1,531 research outputs found
Improved Collisions for Reduced ECHO-256
In this work, we present a collision attack on 5 out of 8 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function with a complexity of in time and memory. In this work, we further show that the merge inbound phase can still be solved in the case of hash function attacks on ECHO. As correctly observed by Jean et al., the merge inbound phase of previous hash function attacks succeeds only with a probability of . The main reason for this behavior is the low rank of the linear SuperMixColumns transformation. However, since there is enough freedom in ECHO we can solve the resulting linear equations with a complexity much lower than . On the other hand, also this low rank of the linear SuperMixColumns transformation allows us to extend the collision attack on the reduced hash function from 4 to 5 rounds. Additionally, we present a collision attack on 6 rounds of the compression function of ECHO-256 and show that a subspace distinguisher is still possible for 7 out of 8 rounds of the compression function of ECHO-256. Both compression function attacks have a complexity of with memory requirements of and chosen salt
Security of the SHA-3 candidates Keccak and Blue Midnight Wish: Zero-sum property
The SHA-3 competition for the new cryptographic standard was initiated by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2007. In the following years, the event grew to one of the top areas currently being researched by the CS and cryptographic communities. The first objective of this thesis is to overview, analyse, and critique the SHA-3 competition. The second one is to perform an in-depth study of the security of two candidate hash functions, the finalist Keccak and the second round candidate Blue Midnight Wish. The study shall primarily focus on zero-sum distinguishers. First we attempt to attack reduced versions of these hash functions and see if any vulnerabilities can be detected. This is followed by attacks on their full versions. In the process, a novel approach is utilized in the search of zero-sum distinguishers by employing SAT solvers. We conclude that while such complex attacks can theoretically uncover undesired properties of the two hash functions presented, such attacks are still far from being fully realized due to current limitations in computing power
Rebound attacks on stribog
Abstract. In August 2012, the Stribog hash function was selected as the new Russian hash standard (GOST R 34.11-2012). Stribog is an AES-based primitive and is considered as an asymmetric reply to the new SHA-3. In this paper we investigate the collision resistance of the Stribog compression function and its internal cipher. Specifically, we present a message differential path for the internal block cipher that allows us to efficiently obtain a 5-round free-start collision and a 7.75 free-start near collision for the internal cipher with complexities 2 8 and 2 40 , respectively. Finally, the compression function is analyzed and a 7.75 round semi freestart collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round semi free-start near collisions are presented along with an example for 4.75 round 50 out of 64 bytes near colliding message pair
Watch your Constants: Malicious Streebog
In August 2012, the Streebog hash function was selected as the new Russian cryptographic hash standard (GOST R 34.11-2012). In this paper, we investigate the new standard in the context of malicious hashing and present a practical collision for a malicious version of the full hash function. In particular, we apply the rebound attack to find three solutions for three different differential paths for four rounds, and using the freedom of the round constants we connect them to obtain a collision for the twelve rounds of the compression function. Additionally, and due to the simple processing of the counter, we bypass the barrier of the checksum finalization step and transfer the compression function collision to the hash function output with no additional cost. The presented attack has a practical complexity and is verified by an example. While the results of this paper may not have a direct impact on the security of the current Streebog hash function, it presents an urge for the designers to publish the origin of the used parameters and the rational behind their choices in order for this function to gain enough confidence and wide spread adoption by the security community
Cryptanalysis of Some AES-based Cryptographic Primitives
Current information security systems rely heavily on symmetric key cryptographic primitives
as one of their basic building blocks. In order to boost the efficiency of the security systems, designers
of the underlying primitives often tend to avoid the use of provably secure designs. In fact, they adopt
ad hoc designs with claimed security assumptions in the hope that they resist known cryptanalytic
attacks. Accordingly, the security evaluation of such primitives continually remains an open field. In
this thesis, we analyze the security of two cryptographic hash functions and one block cipher. We
primarily focus on the recent AES-based designs used in the new Russian Federation cryptographic
hashing and encryption suite GOST because the majority of our work was carried out during the open
research competition run by the Russian standardization body TC26 for the analysis of their new
cryptographic hash function Streebog. Although, there exist security proofs for the resistance of AES-
based primitives against standard differential and linear attacks, other cryptanalytic techniques such as
integral, rebound, and meet-in-the-middle attacks have proven to be effective. The results presented in
this thesis can be summarized as follows:
Initially, we analyze various security aspects of the Russian cryptographic hash function GOST
R 34.11-2012, also known as Streebog or Stribog. In particular, our work investigates five security
aspects of Streebog. Firstly, we present a collision analysis of the compression function and its in-
ternal cipher in the form of a series of modified rebound attacks. Secondly, we propose an integral
distinguisher for the 7- and 8-round compression function. Thirdly, we investigate the one wayness of Streebog with respect to two approaches of the meet-in-the-middle attack, where we present a
preimage analysis of the compression function and combine the results with a multicollision attack
to generate a preimage of the hash function output. Fourthly, we investigate Streebog in the context
of malicious hashing and by utilizing a carefully tailored differential path, we present a backdoored
version of the hash function where collisions can be generated with practical complexity. Lastly, we
propose a fault analysis attack which retrieves the inputs of the compression function and utilize it to
recover the secret key when Streebog is used in the keyed simple prefix and secret-IV MACs, HMAC,
or NMAC. All the presented results are on reduced round variants of the function except for our analysis
of the malicious version of Streebog and our fault analysis attack where both attacks cover the full
round hash function.
