

Watch your Constants: Malicious Streebog

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Abstract. In August 2012, the Streebog hash function was selected as the new Russian cryptographic hash standard (GOST R 34.11-2012). In this paper, we investigate the new standard in the context of malicious hashing and present a practical collision for a malicious version of the full hash function. In particular, we apply the rebound attack to find three solutions for three different differential paths for four rounds, and using the freedom of the round constants we connect them to obtain a collision for the twelve rounds of the compression function. Additionally, and due to the simple processing of the counter, we bypass the barrier of the checksum finalization step and transfer the compression function collision to the hash function output with no additional cost. The presented attack has a practical complexity and is verified by an example. While the results of this paper may not have a direct impact on the security of the current Streebog hash function, it presents an urge for the designers to publish the origin of the used parameters and the rationale behind their choices in order for this function to gain enough confidence and wide spread adoption by the security community.

Keywords: Cryptanalysis, Hash functions, Malicious hashing, Rebound attacks, GOST R 34.11-2012, Streebog.

1 Introduction

Research on malicious cryptographic primitives has always been thought of as the work of intelligence agencies. The belief that governmental spy agencies work hard to incorporate backdoors in their primitives, which enables the efficient manipulation of certain security properties, has always been lurking in the cryptographic community. This belief was further strengthened last year after Edward Snowden exposed the existence of the NSA's Bullrun decryption project [32]. Leaked documents have shown that the NSA has deliberately inserted a backdoor in the standardized pseudorandom number generator Dual_EC_DRBG [33]. This backdoor provides the knowledge of the internal state of the generator and accordingly its subsequent outputs. Additionally, it is also speculated that NSA paid RSA Security \$10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default pseudorandom number generator in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library [33]. With Dual_EC_DRBG being recommended by NIST at that time, these revelations have raised suspicions with respect to the NIST standards being manipulated by the NSA, particularly, after voices from the cryptographic community began suggesting the possibility of the NSA compromising the NIST's recommended elliptic curve constants [29].

Only few papers have been peer reviewed in public venues in the area of malicious cryptography. Young and Young were among the firsts to address the topic of malicious cryptography through their cryptovirology project [34]. Later Rijmen and Preneel proposed malicious versions of CAST and LOKI by hiding linear relations in the used Sboxes [27]. Work related to malicious ciphers, implementations and pseudorandom generators includes [7, 25, 8, 26]. Although most of the previous work focused on ciphers, just recently the concept of malicious hashing have been introduced in [6, 2]. Specifically, Albertini *et al.* proposed a malicious version of SHA-1 by which collisions can be produced in an efficient way. They have used the freedom of the round constants to satisfy a given differential path and generate one block message collisions.

Streebog was proposed in 2010 [18]. It has an output length of 512/256-bit. The compression function employs a 12-round AES-like cipher with 8×8 -byte internal state. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel (MP) mode and is plugged in a modified Merkle-Damgård domain extender with a modular checksum finalization step [1]. Streebog officially replaces the previous standard GOST R 34.11-94 which has been theoretically broken in [21, 20]. The new GOST is standardized by IETF as RFC 6896 [11] as well. Unlike the specifications of other hash functions, the reference of the new GOST standard [1] gives no information about how or why the parameters of the function (e.g., round constants, matrix constants, and the number of rounds) have been chosen. This fact opens the door to our analysis, which makes use of exactly two parameters: the heavily random looking independent constants and the number of rounds, to present practical collisions for a malicious version of Streebog. Early works related to the cryptanalysis of Streebog have been introduced in [3–5, 16] and in [13, 10, 30], where practical semi free-start collision and near collision examples for reduced round versions have been presented in only [3, 30].

In this work, we investigate a malicious version of Streebog. We exploit the randomness of the independent round constants and the number of rounds of the compression function to efficiently generate collisions for the compression function. More precisely, we first employ the rebound attack technique proposed in [30] to find three pairs of messages and keys that satisfy a specific three 4-round differential paths independently. In the sequel, we use the freedom of five out of the twelve round constants to connect the three obtained solutions and obtain collisions for the twelve round compression function. Finally, we tune the last constant of the compression function to adjust its output after the feedforward to cancel the effect of the counter N addition of the following compression function call, and append another identical colliding message pair. Hence, we generate a two block messages 2^2 multicollision structure where two of them have the same modular sum and thus a collision at the output of the hash function. While previous work [6] stated that compression function collisions are not sufficient to generate hash function collision in constructions that incorporate checksum, our results prove that this is not the case with Streebog. Table 1 provides the six new constant used in our malicious version of Streebog. An example of the two

block message collision along with its corresponding digest is provided in Table 3.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the description of the Streebog hash function along with the notation used throughout the paper are provided. A brief overview of the rebound attack is given in Section 3. Afterwards, in Sections 4, we provide a detailed description of the used approach, the malicious compression function attack and its corresponding complexity. In Section 5, we show how collisions of the malicious hash function are generated using the attack presented in Sections 4. Finally, the paper is concluded and a short discussion is provided in Section 6.

