14 research outputs found
Playing Stackelberg Opinion Optimization with Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in
social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been
studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define
a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by
letting the player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed
opinions by doing so-called "internal opinion design", knowing that the other
adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also
conducting her own internal opinion design.
We propose for the min player to play the "follow-the-perturbed-leader"
algorithm in such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other
adversarial player's play. Since our strategy of subset selection is
combinatorial in nature, the probabilities in a distribution over all the
strategies would be too many to be enumerated one by one. Thus, we design a
randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized) pure strategy. We show that the
strategy output by the randomized algorithm for the min player is essentially
an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other adversarial player
Competitive Influence in Social Networks: Convergence, Submodularity, and Competition Effects
In the last 10 years, a vast amount of scientific literature has studied the problem of influence maximization. Yet, only very recently have scientists started considering the more realistic case in which competing entities try to expand their market and maximize their share via viral marketing. Goyal and Kearns [STOC 2012] present a model for the diffusion of two competing alternatives in a social network, which consists of two phases: one for the activation, in which nodes choose whether to adopt any of the two alternatives or none of them, and one for the selection, which is for choosing which of the two alternatives to adopt.
In this work we consider this two-phase model, by composing some of the most known dynamics (threshold, voter, and logit models), and we ask the following questions: (1) How is the stationary distribution of the composition of these dynamics related to those of the single composing dynamics? (2) Does the number of adopters of one of the alternatives increase in a monotone and submodular way with respect to the set of initial adopters of that alternative? (3) To what extent does the competition among alternatives affect the total number of agents adopting one of the alternatives
Welfare maximization with friends-of-friends network externalities
Online social networks allow the collection of large amounts of data about the influence between users connected by a friendship-like relationship. When distributing items among agents forming a social network, this information allows us to exploit network externalities that each agent receives from his neighbors that get the same item. In this paper we consider Friends-of-Friends (2-hop) network externalities, i.e., externalities that not only depend on the neighbors that get the same item but also on neighbors of neighbors. For these externalities we study a setting where multiple different items are assigned to unit-demand agents. Specifically, we study the problem of welfare maximization under different types of externality functions. Let n be the number of agents and m be the number of items. Our contributions are the following: (1) We show that welfare maximization is APX-hard; we show that even for step functions with 2-hop (and also with 1-hop) externalities it is NP-hard to approximate social welfare better than (1-1/e). (2) On the positive side we present (i) an O(sqrt n)-approximation algorithm for general concave externality functions, (ii) an O(\log m)-approximation algorithm for linear externality functions, and (iii) an (1-1/e)\frac{1}{6}-approximation algorithm for 2-hop step function externalities. We also improve the result from [6] for 1-hop step function externalities by giving a (1-1/e)/2-approximation algorithm
Computational Analysis of Intelligent Agents: Social and Strategic Settings
The central motif of this work is prediction and optimization in presence of multiple interacting intelligent agents. We use the phrase `intelligent agents' to imply in some sense, a `bounded rationality', the exact meaning of which varies depending on the setting. Our agents may not be `rational' in the classical game theoretic sense, in that they don't always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is natural for human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. Within this broad framework we study the problem of influence maximization in social networks where behavior of agents is myopic, but complication stems from the structure of interaction networks. In this setting, we generalize two well-known models and give new algorithms and hardness results for our models. Then we move on to models where the agents reason strategically but are faced with considerable uncertainty. For such games, we give a new solution concept and analyze a real-world game using out techniques. Finally, the richest model we consider is that of Network Cournot Competition which deals with strategic resource allocation in hypergraphs, where agents reason strategically and their interaction is specified indirectly via player's utility functions. For this model, we give the first equilibrium computability results. In all of the above problems, we assume that payoffs for the agents are known. However, for real-world games, getting the payoffs can be quite challenging. To this end, we also study the inverse problem of inferring payoffs, given game history. We propose and evaluate a data analytic framework and we show that it is fast and performant
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Characterizing and Leveraging Social Phenomena in Online Networks
Social phenomena have been studied extensively in small scales by social scientists. With the increasing popularity of Web 2.0 and online social networks/media, a large amount of data on social phenomena have become available. In this dissertation we study online social phenomena such as social influence in social networks in various contexts.
This dissertation has two major components: 1. Identifying and characterizing online social phenomena 2. Leveraging online social phenomena for economic and commercial purposes.
We begin the dissertation by developing multi-level revenue sharing schemes for viral marketing on social networks. Viral marketing leverages social influence among users of the social network. For our proposed models, we develop results on the computational complexity, individual rationality, and potential reach of employing the Shapley value as a revenue sharing scheme. Our results indicate that under the multi-level tree-based propagation model, the Shapley value is a promising scheme for revenue sharing, whereas under other models there are computational or incentive compatibility issues that remain open.
We continue with another application of social influence: social advertising. Social advertising is a new paradigm that is utilized by online social networks. Social advertising is based in the premise that social influence can be leveraged to place ads more efficiently. The goal of our work is to understand how social ads can affect click-through rates in social networks. We propose a formal model for social ads in the context of display advertising. In our model, ads are shown to users one after the other. The probability of a user clicking an ad depends on the users who have clicked this ad so far. This information is presented to users as a social cue, thus the click probability is a function of this cue. We introduce the social display optimization problem: suppose an advertiser has a contract with a publisher for showing some number (say B) impressions of an ad. What strategy should the publisher use to show these ads so as to maximize the expected number of clicks? We show hardness results for this problem and in light of the general hardness results, we develop heuristic algorithms and compare them to natural baseline ones.
