Improving the Scalability of a Prosumer Cooperative Game with K-Means Clustering

Among the various market structures under peer-to-peer energy sharing, one model based on cooperative game theory provides clear incentives for prosumers to collaboratively schedule their energy resources. The computational complexity of this model, however, increases exponentially with the number of participants. To address this issue, this paper proposes the application of K-means clustering to the energy profiles following the grand coalition optimization. The cooperative model is run with the "clustered players" to compute their payoff allocations, which are then further distributed among the prosumers within each cluster. Case studies show that the proposed method can significantly improve the scalability of the cooperative scheme while maintaining a high level of financial incentives for the prosumers.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables. Accepted to the 13th IEEE PES PowerTech Conference, 23-27 June 2019, Milano, Ital

The perks and downsides of being a digital prosumer: optimistic and pessimistic approaches to digital prosumption

The recent evolution of users’ position and agency in digital environments absorbs the attention of several scholars in different fields of study. Users’ new ontological status as prosumers, simultaneously producers and consumers, and their role regarding productive paradigms has raised a lot of contrasting opinions. Different discursive techniques are employed to investigate production practices in digital worlds and are often crafted with the conventions of utopian and anti-utopian approaches. Nevertheless, the adoption of optimistic or pessimistic analytical and rhetorical strategies appears to be prejudiced towards the study of emerging online practices. In reality, the analysis of positive and negative approaches to productive paradigms in digital environments results in the detection of their limitations in reaching a comprehensive understanding of the investigated phenomena. Therefore, the adoption of a more neutral perspective is suggested, one that could potentially foster a holistic approach and therefore a broader and deeper comprehension of the analyzed phenomena

Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading: A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach

In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game between the power company and multiple prosumers. In this game, the power company acts as a leader who determines the pricing strategy that maximizes its profits, while the prosumers act as followers who react by choosing the amount of energy to buy or sell so as to optimize their current and future profits. The proposed game accounts for each prosumer's subjective decision when faced with the uncertainty of profits, induced by the random future price. In particular, the framing effect, from the framework of prospect theory (PT), is used to account for each prosumer's valuation of its gains and losses with respect to an individual utility reference point. The reference point changes between prosumers and stems from their past experience and future aspirations of profits. The followers' noncooperative game is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under classical game theory (CGT) which is obtained using a fully distributed algorithm. The results are extended to account for the case of PT using algorithmic solutions that can achieve an NE under certain conditions. Simulation results show that the total grid load varies significantly with the prosumers' reference point and their loss-aversion level. In addition, it is shown that the power company's profits considerably decrease when it fails to account for the prosumers' subjective perceptions under PT

An Energy Sharing Game with Generalized Demand Bidding: Model and Properties

This paper proposes a novel energy sharing mechanism for prosumers who can produce and consume. Different from most existing works, the role of individual prosumer as a seller or buyer in our model is endogenously determined. Several desirable properties of the proposed mechanism are proved based on a generalized game-theoretic model. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists and is the unique solution of an equivalent convex optimization problem. The sharing price at the Nash equilibrium equals to the average marginal disutility of all prosumers. We also prove that every prosumer has the incentive to participate in the sharing market, and prosumers' total cost decreases with increasing absolute value of price sensitivity. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium approaches the social optimal as the number of prosumers grows, and competition can improve social welfare.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figure

Local flexibility market design for aggregators providing multiple flexibility services at distribution network level

This paper presents a general description of local flexibility markets as a market-based management mechanism for aggregators. The high penetration of distributed energy resources introduces new flexibility services like prosumer or community self-balancing, congestion management and time-of-use optimization. This work is focused on the flexibility framework to enable multiple participants to compete for selling or buying flexibility. In this framework, the aggregator acts as a local market operator and supervises flexibility transactions of the local energy community. Local market participation is voluntary. Potential flexibility stakeholders are the distribution system operator, the balance responsible party and end-users themselves. Flexibility is sold by means of loads, generators, storage units and electric vehicles. Finally, this paper presents needed interactions between all local market stakeholders, the corresponding inputs and outputs of local market operation algorithms from participants and a case study to highlight the application of the local flexibility market in three scenarios. The local market framework could postpone grid upgrades, reduce energy costs and increase distribution grids’ hosting capacity.Postprint (published version