2 Description of Steebog

Streebog outputs a 512 or 256-bit hash value, where half the last state is truncated when adopting the 256-bit output. The standard specifies two different *IVs* to be used with the two output lengths. The function can process messages of length up to $2^{512} - 1$. The compression function iterates over 12 rounds of an AES-like cipher with an 8×8 byte internal state and a final round of key mixing. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damgård domain extender with a finalization step. The input message M is padded into a multiple of 512 bits by appending one followed by zeros. The message length for MD-strengthening is further included as an extra separate block, followed by a block of a checksum evaluated by the modulo 2^{512} addition of all message blocks as a finalization step. More precisely, let $n = \lfloor \frac{|M|}{512} \rfloor$ and the input message $M = x \| m_n \| \dots \| m_1 \| m_0$, where $|M|$ is length of M , and x is an un-complete or an empty block. The message is padded as follows: let $m_{n+1} = 0^{511-|x|} \| 1 \| x$, then the padded message $M = m_{n+1} \| m_n \| \dots \| m_1 \| m_0$. Let $\sum = m_{n+1} + \dots + m_1 + m_0$. The compression function g_N is fed with three inputs:




Fig. 1. Streebog's compression function g_N

the chaining value h_{i-1} , a message block m_{i-1} , and the counter of bits hashed

so far $N_{i-1} = 512 \times i$. (see Figure 1). Let h_i be a 512-bit chaining variable. The first state is loaded with the initial value IV and assigned to h_0 . The hash value of M is computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} h_i &\leftarrow g_N(h_{i-1}, m_{i-1}, N_{i-1}) \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n+2 \\ h_{n+3} &\leftarrow g_0(h_{n+2}, |M|, 0) \\ h(M) &\leftarrow g_0(h_{n+3}, \sum, 0), \end{aligned}$$

where $h(M)$ is the hash value of M , and g_0 is g_N with $N = 0$. As depicted in Figure 1, the compression function g_N consists of:

- K_N : a nonlinear whitening round of the chaining value. It takes a 512-bit chaining variable h_{i-1} and a counter of the bits hashed so far N_{i-1} and outputs a 512-bit key K .
- E : an AES-based cipher that iterates over the message for 12 rounds in addition to a finalization key mixing round. The cipher E takes a 512-bit key K and a 512-bit message block m as a plaintext. As shown in Figure 2, it consists of two similar parallel flows for the state update and the key scheduling.




Fig. 2. The internal block cipher (E)

Both K_N and E operate on an 8×8 byte key state K . E updates an additional 8×8 byte message state M . In one round, a given state is updated by the following sequence of transformations:

- AddKey(X): XOR with either a round key, a constant, or the counter of bits hashed so far (N).
- SubBytes (S): A nonlinear byte bijective mapping.
- Transposition (P): Byte permutation.
- Linear Transformation (L): Row multiplication by an MDS matrix in $GF(2)$.

Initially, state K is loaded with the chaining value h_{i-1} and updated by K_N as follows:

$$k_0 = L \circ P \circ S \circ X[N_{i-1}](K).$$

Now K contains the key k_0 to be used by the cipher E . The message state M is initially loaded with the message block m and $E(k_0, m)$ runs the key scheduling function on state K to generate 12 round keys, k_1, k_2, \dots, k_{12} , as follows:

$$k_i = L \circ P \circ S \circ X[C_{i-1}](k_{i-1}), \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \dots, 12,$$

where C_{i-1} is the i^{th} round constant. The state M is updated as follows:

$$M_i = L \circ P \circ S \circ X[k_{i-1}](M_{i-1}), \text{ for } i = 1, 2, \dots, 12.$$

The final round output is given by $E(k_0, m) = M_{12} \oplus k_{12}$. The output of g_N in the Miyaguchi-Preneel mode is $E(K_N(h_{i-1}, N_{i-1}), m_{i-1}) \oplus m_{i-1} \oplus h_{i-1}$ as shown in Figure 1. For further details, the reader is referred to [1].

