6,724 research outputs found
Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion
We consider a multi-receivers Bayesian persuasion model where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to take a certain action. The state of nature is known to the sender, but it is unknown to the receivers. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver. This work studies the computation aspects of finding a signaling policy that maximizes the sender\u27s revenue.
We show that if the sender\u27s utility is a submodular function of the set of receivers that take the desired action, then we can efficiently find a signaling policy whose revenue is at least (1-1/e) times the optimal. We also prove that approximating the sender\u27s optimal revenue by a factor better than (1-1/e) is NP-hard and, hence, the developed approximation guarantee is essentially tight. When the sender\u27s utility is a function of the number of receivers that take the desired action (i.e., the utility function is anonymous), we show that an optimal signaling policy can be computed in polynomial time. Our results are based on an interesting connection between the Bayesian persuasion problem and the evaluation of the concave closure of a set function
Persuading communicating voters
This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strategy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages to the receivers, who are in an exogenous and commonly known network. Receivers can observe their neighbors’ private messages and after updating their beliefs, vote sincerely on the proposal. We examine how networks of shared information affect the sender’s gain from persuasion and find that in many cases it is not restricted by the additional information provided by the receivers’ neighborhoods. Perhaps surprisingly, the sender’s gainfrom persuasion is not monotonically decreasing with the density of the network
Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver
by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where
the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation
history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the
set of equilibria that are not Pareto dominated. In each of these equilibria under private
experimentation the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher
quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the
senderĂs stakes
Essays in information economics and communication
Communication and Public Goods,
Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation,
Crisis and Credit Rating Agencie
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication
between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the
receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy:
either the sender is powerful enough to communicate separately with each
receiver (a.k.a. private persuasion), or she cannot communicate separately at
all (a.k.a. public persuasion). We study a model that smoothly interpolates
between the two, by considering a natural multi-channel communication structure
in which each receiver observes a subset of the sender's communication
channels. This captures, e.g., receivers on a network, where information
spillover is almost inevitable.
We completely characterize when one communication structure is better for the
sender than another, in the sense of yielding higher optimal expected utility
universally over all prior distributions and utility functions. The
characterization is based on a simple pairwise relation among receivers - one
receiver information-dominates another if he observes at least the same
channels. We prove that a communication structure is (weakly) better than
if and only if every information-dominating pair of receivers in is
also such in . We also provide an additive FPTAS for the optimal sender's
signaling scheme when the number of states is constant and the graph of
information-dominating pairs is a directed forest. Finally, we prove that
finding an optimal signaling scheme under multi-channel persuasion is,
generally, computationally harder than under both public and private
persuasion
Bayesian Persuasion
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K40, M31)
Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model
strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these
theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they
provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand,
people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these
strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and
psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether
strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated
agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated
agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation
settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory
based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based
argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games
and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
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