the field of dynamic spectrum access and aims to compare pricing strategies of secondary users in terms of the revenue earned by the primary service providers as well as investigate the impact of regulations on said pricing strategies. The pricing strategies modelled and simulated in MATLAB include the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing strategy. These two strategies are chosen as they are the most relevant in South Africa. The two pricing strategies are compared in terms of advantages and disadvantages as well the revenue earned by each of the primary services. The framework for testing is provided along with the test cases. The influence of telecommunication regulations and policy on the frameworks and results are discussed in detail as well as the impact of the telecommunication regulation and policy in South Africa

Evolution of the Secondary Spectrum Market

The secondary spectrum market where primaries (license holders) lease the secondaries (unlicensed users) in lieu of the financial remuneration can eliminate the inefficiencies of the static spectrum allocation policy. We redress some of the challenges that have inhibited the wide scale deployment of the secondary spectrum market. We first consider a secondary spectrum market where the primaries quote their prices for their available channels at a single location. The transmission rates offered by the channels of primaries evolve randomly because of the fading and noise. The secondaries decide to buy among the channels based on the transmission rate and the prices. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with the primaries as players. Each primary selects a price based on its own channel state only, as it is unaware of the channel states of the other primaries. We show that under the unique NE strategy profile a primary prices its channel to render the channel which provides high transmission rate more preferable; this negates the perception that prices ought to be selected to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their transmission rates. Next, we consider the setting where the secondary spectrum market operates over multiple locations. Each primary needs to select an independent set in a conflict graph and the price at each location. We consider two scenarios--i) the number of locations is small, and ii) the number of locations is large. We show that when the number of locations is small, in a symmetric NE strategy, each primary sells its channel to an independent set whose cardinality exceeds a certain threshold. The threshold also decreases as the transmission rate offered by the channel decreases. The symmetric NE is unique in a widely seen conflict graph-the linear conflict graph. In contrast, when the number of locations is large, a primary only sells its channel in the maximum independent set and the symmetric NE in not unique in the linear conflict graph. Subsequently, we consider the setting where a primary owns a channel at a single location and can acquire the competitor\u27s channel state information (C-CSI) by incurring a cost. Each primary now needs to decide whether to acquire the C-CSI or not and a price based on the information it has. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative game with two primaries as players and characterize the NE strategies. We first characterize the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game for a symmetric model where the C-CSI is perfect. We show that the payoff of a primary is independent of the C-CSI acquisition cost. We then generalize our analysis to allow for imperfect estimation and cases where the two primaries have different C-CSI costs or different channel availabilities. Our results show interestingly that the payoff of a primary increases when there is estimation error. We also show that surprisingly, the expected payoff of a primary may decrease when the C-CSI acquisition cost decreases when primaries have different availabilities. Finally, we consider the setting where a primary allows multiple secondaries use the channel of a primary at a location. The interference must be limited at each primary-user terminal (primary-UT) in order to maintain a quality of service for each primary-UT. The secondary-base stations (secondary-BSs) are self-interested entities and only maximize their own utilities which makes it difficult to obtain a simple interference mitigation policy. We formulate the problem as a non cooperative coupled constrained concave game. We use the concept of the normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) since it caters to the distributed setting. We develop a distributed algorithm which converges to the unique NNE for a large class of utility functions. In the distributed algorithm, the secondary-BSs do not need to exchange information among themselves, and the minimal cooperation from the primary-UTs. When the NNE is not unique or difficult to compute, we introduce the concept of WNNE which retains most of the properties of the NNE, but it can be computed easily compared to the NNE

Economics Of Non-Neutrality In The Internet

Net-neutrality on the Internet is the set of policies that prevents a paid or unpaid discrimination by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) among different types of transmitted data. The recent moves to change the net neutrality rules and the growing demand for data have driven the ISPs to provide differential treatment of traffic to generate additional revenue streams from Content Providers (CPs). In this thesis, we consider economic frameworks to investigate different questions about the departure toward a non-neutral regime and its possible consequences. In particular, we i) assess whether different entities of the market have the incentive to adopt a non-neutral pricing scheme; and if yes ii) what are the pricing strategies they choose; and iii) how these changes affect the Internet market. First, we investigate the incentives of different entities of the Internet market for migrating to a non-neutral regime. Thus, we consider early stages of a non-neutral Internet. We consider a diverse set of parameters for the market, e.g. market powers of ISPs, sensitivity of EUs and CPs to the quality of the content. The goal is to obtain founded insights on whether there exists a market equilibrium, the structure of the equilibria, and how they depend on different parameters of the market when the current equilibrium (neutral regime) is disrupted and some ISPs have switched to a non-neutral regime. Then, we seek to investigate frameworks using which ISPs and CPs select appropriate incentives for each other, and investigate the implications of these new schemes on the entities of the Internet market. We analyze two non-neutral frameworks. In the first framework, we focus on the price competition between ISPs in the presence of uncertainty in competition and demand when CPs, i.e. demand, is merely price taker, i.e. passive in equilibrium selection. Then, in the second framework, we consider the case in which CPs have an active role in the market, and decide on the number of resources they want to reserve/buy from ISPs based on the price ISPs quote. In this case, we also consider the coupling between limited resources and the quality of the content delivered to end-users and subsequently the strategies of the decision makers. We obtain strategies for ISPs and CPs under a variety of market dynamics