2.1 Notation

Let M and K be (8×8) -byte states denoting the message and key state, respectively. The following notation is used throughout the paper:

- M_i : The message state at the beginning of round i .
- M_i^U : The message state after the U transformation at round i , where $U \in X, S, P, L$.
- $M_i[r, c]$: A byte at row r and column c of state M_i .
- $M_i[\text{row } r]$: Eight bytes located at row r of M_i state.
- $M_i[\text{col } c]$: Eight bytes located at column c of M_i state.

Same notation applies to K .

3 The rebound attack

The rebound attack [22] was proposed by Mendel *et al.* for the cryptanalysis of AES-based hash functions. It is a differential attack that follows the inside-out or start from the middle approach which is used in the boomerang attack [31]. The attack is composed of three phases, one inbound and two outbound. The compression function, internal block cipher or permutation of the hash function is divided into three parts. If C is a block cipher, then C is expressed as $C = C_{fw} \circ C_{in} \circ C_{bw}$. The middle part is the inbound phase and the forward and backward parts are the two outbound phases. In the inbound phase, a low probability XOR differential path is used and all possible degrees of freedom are used to satisfy the inbound path. In the two outbound phases, high probability truncated paths [14] are used. In other words, one starts from the middle satisfying C_{in} , then hash forward and backward to satisfy C_{fw} and C_{bw} probabilistically. For an 8×8 byte state, the basic rebound attack finds two states satisfying an inbound phase over two rounds $8 \xrightarrow{r_i} 64 \xrightarrow{r_{i+1}} 8$. The main idea of the attack is to pick random differences at each of the two eight active bytes states. Then propagate both backward and forward until the output and input of the Sbox, respectively.

Using the Sbox differential distribution table (DDT), we find values that satisfy input and output differentials. This process is further illustrated in Figure 3. The last step of the attack is called the Sbox matching phase and its complexity depends on the Sbox DDT. If the probability of differentials that have solutions is p , then the matching probability is given by p^8 .




Fig. 3. The rebound attack.

Literature related to the rebound attack includes Mendel *et al.* first proposal on the ISO standard Whirlpool and the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [22, 23]. In particular, Mendel *et al.* presented a 4.5-round collision, 5.5-round semi free-start collision and 7.5-round near collision attacks on the Whirlpool compression function. As for Grøstl-256, a 6-round semi free-start collision is given. Subsequently, rebound attacks have been applied to other AES-based hash functions such as LANE [17], JH [28], Echo [12], Streebog [3], and Grøstl [24]. Various tweaks have been applied to the basic rebound attack in order to construct differential paths that cover more rounds such as merging multiple in-bounds [15], super Sbox cryptanalysis [9], extended 5-round inbound [15], and linearized match-in-the-middle and start-from-the-middle techniques [19]. Lastly, Kölbl and Rechberger presented a practical method to find semi free-start collision for a 4-round AES-based compression function [30]. More precisely, they have proposed a way to first find a specific differential path for $1 \xrightarrow{r_i} 8 \xrightarrow{r_{i+1}} 64 \xrightarrow{r_{i+2}} 8 \xrightarrow{r_{i+3}} 1$ transition, then use the freedom in the key to find two messages that follow the given path. They have implemented their approach on Streebog and presented a semi free-start collision for the 4-round reduced compression function. In what follows, we show how we used this approach to generate collisions for a malicious version of Streebog compression function.

4 Malicious compression function collision

In this section, we give the details of our malicious adaptation of the streebog compression function that allows us to efficiently construct collisions for the twelve round compression function. Our approach makes use of the heavily random looking independent round constants and the twelve rounds of the compression function. In fact, the specific number of rounds (12) used in Streebog enables us to find three independent solutions for the commonly known $1 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow 64 \rightarrow 8 \rightarrow 1$ four round differential path and by changing five constants we can successfully connect them and generate a collision.




Fig. 4. The first truncated differential path.

Our attack starts by finding the first solution which is a pair of messages and a key that follow the given differential path shown in Figure 4. In doing so, we employ the approach proposed in [30] which is composed of two procedures and is briefly described as follows:

4.1 Building the differential characteristic

In this procedure, one determines the exact differential transitions of the truncated differential trail given above.

