Predicting Financial Crisis in Developing Economies: Astronomy or Astrology?

In the aftermath of the European currency crisis of 1992-3, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-5 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, neoclassical economists in the academy and policy community have been engaged in a project to develop predictors or indicators of currency, banking and generalized financial crises in developing economies. This paper critically examines the efforts of the economics profession in this regard on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The paper argues that these predictors perform poorly on empirical grounds--indeed, the predictors developed after each of these crises failed to predict the next major crisis. These predictors are also rejected on theoretical grounds. From a post-Keynesian perspective, there is no reason to expect that the mere provision of information will prevent crises by changing agents' behaviors. The paper will also propose several indicators that are consonant with post-Keynesian economic theory, although it will be argued that these indicators do not represent a sufficient means to prevent financial crisis. Ironically, as agents develop confidence in the predictive capacity of crisis indicators, they may engage in actions that increase the economy's vulnerability to crisis. Far more important to the project of preventing financial crisis in developing economies is the implementation of constraints on those investor behaviors that render liberalized, internationally integrated financial systems inherently prone to instability and crisis. Hence, intellectual capital would be more productively expended on devising appropriate changes in the overall regime in which investors operate (such as measures that compel changes in financing strategies) rather than in searching for new predictors of crisis.Financial Crisis

Anticipating economic market crises using measures of collective panic

Sem informaçãoPredicting panic is of critical importance in many areas of human and animal behavior, notably in the context of economics. The recent financial crisis is a case in point. Panic may be due to a specific external threat or self-generated nervousness. Here we show that the recent economic crisis and earlier large single-day panics were preceded by extended periods of high levels of market mimicry-direct evidence of uncertainty and nervousness, and of the comparatively weak influence of external news. High levels of mimicry can be a quite general indicator of the potential for self-organized crises.Predicting panic is of critical importance in many areas of human and animal behavior, notably in the context of economics. The recent financial crisis is a case in point. Panic may be due to a specific external threat or self-generated nervousness. Here we show that the recent economic crisis and earlier large single-day panics were preceded by extended periods of high levels of market mimicry-direct evidence of uncertainty and nervousness, and of the comparatively weak influence of external news. High levels of mimicry can be a quite general indicator of the potential for self-organized crises.107127Sem informaçãoSem informaçãoSem informaçã

Identifying financial crises in real time

Following the thermodynamic formulation of multifractal measure that was shown to be capable of detecting large fluctuations at an early stage, here we propose a new index which permits us to distinguish events like financial crisis in real time . We calculate the partition function from where we obtain thermodynamic quantities analogous to free energy and specific heat. The index is defined as the normalized energy variation and it can be used to study the behavior of stochastic time series, such as financial market daily data. Famous financial market crashes - Black Thursday (1929), Black Monday (1987) and Subprime crisis (2008) - are identified with clear and robust results. The method is also applied to the market fluctuations of 2011. From these results it appears as if the apparent crisis of 2011 is of a different nature from the other three. We also show that the analysis has forecasting capabilities.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure

TRIP WIRES AND SPEED BUMPS: MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS AND REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR FINANCIAL CRISES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

This paper investigates the shortcomings of the “early warning systems” (EWS) that are currently being promoted with such vigour in the multilateral and academic community. It then advocates an integrated “trip wire-speed bump” regime to reduce financial risk and, as a consequence, to reduce the frequency and depth of financial crises in developing countries. Specifically, this paper achieves four objectives. First, it demonstrates that efforts to develop EWS for banking, currency and generalized financial crises in developing countries have largely failed. It argues that EWS have failed because they are based on faulty theoretical assumptions, not least that the mere provision of information can reduce financial turbulence in developing countries. Second, the paper advances an approach to managing financial risks through trip wires and speed bumps. Trip wires are indicators of vulnerability that can illuminate the specific risks to which developing economies are exposed. Among the most significant of these vulnerabilities are the risk of large-scale currency depreciations, the risk that domestic and foreign investors and lenders may suddenly withdraw capital, the risk that locational and/or maturity mismatches will induce debt distress, the risk that non-transparent financial transactions will induce financial fragility, and the risk that a country will suffer the contagion effects of financial crises that originate elsewhere in the world or within particular sectors of their own economies. It argues that trip wires must be linked to policy responses that alter the context in which investors operate. In this connection, policymakers should link specific speed bumps that change behaviours to each type of trip wire. Third, the paper argues that the proposal for a trip wire-speed bump regime is not intended as a means to prevent all financial instability and crises in developing countries. Indeed, such a goal is fanciful. But insofar as developing countries remain highly vulnerable to financial instability, it is critical that policymakers vigorously pursue avenues for reducing the financial risks to which their economies are exposed and for curtailing the destabilizing effects of unpredictable changes in international private capital flows. Fourth, the paper responds to likely concerns about the response of investors, the IMF and powerful governments to the trip wire-speed bump approach. The paper also considers the issue of technical/institutional capacity to pursue this approach to policy. The paper concludes by arguing that the obstacles confronting the trip wire-speed bump approach are not insurmountable.

Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game

This paper is aimed to address when and why do banking crises occur, and whether financial reforms in reaction to crises are generally beneficial. It is argued that banking crises properly defined consist either of panics or of waves of costly bank failures, and they do not necessarily coincide. Risk-inviting microeconomic rules of the banking game that are established by government are viewed as the key necessary condition to producing a propensity for banking distress, whether in the form of a high propensity for banking panics or a high propensity for waves of bank failures.Banking, banking crises, financial reforms, microeconomic rules.

Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy

This Article examines how insights into limited human rationality can improve financial regulation. The Article identifies four categories of limitations—herd behavior, cognitive biases, overreliance on heuristics, and a proclivity to panic—that undermine the perfect-market regulatory assumptions that parties have full information and will act in their rational self-interest. The Article then analyzes how insights into these limitations can be used to correct resulting market failures. Requiring more robust disclosure and due diligence, for example, can help to reduce reliance on misleading information cascades that motivate herd behavior. Debiasing through law, such as requiring more specific, poignant, and concrete disclosure of risks and their consequences, can help to correct cognitive biases. Requiring firms to engage in more self-aware operational risk management and reporting can reduce the likelihood that parties will over-rely on heuristics. And legislating backstop market liquidity and other stabilizing controls can help to minimize panics. Regulation, however, can only partly overcome these limitations. Effective financial regulation should therefore be designed not only to address these limitations but also to try to mitigate the harm of inevitable financial failures

The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects

macroeconomics, East Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia, Financial crisis, Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects