A Semantic Conception of Truth

I explore three main points in Alfred Tarski’s Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundation of Theoretical Semantics: (1) his physicalist program, (2) a general theory of truth, and (3) the necessity of a metalanguage when defining truth. Hartry Field argued that Tarski’s theory of truth failed to accomplish what it set out to do, which was to ground truth and semantics in physicalist terms. I argue that Tarski has been adequately defended by Richard Kirkham. Development of logic in the past three decades has created a shift away from Fregean and Russellian understandings of quantification to an independent conception of quantification in independence-friendly first-order logic. This shift has changed some of the assumptions that led to Tarski’s Impossibility Theorem

A propos de l'actualité de Charles Peirce

Des lecteurs dune récente livraison de Monist, The Relevance of Charles Peirce, pourraient chercher l'actualité de Peirce chez des philosophes contemporains influencés par lui. J'essaie de montrer que Peirce est actuel parce que son apport principal, le pragmatisme, se rattache profondément à des sujets qui nous sont familiers. Formé dans la tradition cartésienne et kantienne de l'epistemologie, l'oeuvre de Peirce intéresse les héritiers de cette tradition.Cependant, son pragmatisme fait apparaître les hésitations de cette tradition qui offre à ses héritiers une incertitude epistemologic ue générale dont l'effet est de les engager vers un fondationalisme égocentrique qui isole plusieurs philosophes de l'actualité. Readers of the recent Monist publication, The Relevance of Charles Peirce (La Salle, Illinois, 1983) may seek to locate Peirce's « relevance » in the number of contemporary philosophers influenced by any aspect of his work.I argue, instead, that Peirce is relevant because his central work, pragmatism, relates deeply to matters immediately at hand. Since he is trained in Cartesian-Kantian tradition of epistemology, Peirce's work interests disciples of that tradition. In the end, however, his pragmatism discloses the errent tendency of that tradition : to offer its disciples over-generalized epistemological uncertainty and, therefore, the compensatory need to engage in egocentric foundationalisms. These foundationalisms isolate many contemporary philosophers from « mutters immediately at hand »

Heidegger’s Theory of Truth and its Importance for Quality of Qualitative Research

When reliability and validity were introduced as validation criteria for empirical research in the human sciences, quantitative research methods prevailed, and theory of science relied on neopositivism (Vienna Circle) or postpositivism (scientific realism). Within this worldview, notions of reliability and validity as criteria of scientific goodness were introduced. Reliability and validity were associated with the correspondence theory of truth, which is mostly ill-suited to the needs of qualitative research. For that reason, qualitative research must look for other kinds of validation criteria. The article elaborates the problems arising when the correspondence theory of truth is used as an ultimate criterion in evaluating qualitative research and proposes Heidegger’s hermeneutical or alethetical idea of truth as a more suitable approach.</p

Hilbert's Metamathematical Problems and Their Solutions

This dissertation examines several of the problems that Hilbert discovered in the foundations of mathematics, from a metalogical perspective. The problems manifest themselves in four different aspects of Hilbert’s views: (i) Hilbert’s axiomatic approach to the foundations of mathematics; (ii) His response to criticisms of set theory; (iii) His response to intuitionist criticisms of classical mathematics; (iv) Hilbert’s contribution to the specification of the role of logical inference in mathematical reasoning. This dissertation argues that Hilbert’s axiomatic approach was guided primarily by model theoretical concerns. Accordingly, the ultimate aim of his consistency program was to prove the model-theoretical consistency of mathematical theories. It turns out that for the purpose of carrying out such consistency proofs, a suitable modification of the ordinary first-order logic is needed. To effect this modification, independence-friendly logic is needed as the appropriate conceptual framework. It is then shown how the model theoretical consistency of arithmetic can be proved by using IF logic as its basic logic. Hilbert’s other problems, manifesting themselves as aspects (ii), (iii), and (iv)—most notably the problem of the status of the axiom of choice, the problem of the role of the law of excluded middle, and the problem of giving an elementary account of quantification—can likewise be approached by using the resources of IF logic. It is shown that by means of IF logic one can carry out Hilbertian solutions to all these problems. The two major results concerning aspects (ii), (iii) and (iv) are the following: (a) The axiom of choice is a logical principle; (b) The law of excluded middle divides metamathematical methods into elementary and non-elementary ones. It is argued that these results show that IF logic helps to vindicate Hilbert’s nominalist philosophy of mathematics. On the basis of an elementary approach to logic, which enriches the expressive resources of ordinary first-order logic, this dissertation shows how the different problems that Hilbert discovered in the foundations of mathematics can be solved