1. Choose a random difference at $M_4^L[3, 3]$ and propagate it backward until the full active state M_3^S .
2. For each byte difference in M_3^S , save a set of all possible input differences
3. Create a table T_L of all possible 255 byte difference values d_3 (candidates for $M_2^P[* , 3]$) and their corresponding 8 byte difference values $L(d_3)$ (candidates for $M_3^X[\text{row } 3]$). These values are the result of applying the linear transformation L to a difference at column 3.
4. For each row of M_3^X , check if there is a possible match with the rows in T_L .
5. To achieve the transition from 1 active byte in $M_1^P[* , 3]$ to 8 active bytes in $M_2^X[\text{row } 3]$, steps 2 and 4 must be repeated for only one row between states M_2^S and M_1^P .

According to the Streebog Sbox differential distribution properties, [30] states that finding the differential characteristic has a complexity of $\approx 2^{20}$ and consequently, the above procedure is repeated 2^{20} times.

4.2 Finding a solution for the differential path

Once we have found a characteristic, we now need to find a message pair that follows it. This can be done by performing the following steps:

1. Set the message state at M_3^X with a solution that satisfies the full active state differentials from the above procedure.
2. Use $K_3[\text{col } 3]$ to satisfy the solutions of the Sbox differentials at $M_2^P[\text{col } 3]$. Also use $K_3[\text{row } 3]$ to satisfy the solutions of the Sbox differentials at $M_4^X[\text{col } 3]$

Since there is one byte, $K_3[3, 3]$, shared between the two solutions, one needs to repeat the above procedure 2^8 times. For more details on the specifics of the used technique, the reader is referred to [30].

To this end, we have found a solution to the first differential path with a key input different from that is produced by the standard IV. This solution gives us a specific input and output differences Δ_{in}^1 and Δ_{out}^1 at $M_1[3, 3]$ and $M_4^L[3, 3]$, respectively. In the sequel, we restart the above two procedures to search for the second differential characteristic and its solution such that this second search covers rounds five to eight and have an input difference Δ_{in}^2 at $M_5[3, 3]$ equals to the output difference Δ_{out}^1 of the first path. Since we restrict the input difference of the second path to a specific value, the complexity of the second procedure of our search is increased by a factor of 2^8 . However, the overall search complexity is still dominated by the first procedure which is about 2^{20} . Finally, we search for the third and last differential path and its solution which covers rounds nine to twelve. For this path, we have to restrict its input difference Δ_{in}^3 at $M_9[3, 3]$ to be equal Δ_{out}^2 at $M_8^L[3, 3]$ and its output difference Δ_{out}^3 at $M_{12}[3, 3]$ to be equal Δ_{in}^1 at $M_1[3, 3]$, so that the latter cancels out after the feedforward.

Connecting the three solutions: Now that we have the three solutions, we can start tuning specific round constants to connect them. We first work on the first solution's key output K_1 , which is different than that generated by the standard IV. To solve this problem, we fix the new $C_1 = LPS(IV) \oplus (K_1^X)$. By doing this, we guarantee that the resulting new key satisfies the first differential path. Thus, the new colliding messages are $m_1 = (M_1^X \oplus LPS(IV))$ and $m_2 = m_1 \oplus \Delta_{in}^1$.

To connect the first and second solutions, we have to change K_5 . However, altering K_5 affects both K_4 and K_6 , which are restricted by the solutions of the first and second paths, respectively. In order to cancel the propagation of alteration to the latter two round keys, we compute the new two constants C_5 and C_4 as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} K_5 &= M_4^L \oplus M_5^X \\ C_5 &= K_5 \oplus K_5^X \\ C_4 &= S^{-1}PL^{-1}(K_5) \oplus K_4, \end{aligned}$$

where M_4^L and K_4 are solutions of the first path, while M_5^X and K_5^X are solutions of the second path. To connect the second and third paths, we perform the same procedure to compute the new C_8 and C_9 . Having all the new five constants in place, Table 3, gives an example of a colliding message pair which have the same compression function output using IV=0 and N=0.

5 Collision attack on the full malicious Streebog

While previous work [6] speculated that collisions of the compression function cannot be reflected at the output of the hash function when employing a checksum finalization step, in this section, we show how to turn the previous compression function collision to a hash function collision. On top of the modular checksum finalization step, Streebog incorporates a counter N with each compression function call. However, N is mixed with the chaining value with a simple XOR operation. It should be noted that once the constants of the compression function are fixed to some values, they remain the same for all successive executions of the compression function. Accordingly, one cannot search for a different collision with the same constants.