We then study distributed content curation on the Web. In recent years readers have turned to the social web to consume content. In other words, they rely on their social network to curate content for them as opposed to the more traditional way of relying on news editors for this purpose -- this is an implicit consequence of social influence as well. We study how efficient this is for users with limited budgets of attention. We model distributed content curation as a reader-publisher game and show various results. Our results imply that in the complete information setting, when publishers maximize their utility selfishly, distributed content curation reaches an equilibrium which is efficient, that is, the social welfare is a constant factor of that under an optimal centralized curation.
Next, we initiate the study of an exchange market problem without money that is a natural generalization of the well-studied kidney exchange problem. From the practical point of view, the problem is motivated by barter websites on the Internet, e.g., swap.com, and u-exchange.com. In this problem, the users of the social network wish to exchange items with each other. A mechanism specifies for each user a set of items that she gives away, and a set of items that she receives. Consider a set of agents where each agent has some items to offer, and wishes to receive some items from other agents. Each agent would like to receive as many items as possible from the items that she wishes, that is, her utility is equal to the number of items that she receives and wishes. However, she will have a large dis-utility if she gives away more items than what she receives, because she considers such a trade to be unfair. To ensure voluntary participation (also known as individual rationality), we require the mechanism to avoid this. We consider different variants of this problem: with and without a constraint on the length of the exchange cycles and show different results including their truthfulness and individual rationality.
In the other main component of this thesis, we study and characterize two other social phenomena: 1. friends vs. the crowd and 2. altruism vs. reciprocity in social networks. More specifically, we study how a social network user's actions are influenced by her friends vs. the crowd's opinion. For example, in social rating websites where both ratings from friends and average ratings from everyone is available, we study how similar one's ratings are to each other. In the next part, we aim to analyze the motivations behind users' actions on online social media over an extended period of time. We look specifically at users' likes, comments and favorite markings on their friends' posts and photos. Most theories of why people exhibit prosocial behavior isolate two distinct motivations: Altruism and reciprocity. In our work, we focus on identifying the underlying motivations behind users' prosocial giving on social media. In particular, our goal is to identify if the motivation is altruism or reciprocity. For that purpose, we study two datasets of sequence of users' actions on social media: a dataset of wall posts by users of Facebook.com, and another dataset of favorite markings by users of Flickr.com. We study the sequence of users' actions in these datasets and provide several observations on patterns related to their prosocial giving behavior
Influence Analysis towards Big Social Data
Large scale social data from online social networks, instant messaging applications, and wearable devices have seen an exponential growth in a number of users and activities recently. The rapid proliferation of social data provides rich information and infinite possibilities for us to understand and analyze the complex inherent mechanism which governs the evolution of the new technology age. Influence, as a natural product of information diffusion (or propagation), which represents the change in an individual’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors resulting from interaction with others, is one of the fundamental processes in social worlds. Therefore, influence analysis occupies a very prominent place in social related data analysis, theory, model, and algorithms. In this dissertation, we study the influence analysis under the scenario of big social data. Firstly, we investigate the uncertainty of influence relationship among the social network. A novel sampling scheme is proposed which enables the development of an efficient algorithm to measure uncertainty. Considering the practicality of neighborhood relationship in real social data, a framework is introduced to transform the uncertain networks into deterministic weight networks where the weight on edges can be measured as Jaccard-like index. Secondly, focusing on the dynamic of social data, a practical framework is proposed by only probing partial communities to explore the real changes of a social network data. Our probing framework minimizes the possible difference between the observed topology and the actual network through several representative communities. We also propose an algorithm that takes full advantage of our divide-and-conquer strategy which reduces the computational overhead. Thirdly, if let the number of users who are influenced be the depth of propagation and the area covered by influenced users be the breadth, most of the research results are only focused on the influence depth instead of the influence breadth. Timeliness, acceptance ratio, and breadth are three important factors that significantly affect the result of influence maximization in reality, but they are neglected by researchers in most of time. To fill the gap, a novel algorithm that incorporates time delay for timeliness, opportunistic selection for acceptance ratio, and broad diffusion for influence breadth has been investigated. In our model, the breadth of influence is measured by the number of covered communities, and the tradeoff between depth and breadth of influence could be balanced by a specific parameter. Furthermore, the problem of privacy preserved influence maximization in both physical location network and online social network was addressed. We merge both the sensed location information collected from cyber-physical world and relationship information gathered from online social network into a unified framework with a comprehensive model. Then we propose the resolution for influence maximization problem with an efficient algorithm. At the same time, a privacy-preserving mechanism are proposed to protect the cyber physical location and link information from the application aspect. Last but not least, to address the challenge of large-scale data, we take the lead in designing an efficient influence maximization framework based on two new models which incorporate the dynamism of networks with consideration of time constraint during the influence spreading process in practice. All proposed problems and models of influence analysis have been empirically studied and verified by different, large-scale, real-world social data in this dissertation