Totuus, todistettavuus ja gödeliläiset argumentit : Tarskilaisen totuuden puolustus matematiikassa

Eräs tärkeimmistä kysymyksistä matematiikanfilosofiassa on totuuden ja formaalin todistettavuuden välinen suhde. Kantaa, jonka mukaan nämä kaksi käsitettä ovat yksi ja sama, kutsutaan deflationismiksi, ja vastakkaista näkökulmaa substantialismiksi. Ensimmäisessä epätäydellisyyslauseessaan Kurt Gödel todisti, että kaikki ristiriidattomat ja aritmetiikan sisältävät formaalit systeemit sisältävät lauseita, joita ei voida sen enempää todistaa kuin osoittaa epätosiksi kyseisen systeemin sisällä. Tällaiset Gödel-lauseet voidaan kuitenkin osoittaa tosiksi, jos laajennamme formaalia systeemiä Alfred Tarskin semanttisella totuusteorialla, kuten Stewart Shapiro ja Jeffrey Ketland ovat näyttäneet semanttisissa argumenteissaan substantialismin puolesta. Heidän mukaansa Gödel-lauseet ovat eksplisiittinen tapaus todesta lauseesta, jota ei voida todistaa, ja siten deflationismi on kumottu. Tätä vastaan Neil Tennant on näyttänyt, että tarskilaisen totuuden sijaan voimme laajentaa formaalia systeemiä ns. pätevyysperiaatteella, jonka mukaan kaikki todistettavat lauseet ovat ”väitettävissä”, ja josta seuraa myös Gödel-lauseiden väitettävyys. Relevantti kysymys ei siis ole se pystytäänkö Gödel-lauseiden totuus osoittamaan, vaan se onko tarskilainen totuus hyväksyttävämpi laajennus kuin pätevyysperiaate. Tässä työssä väitän, että tätä ongelmaa on paras lähestyä ajattelemalla matematiikkaa ilmiönä, joka on laajempi kuin pelkästään formaalit systeemit. Kun otamme huomioon esiformaalin matemaattisen ajattelun, huomaamme että tarskilainen totuus ei itse asiassa ole laajennus lainkaan. Väitän, että totuus on esiformaalissa matematiikassa sitä mitä todistettavuus on formaalissa, ja tarskilainen semanttinen totuuskäsitys kuvaa tätä suhdetta tarkasti. Deflationisti voi kuitenkin argumentoida, että vaikka esiformaali matematiikka on olemassa, voi se silti olla filosofisesti merkityksetöntä mikäli se ei viittaa mihinkään objektiiviseen. Tätä vastaan väitän, että kaikki todella deflationistiset teoriat johtavat matematiikan mielivaltaisuuteen. Kaikissa muissa matematiikanfilosofisissa teorioissa on tilaa objektiiviselle viittaukselle, ja laajennus tarskilaiseen totuuteen voidaan tehdä luonnollisesti. Väitän siis, että mikäli matematiikan mielivaltaisuus hylätään, täytyy hyväksyä totuuden substantiaalisuus. Muita tähän liittyviä aiheita, kuten uusfregeläisyyttä, käsitellään myös tässä työssä, eikä niiden todeta poistavan tarvetta tarskilaiselle totuudelle. Ainoa jäljelle jäävä mahdollisuus deflationistille on vaihtaa logiikkaa niin, että formaalit kielet voivat sisältää omat totuuspredikaattinsa. Tarski osoitti tämän mahdottomaksi klassisille ensimmäisen kertaluvun kielille, mutta muilla logiikoilla ei välttämättä olisi lainkaan tarvetta laajentaa formaaleja systeemejä, ja yllä esitetty argumentti ei pätisi. Vaihtoehtoisista tavoista keskityn tässä työssä eniten Jaakko Hintikan ja Gabriel Sandun ”riippumattomuusystävälliseen” IF-logiikkaan. Hintikka on väittänyt, että IF-kieli voi sisältää oman adekvaatin totuuspredikaattinsa. Väitän kuitenkin, että vaikka tämä onkin totta, tätä predikaattia ei voida tunnistaa totuuspredikaatiksi saman IF-kielen sisäisesti, ja siten tarve tarskilaiselle totuudelle säilyy. IF-logiikan lisäksi myös toisen kertaluvun klassinen logiikka ja Saul Kripken käyttämä Kleenen logiikka epäonnistuvat samalla tavalla