Fig. 5. Malicious Streebog collision.

Our approach is to replicate the first collision two times, thus creating a 2-block multicollision structure with the same H_2 input to the padding call $g_N(H_2, m_p)$ as depicted in Figure 5. By doing this, it is guaranteed that four messages collide at H_2 , and only two of them collide at the output of the hash function. Namely, those two that have the same modular checksum which are $M = m_1||m_2$ and $M' = m_2||m_1$. However, using the same collision twice implies that the second collision should have a chaining input H_1 equal to that of the first collision which is $IV = 0$. For this, we compute a new C_{12} to enforce the output of the first collision H_1 to be 512, which is equal to the value of N used in the following compression function call. To this end, at the input of the second compression function call H_1 cancels the effect of N and the second colliding message pair has a chaining input equal to the IV which is used at the first call.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

In this paper, we have investigated a malicious version of Streebog. We took advantage of the heavily random looking constants and the number of rounds of the compression function to present a 2-block message pair with the same

digest. Our approach first searches for three solutions for three different 4-round differential paths and use the freedom of five constants to connect them to produce a compression function collision. Finally, we employed the freedom in the last constant used in the round key generation to cancel the effect of the counter used in the second compression function call. Hence, we were able to append a second similar message pair, thus creating a 2^2 multicollision structure where only two of them have the same modular checksum and accordingly the same digest.

It should be noted that these results has no impact on the security of the original standard. Additionally, this new set of constants does not provide collision for GOST-256 as it uses a different IV. However, they are interesting in the light of the absence of the source of the used parameters of the standard. Our results also show one of the first examples of compression function collisions being sufficient to generate hash function collisions. It is interesting to mention that, due to the versatility of the used differential path where the one byte difference can virtually be anywhere in the state, we get the freedom to satisfy the magic number as well as other constraints that are needed to produce meaningful collisions for some specific file formats (cf. section 4 in [2]). As a future direction, one may investigate the applicability of the attack if the number of rounds is not a multiple of four. Also, one might try searching for a malicious adaptation that holds for the two versions of the hash function simultaneously. Finally, we see that this paper provides an incentive for the designers of Streebog to publish the origin of the used parameters and the rational behind their choices.

C_1				C_4				C_5															
3b	7b	5d	ca	f1	e4	23	2f	7b	51	2e	eb	f5	f6	ab	f4	9b	b1	e8	b9	00	2f	6d	75
de	dd	27	78	d6	9b	fe	93	42	52	38	55	1b	14	c2	9d	96	d7	e3	12	a2	5c	66	9c
f7	9f	94	dd	27	02	f3	a2	6e	5b	20	23	c9	b9	8f	3d	7e	aa	0e	bf	dd	0e	04	88
4b	8e	ad	06	8d	6f	3a	fd	a5	cc	0b	e3	78	9b	9d	52	f7	30	67	e2	8c	b5	37	1e
fa	da	e2	5c	b1	2a	0f	3a	bc	30	cc	de	99	39	07	69	6b	1c	1b	28	09	6d	0d	78
0f	7d	0d	18	ba	f6	0c	e9	cb	69	60	cf	89	c9	20	cd	4c	fa	57	06	9e	da	f6	4f
27	b7	42	a3	7d	68	cd	64	e7	e6	7c	81	ef	d7	97	6e	1d	20	22	e9	ce	7e	54	3f
5b	41	e8	61	e2	cb	9d	a6	71	ac	16	e5	bf	cc	b9	c1	35	0c	56	b4	d8	a5	01	b7
C_8				C_9				C_{12}															
02	e5	04	18	6c	11	2d	01	f9	53	2e	c1	78	84	d2	6e	a3	23	32	b5	81	5e	1b	85
02	f1	f2	49	5d	d0	aa	7b	17	ae	c9	5a	a4	44	4c	8d	f4	67	4d	bc	c3	77	fd	7f
98	4c	e1	b8	08	fd	0f	60	21	8b	63	a4	c1	2a	32	b8	f8	a1	db	b5	e3	69	99	41
46	79	75	f7	37	5d	a1	8c	41	2c	9a	d0	71	20	55	30	eb	15	09	84	de	8d	22	ea
3c	b5	83	ac	90	27	38	30	fb	71	99	26	59	a8	6f	4f	9d	e6	44	d5	fd	40	7b	5d
25	af	e8	05	d1	bd	e3	34	8e	37	7a	c5	06	ad	7f	93	d1	32	45	08	e9	3d	3f	51
ea	eb	50	bf	be	39	32	9a	50	0b	be	70	04	4b	9d	5c	2a	36	ae	cc	53	97	0f	fc
61	1a	1a	22	e1	0d	ff	58	d7	aa	2c	27	6e	cd	41	01	41	a7	84	f3	44	91	24	3e

Table 1. The six new constants.

