Social Data Offloading in D2D-Enhanced Cellular Networks by Network Formation Games

Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content updates all the time. Offloading such traffic through complementary networks, such as a delay tolerant network formed by device-to-device (D2D) communications between mobile subscribers, is a promising solution to reduce the cellular burdens. In the existing solutions, mobile users are assumed to be volunteers who selfishlessly deliver the content to every other user in proximity while moving. However, practical users are selfish and they will evaluate their individual payoffs in the D2D sharing process, which may highly influence the network performance compared to the case of selfishless users. In this paper, we take user selfishness into consideration and propose a network formation game to capture the dynamic characteristics of selfish behaviors. In the proposed game, we provide the utility function of each user and specify the conditions under which the subscribers are guaranteed to converge to a stable network. Then, we propose a practical network formation algorithm in which the users can decide their D2D sharing strategies based on their historical records. Simulation results show that user selfishness can highly degrade the efficiency of data offloading, compared with ideal volunteer users. Also, the decrease caused by user selfishness can be highly affected by the cost ratio between the cellular transmission and D2D transmission, the access delays, and mobility patterns

The path player game: A network game from the point of view of the network providers

We introduce the path player game, a noncooperative network game with a continuum of mutually dependent set of strategies. This game models network flows from the point of view of competing network operators. The players are represented by paths in the network. They have to decide how much flow shall be routed along their paths. The competitive nature of the game is due to the following two aspects: First, a capacity bound on the overall network flow links the decisions of the players. Second, edges may be shared by several players which might have conflicting goals. In this paper, we prove the existence of feasible and pure-strategy equilibria in path player games, which is a non-trivial task due to non-continuity of payoff functions and the infinite, mutually dependent strategy sets. We analyze different instances of path player games in more detail and present characterizations of equilibria for these cases

Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Mathematics, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 157-165).Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for various combinatorial optimization problems in such systems. First, we investigate the distributed caching and a general set of assignment problems. We develop an almost tight LP-based ... approximation algorithm and a local search ... approximation algorithm for these problems. We also design efficient decentralized mechanisms for these problems and study the convergence of the corresponding games. In the following chapters, we study the speed of convergence to high quality solutions on (random) best-response paths of players. First, we study the average social value on best response paths in basic-utility, market sharing, and cut games. Then, we introduce the sink equilibrium as a new equilibrium concept. We argue that, unlike Nash equilibria, the selfish behavior of players converges to sink equilibria and all strategic games have a sink equilibrium. To illustrate the use of this new concept, we study the social value of sink equilibria in weighted selfish routing (or weighted congestion) games and valid-utility (or submodular-utility) games. In these games, we bound the average social value on random best-response paths for sink equilibria.. Finally, we study cross-monotonic cost sharings and group-strategyproof mechanisms.(cont.) We study the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including set cover and metric facility location. We develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight bounds for these games. At the end, we extend some of these results to group-strategyproof mechanisms.by Vahab S. Mirrokni.Ph.D

Mobility and Accessibility in Urban Areas : An Assessment of Urban Transport and Social Exclusion among Low-Income Groups in Harare

This study sought to unravel and explain the transport related challenges faced by low-income residents of Southlea Park in Harare, Zimbabwe, and the resultant social exclusion that these residents were facing. The study was therefore inspired by the common struggles, hurdles and challenges faced by the Southlea Park residents in their commuting life. A single case study research design focusing on the residents of Southlea Park was adopted for the research. The study was, therefore, qualitative. Key informants from the relevant line ministries and transport parastatals, including the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company, the National Railways of Zimbabwe, the Vehicle Inspection Department, and the City of Harare (CoH) were taken as the research participants. From the private sector, key informants from commuter omnibus (kombis) operators, private bus operators and the unregistered taxicab (Mushikashika) were also taken as study participants as these were key players in the provision of transport to residents of Southlea Park. Semi-structured interviews and non-participant observation were the main data collection techniques. This study revealed that the residents of Southlea Park in Harare were being socially excluded and marginalized from economic and social participation due to the numerous transport related challenges they were facing. These challenges emanated from the misuse of land and corruption in the suburb that led to the spaces meant for business activities, schools and hospitals being taken up by houses hence forcing the residents to look for these services elsewhere. The players in the provision of public transport in the city were also significantly contributing to the transport related challenges faced by residents as they themselves were failing to cope with the levels of congestion, transport shortages, lawlessness on the part of the transport providers and the commuters themselves, and the heightened transport related corruption bedeviling the city. This study had a lot of policy implications for the players in the provision of transport to this suburb, including the need for a transport strategy and an overall integrated policy and master plan for further development of Southlea Park and other residential areas in the city’s fringesDissertation (MSocSci (Development Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2020.Anthropology and ArchaeologyMSocSci (Development Studies)Unrestricte

Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud

Cloud computing has reached significant maturity from a systems perspective, but currently deployed solutions rely on rather basic economics mechanisms that yield suboptimal allocation of the costly hardware resources. In this paper we present Economic Resource Allocation (ERA), a complete framework for scheduling and pricing cloud resources, aimed at increasing the efficiency of cloud resources usage by allocating resources according to economic principles. The ERA architecture carefully abstracts the underlying cloud infrastructure, enabling the development of scheduling and pricing algorithms independently of the concrete lower-level cloud infrastructure and independently of its concerns. Specifically, ERA is designed as a flexible layer that can sit on top of any cloud system and interfaces with both the cloud resource manager and with the users who reserve resources to run their jobs. The jobs are scheduled based on prices that are dynamically calculated according to the predicted demand. Additionally, ERA provides a key internal API to pluggable algorithmic modules that include scheduling, pricing and demand prediction. We provide a proof-of-concept software and demonstrate the effectiveness of the architecture by testing ERA over both public and private cloud systems -- Azure Batch of Microsoft and Hadoop/YARN. A broader intent of our work is to foster collaborations between economics and system communities. To that end, we have developed a simulation platform via which economics and system experts can test their algorithmic implementations

Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

Content Sharing in Mobile Networks with Infrastructure: Planning and Management

This thesis focuses on mobile ad-hoc networks (with pedestrian or vehicular mobility) having infrastructure support. We deal with the problems of design, deployment and management of such networks. A first issue to address concerns infrastructure itself: how pervasive should it be in order for the network to operate at the same time efficiently and in a cost-effective manner? How should the units composing it (e.g., access points) be placed? There are several approaches to such questions in literature, and this thesis studies and compares them. Furthermore, in order to effectively design the infrastructure, we need to understand how and how much it will be used. As an example, what is the relationship between infrastructure-to-node and node-to-node communication? How far away, in time and space, do data travel before its destination is reached? A common assumption made when dealing with such problems is that perfect knowledge about the current and future node mobility is available. In this thesis, we also deal with the problem of assessing the impact that an imperfect, limited knowledge has on network performance. As far as the management of the network is concerned, this thesis presents a variant of the paradigm known as publish-and-subscribe. With respect to the original paradigm, our goal was to ensure a high probability of finding the requested content, even in presence of selfish, uncooperative nodes, or even nodes whose precise goal is harming the system. Each node is allowed to get from the network an amount of content which corresponds to the amount of content provided to other nodes. Nodes with caching capabilities are assisted in using their cache in order to improve the amount of offered conten

Service-Driven Networking

This thesis presents our research on service-driven networking, which is a general design framework for service quality assurance and integrated network and service management in large scale multi-domain networks. The philosophy is to facilitate bi-party open participation among the users and the providers of network services in order to bring about better service customization and quality assurance, without sacrificing the autonomy and objectives of the individual entities. Three primary research topics are documented: service composition and adaptation, self-stabilization in uncoordinated environment, and service quality modeling. The work involves theoretical analysis, algorithm design, and simulations as evaluation methodology