Next, we examine the preimage resistance of the AES-based Maelstrom-0 hash function which is
designed to be a lightweight alternative to the ISO standardized hash function Whirlpool. One of the
distinguishing features of the Maelstrom-0 design is the proposal of a new chaining construction called
3CM which is based on the 3C/3C+ family. In our analysis, we employ a 4-stage approach that uses
a modified technique to defeat the 3CM chaining construction and generates preimages of the 6-round
reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function.
Finally, we provide a key recovery attack on the new Russian encryption standard GOST R 34.12-
2015, also known as Kuznyechik. Although Kuznyechik adopts an AES-based design, it exhibits a
faster diffusion rate as it employs an optimal diffusion transformation. In our analysis, we propose
a meet-in-the-middle attack using the idea of efficient differential enumeration where we construct
a three round distinguisher and consequently are able to recover 16-bytes of the master key of the
reduced 5-round cipher. We also present partial sequence matching, by which we generate, store, and
match parts of the compared parameters while maintaining negligible probability of matching error,
thus the overall online time complexity of the attack is reduced
The Rebound Attack and Subspace Distinguishers: Application to Whirlpool
We introduce the rebound attack as a variant of differential cryptanalysis on
hash functions and apply it to the hash function Whirlpool, standardized by
ISO/IEC. We give attacks on reduced variants of the Whirlpool hash function and
the Whirlpool compression function. Next, we introduce the subspace problems as
generalizations of near-collision resistance. Finally, we present
distinguishers based on the rebound attack, that apply to the full compression
function of Whirlpool and the underlying block cipher
Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions
Wydział Matematyki i InformatykiKryptograficzne funkcje haszujące stanowią element składowy wielu algorytmów kryptograficznych. Przykładowymi zastosowaniami kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących są podpisy
cyfrowe oraz kody uwierzytelniania wiadomości. Ich własności kryptograficzne mają znaczący wpływ na poziom bezpieczeństwa systemów kryptograficznych wykorzystujących haszowanie.
W dysertacji analizowane są
kryptograficzne funkcje haszujące oraz omówione główne zasady tworzenia
bezpiecznych kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących. Analizujemy bezpieczeństwo dedykowanych funkcji haszujących (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) oraz funkcji haszujących zbudowanych z szyfrów blokowych (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). Głównymi metodami kryptoanalizy użytymi są skrócona analiza różnicowa, analiza rotacyjna i przesuwna. Uzyskane wyniki pokazują słabości analizowanych konstrukcji.Cryptographic Hash Functions (CHFs) are building blocks of many cryptographic algorithms. For instance, they are indispensable tools for efficient digital signature and authentication tags. Their security properties have tremendous impact on the security level of systems, which use cryptographic hashing.
This thesis analyzes CHFs and studies the design principles for construction of secure and efficient CHFs. The dissertation investigates security of both dedicated hash functions (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) and hash functions based on block ciphers (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). The main cryptographic tools applied are truncated differentials, rotational and
shift analysis. The findings show weaknesses in the designs
Analysis of BLAKE2
We present a thorough security analysis of the hash function family BLAKE2, a recently proposed and already in use tweaked version of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE. We study how existing attacks on BLAKE apply to BLAKE2 and to what extent the modifications impact the attacks. We design and run two improved searches for (impossible) differential attacks — the outcomes suggest higher number of attacked rounds in the case of impossible differentials (in fact we improve the best results for BLAKE as well), and slightly higher for the differential attacks on the hash/compression function (which gives an insight into the quality of the tweaks). We emphasize the importance of each of the modifications, in particular we show that an improper initialization could lead to collisions and near-collisions for the full-round compression function. We analyze the permutation of the new hash function and give rotational attacks and internal differentials for the whole design. We conclude that the tweaks in BLAKE2 were chosen properly and, despite having weaknesses in the theoretical attack frameworks of permutations and of fully-chosen state input compression functions, the hash function of BLAKE2 has only slightly lower security margin than BLAKE
Whirlwind: a new cryptographic hash function
A new cryptographic hash function Whirlwind is presented. We give the full specification and explain the design rationale. We show how the hash function can be implemented efficiently in software and give first performance numbers. A detailed analysis of the security against state-of-the-art cryptanalysis methods is also provided. In comparison to the algorithms submitted to the SHA-3 competition, Whirlwind takes recent developments in cryptanalysis into account by design. Even though software performance is not outstanding, it compares favourably with the 512-bit versions of SHA-3 candidates such as LANE or the original CubeHash proposal and is about on par with ECHO and MD6
Haraka v2 – Efficient Short-Input Hashing for Post-Quantum Applications
Recently, many efficient cryptographic hash function design strategies have been explored, not least because of the SHA-3 competition. These designs are, almost exclusively, geared towards high performance on long inputs. However, various applications exist where the performance on short (fixed length) inputs matters more. Such hash functions are the bottleneck in hash-based signature schemes like SPHINCS or XMSS, which is currently under standardization. Secure functions specifically designed for such applications are scarce. We attend to this gap by proposing two short-input hash functions (or rather simply compression functions). By utilizing AES instructions on modern CPUs, our proposals are the fastest on such platforms, reaching throughputs below one cycle per hashed byte even for short inputs, while still having a very low latency of less than 60 cycles. Under the hood, this results comes with several innovations. First, we study whether the number of rounds for our hash functions can be reduced, if only second-preimage resistance (and not collision resistance) is required. The conclusion is: only a little. Second, since their inception, AES-like designs allow for supportive security arguments by means of counting and bounding the number of active S-boxes. However, this ignores powerful attack vectors using truncated differentials, including the powerful rebound attacks. We develop a general tool-based method to include arguments against attack vectors using truncated differentials
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