Towards an ethics for digital media : challenges between the private and the public ; what, after all, are we doing with words?

Notre problématique centrale concerne le défi éthico-discursif d’une communication qui soit appropriée aux sociétés démocratiques, sur la base de la distinction entre argumentation légitime (persuasion/appropriation) et manipulation (abus/violence). Dans un monde compris comme « globalisé », un tel défi rencontre le problème cognitiviste de traiter les dichotomies entre universel/contextuel, objectif/subjective, public/privé (etc.) dans notre vivre-ensemble, lequel se trouve maintenant largement médiatisé par les technologies numériques. Il faut noter également que tout ce qui vaut pour des actions, en général, vaut également pour la discussion en tant qu’action fondamentale et constitutive des sociétés humaines, où les interlocuteurs sont supposés s’exprimer ouvertement, ainsi que tenir bien compte de leurs points de vue réciproques afin d’arriver, d’une façon simultanément raisonnable et critique, à un accord en suivant une discussion critique (Habermas 1992). La communication légitime aurait ce pouvoir, malgré le défi du « paradoxe de l’argumentation » tel que souligné par Philippe Breton (2008), de dépasser les points de vue individuels des interlocuteurs, afin d’arriver à un résultat partagé qui consisterait en une intégration dans un tout universalisable (consensus – Apel 1994). (Ex.: la constitution d’un pays, les lois internationales comme la Carte des Droits Fondamentaux de l’Homme et qui sait, par la suite, une Magna Carta pour l’Internet.) Ces éléments, posés dans la première partie du texte, viennent nous préparer pour la seconde partie, consacrée à une éthique pour les médias numériques. Notre objectif est donc de lier une préoccupation d’éthique et de philosophie politique, incluant une préoccupation centrale pour l’argumentation, avec celle de la question des mécanismes dont nous disposons, ou devrions disposer, sur la question complexe et difficile de ce qu’on peut appeler l’éthique de la protection de la vie privée de la personne sur internet. Les premiers points sont traités dans la partie A, pour en venir à l’éthique des médias numériques dans la partie B. Conclusions : Le paradigme proposé par l’éthique discursive offre une approche possible de la communication afin de la comprendre de façon moins réductionniste (c.-à-d., plus holistique), ce qui est mieux approprié à un monde qui se comprend de plus en plus comme « globalisé ». La synthèse du modèle triadique « composé », selon Peirce-Mead-Grize-Breton, se présente comme un outil éclairant pour cette prise en compte, dans la mesure où elle fournir un cadre interprétatif et critique. Selon ce cadre théorique on analyse les régulations au Canada et au Brésil, en utilisant le model triangulaire adapté du triangle argumentatif de Breton. Une Magna Carta « universalisable » pour l’Internet devient une piste envisagée, en soulignant ces trois principes centraux: - neutralité de la toile; - protection de la liberté d’expression; - protection des données personnelles, liée au droit de la vie privée (« privacy »).Abstract : We confront the tension between legitimacy vs. manipulation in persuasive discourse: the old tricky aporia of argumentation, dating back to the ancient Greeks when they first founded democracy. This has been more recently highlighted by Philippe Breton (2008) as the subtle “paradox of argumentation,” which concerns the dynamics of human language as a valuable hermeneutical enterprise, one susceptible to (mis) interpretations as well as to phenomena of critical dissent and controversies. Our main questions subsequently turn around the central concern of how we may promote democratic participation and discussion, in the era of the Internet, in ways that can work to motivate the improvement of our inter-subjective communicative performances in healthy and legitimate manners, instead of facilitating corruption via blunt censorship or other manipulative tricks. As we consider dialogue and argumentation to be the most crucial traits of the democratic enterprise, we also discuss the role played by American pragmatism to the nourishment of such democratic ideal. Particularly, we focus on the theoretical approaches proposed by Peirce and Mead concerning autonomy and reflexivity, not without mentioning its champion on education, John Dewey, whose works have all been preoccupied with the maintenance and development of the main axes for good functioning democratic societies, namely: education, science, and communication. To better reflect about this, we integrate into Breton’s triangle a Peirce-Mead semiotic “triadic” approach that supports autonomy, so as to propose a compounded model that is able to both encompass the rich possibilities of communication and, on the other hand, delimit as much as possible the range of interactive dialogism, peculiar to human language, so as to foster ethical (legitimate) exchanges. All these elements considered in Part A prepare the terrain for the subsequent considerations developed in Part B, regarding an ethics for digital media. Conclusions: • The paradigm proposed by Discourse Ethics, under the light of a semiotic approach on autonomy, reflexivity and the self, is suggested as a reliable theoretical framework of departure. • This has led us to a compounded ‘triadic’ model that incorporates the most relevant aspects from the views of Peirce, Mead, Grize and Breton. • Then, in Part B, concerning the challenges brought by Digital Media to contemporary societies, we conclude that the more of one’s privacy an individual is required to relinquish for governments and/or companies (no matter the reasons involved), the more transparency by those handling one’s sensitive information should be required to be provided, in return. • All this in order to prevent manipulation and abuses of power as much as possible, so as to keep a balanced ‘communicative triangle’ among interlocutors (according to the proposed triangular model), essential for democracies to be maintained and thrive, so as to rend possible the adoption of a Magna Carta for the Internet that would be globally acceptable and focused on the three main principles of: - net neutrality; - freedom of expression; - privacy protection

