11,747 research outputs found
Equality of Voice: Towards Fair Representation in Crowdsourced Top-K Recommendations
To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major
websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K
recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most
Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select
the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different
preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express
their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or
people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely
do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by
small but hyper-active user groups.
To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K
items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and
identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having
many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We
develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority
which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our
approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through
extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we
show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts
down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few
users.Comment: In the proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency (FAT* '19). Please cite the conference versio
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The Logic of Ministerial Selection: Electoral System and Cabinet Appointments in Japan
Economic Crisis and Fiscal Reforms in Latin America
The recent financial crisis has initiated pressures for not only policy reform but also fundamental institutional fiscal reforms. This paper explores the connection between economic crises and fiscal institutional reforms in a region that has experienced plenty of both in recent years, namely Latin America. For that purpose it reviews the literature and provides five hypotheses about why, and under what circumstances, crises would promote reforms. The empirical evidence shows that debt crises make reforms more likely but banking crises on their own, if anything, reduce the pressure for fiscal institutional reforms. Political institutions are also important. If the electoral system encourages the personal vote, the country is more likely to reform. This evidence may become useful for predicting the likelihood of reforms in the developed world.Information and communications technology, Education, Experimental design, Ecuador
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where `citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be `disconnected'. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.Proportional representation, Party formation, Coalitions
Full Transparency of Politicians' Actions Does Not Increase the Quality of Political Representation
We identify the impact of transparency in political decision-making on the quality of political representation with a difference-in-difference strategy. The quality of political representation is measured by the observed divergence of parliamentary decisions from revealed voter preferences on identical issues. We show that full transparency of votes of individual politicians does not decrease divergence from voter preference
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