C_2				C_3				C_6															
6f	a3	b5	8a	a9	9d	2f	1a	f5	74	dc	ac	2b	ce	2f	c7	ae	4f	ae	ae	1d	3a	d3	d9
4f	e3	9d	46	0f	70	b5	d7	0a	39	fc	28	6a	3d	84	35	6f	a4	c3	3b	7a	30	39	c0
f3	fe	ea	72	0a	23	2b	98	06	f1	5e	5f	52	9c	1f	8b	2d	66	c4	f9	51	42	a4	6c
61	d5	5e	0f	16	b5	01	31	f2	ea	75	14	b1	29	7b	7b	18	7f	9a	b4	9a	f0	8e	c6
9a	b5	17	6b	12	d6	99	58	d3	e2	0f	e4	90	35	9e	b1	cf	fa	a6	b7	1c	9a	b7	b4
5c	b5	61	c2	db	0a	a7	ca	c1	c9	3a	37	60	62	db	09	0a	f2	1f	66	c2	be	c6	b6
55	dd	a2	1b	d7	cb	cd	56	c2	b6	f4	43	86	7a	db	31	bf	71	c5	72	36	90	4f	35
e6	79	04	70	21	b1	9b	b7	99	1e	96	f5	0a	ba	0a	b2	fa	68	40	7a	46	64	7d	6e
C_7				C_{10}				C_{11}															
f4	c7	0e	16	ee	aa	c5	ec	ab	be	de	a6	80	05	6f	52	7b	cd	9e	d0	ef	c8	89	fb
51	ac	86	fe	bf	24	09	54	38	2a	e5	48	b2	e4	f3	f3	30	02	c6	cd	63	5a	fe	94
39	9e	c6	c7	e6	bf	87	c9	89	41	e7	1c	ff	8a	78	db	d8	fa	6b	bb	eb	ab	07	61
d3	47	3e	33	19	7a	93	c9	1f	ff	e1	8a	1b	33	61	03	20	01	80	21	14	84	66	79
09	92	ab	c5	2d	82	2c	37	9f	e7	67	02	af	69	33	4b	8a	1d	71	ef	ea	48	b9	ca
06	47	69	83	28	4a	05	04	7a	1e	6c	30	3b	76	52	f4	ef	ba	cd	1d	7d	47	6e	98
35	17	45	4c	a2	3c	4a	f3	36	98	fa	d1	15	3b	b6	c3	de	a2	59	4a	c0	6f	d8	5d
88	86	56	4d	3a	14	d4	93	74	b4	c7	fb	98	45	9c	ed	6b	ca	a4	cd	81	f3	2d	1b

Table 2. The six unchanged (original) constants.

m_1				m_2				Δm															
d2	d7	5d	81	b1	63	d8	cc	d2	d7	5d	81	b1	63	d8	cc	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
63	16	bb	de	0e	61	85	d6	63	16	bb	de	0e	61	85	d6	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
97	89	a3	e6	55	cf	46	e7	97	89	a3	e6	55	cf	46	e7	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
37	de	22	19	54	d6	01	95	37	de	22	bb	54	d6	01	95	00	00	00	a2	00	00	00	00
13	44	b8	4d	a3	4d	36	4c	13	44	b8	4d	a3	4d	36	4c	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
a3	50	36	27	f3	51	7f	ee	a3	50	36	27	f3	51	7f	ee	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
58	23	1d	88	80	1b	09	62	58	23	1d	88	80	1b	09	62	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
08	9d	bc	4d	aa	a1	73	2a	08	9d	bc	4d	aa	a1	73	2a	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00

$$H(m_1||m_2) = H(m_2||m_1)$$

94e19a2ad9252ca78d14600c20488ad66de12c72ab3aac19f7bb9e277abe973a
ea22f1c3fa3be180c6dd212f4b19eefed80fb114c44dfb39ffdb2cfad24c6275

Table 3. Example of a 2-block message collision for the malicious Streebog hash function.

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