5G network slicing for rural connectivity: multi-tenancy in wireless networks

As the need for wireless broadband continues to grow around the world, there is an increasing focus to minimise the existing digital divide and ensuring that everyone receives high-quality internet services, especially the inhabitants of rural areas. As a result, different technological solutions are being studied and trialled for improving rural connectivity, such as 5G with dynamic spectrum access. One of the architectures of 5G is network slicing, which supports network virtualisation and consists of independent logical networks, called slices, on the 5G network. Network slicing supports the multi-tenancy of different operators on the same physical network, and this feature is known as neutral host networks (NHN). It allows multiple operators to co-exist on the same physical network but on different virtual networks to serve end users. Generally, the 5G NHN deployment is handled by an infrastructure provider (InP), who could be a mobile network operator (MNO), an Internet service provider, a third-party operator, etc. At the same time, potential tenants would lease slices from the InP. The NHN strategy would help reduce resource duplication and increase the utilisation of existing resources. The existing research into NHN for small cells, in-building connectivity solutions, and other deployment scenarios help to understand the technological and business requirements. End-to-end sharing across operators to provide services to their end users is another innovative application of 5G NHN that has been tested for dense areas. Meanwhile, the feasibility and policy impact of NHN is not studied extensively for the rural scenario. The research in this thesis examines the use of NHN in macro- and small-cell networks for 5G communication systems to minimise the digital divide, with a special focus on rural areas. The study also presents and analyses the 5G multi-tenancy system design for the rural wireless scenario, focusing mainly on exploring suitable business cases through network economics, techno-economic study, and game theory analysis. The results obtained from the study, such as cost analysis, business models, sensitivity analysis, and pricing strategies, help in formulating the policy on infrastructure sharing to improve rural connectivity. The contributions of the thesis are useful for stakeholders and policymakers to assess the suitability of the rural 5G NHN by exploring state-of-the-art technologies, techno-economic analysis, sensitivity analysis, newer business models, investment assessment, cost allocation, and risk sharing. Initially, the research gap is highlighted through the extensive literature review and stakeholders’ views on rural connectivity collected from discussions with them. First, the in-depth discussion on the network economics of the rural 5G NHN includes the study of potential future scenarios, value network configurations, spectrum access strategy models, and business models. Secondly, the techno-economic analysis studies the key performance indicators (KPI), cost analysis, return on investment, net present value, and sensitivity analysis, with the application for the rural parts of the UK and India. Finally, the game theory framework includes the study of strategic interaction among the two key stakeholders, InP and the MNO, using models such as investment games and pricing strategies during multi-tenancy. The research concludes by presenting the contribution towards the knowledge and future work.As the need for wireless broadband continues to grow around the world, there is an increasing focus to minimise the existing digital divide and ensuring that everyone receives high-quality internet services, especially the inhabitants of rural areas. As a result, different technological solutions are being studied and trialled for improving rural connectivity, such as 5G with dynamic spectrum access. One of the architectures of 5G is network slicing, which supports network virtualisation and consists of independent logical networks, called slices, on the 5G network. Network slicing supports the multi-tenancy of different operators on the same physical network, and this feature is known as neutral host networks (NHN). It allows multiple operators to co-exist on the same physical network but on different virtual networks to serve end users. Generally, the 5G NHN deployment is handled by an infrastructure provider (InP), who could be a mobile network operator (MNO), an Internet service provider, a third-party operator, etc. At the same time, potential tenants would lease slices from the InP. The NHN strategy would help reduce resource duplication and increase the utilisation of existing resources. The existing research into NHN for small cells, in-building connectivity solutions, and other deployment scenarios help to understand the technological and business requirements. End-to-end sharing across operators to provide services to their end users is another innovative application of 5G NHN that has been tested for dense areas. Meanwhile, the feasibility and policy impact of NHN is not studied extensively for the rural scenario. The research in this thesis examines the use of NHN in macro- and small-cell networks for 5G communication systems to minimise the digital divide, with a special focus on rural areas. The study also presents and analyses the 5G multi-tenancy system design for the rural wireless scenario, focusing mainly on exploring suitable business cases through network economics, techno-economic study, and game theory analysis. The results obtained from the study, such as cost analysis, business models, sensitivity analysis, and pricing strategies, help in formulating the policy on infrastructure sharing to improve rural connectivity. The contributions of the thesis are useful for stakeholders and policymakers to assess the suitability of the rural 5G NHN by exploring state-of-the-art technologies, techno-economic analysis, sensitivity analysis, newer business models, investment assessment, cost allocation, and risk sharing. Initially, the research gap is highlighted through the extensive literature review and stakeholders’ views on rural connectivity collected from discussions with them. First, the in-depth discussion on the network economics of the rural 5G NHN includes the study of potential future scenarios, value network configurations, spectrum access strategy models, and business models. Secondly, the techno-economic analysis studies the key performance indicators (KPI), cost analysis, return on investment, net present value, and sensitivity analysis, with the application for the rural parts of the UK and India. Finally, the game theory framework includes the study of strategic interaction among the two key stakeholders, InP and the MNO, using models such as investment games and pricing strategies during multi-tenancy. The research concludes by presenting the contribution towards the knowledge and future work