The Liar Paradox: A Consistent and Semantically Closed Solution

This thesis develops a new approach to the formal de nition of a truth predicate that allows a consistent, semantically closed defiition within classical logic. The approach is built on an analysis of structural properties of languages that make Liar Sentences and the paradoxical argument possible. By focusing on these conditions, standard formal dfinitions of semantics are shown to impose systematic limitations on the definition of formal truth predicates. The alternative approach to the formal definition of truth is developed by analysing our intuitive procedure for evaluating the truth value of sentences like "P is true". It is observed that the standard procedure breaks down in the case of the Liar Paradox as a side effect of the patterns of naming or reference necessary to the definition of Truth as a predicate. This means there are two ways in which a sentence like "P is true" can be not true, which requires that the T-Schema be modified for such sentences. By modifying the T-Schema, and taking seriously the effects of the patterns of naming/ reference on truth values, the new approach to the definition of truth is developed. Formal truth definitions within classical logic are constructed that provide an explicit and adequate truth definition for their own language, every sentence within the languages has a truth value, and there is no Strengthened Liar Paradox. This approach to solving the Liar Paradox can be easily applied to a very wide range of languages, including natural languages

Etica ed epistemologia nella pragmatica trascendentale di Karl-Otto Apel

La tesi ha l’obiettivo di esporre e analizzare criticamente i temi più importanti del pensiero di Karl-Otto Apel. Nei tre capitoli in cui è suddivisa la tesi si presenta inizialmente la posizione di Apel su uno specifico argomento, e poi si compie un’analisi critica di essa facendo riferimento alla letteratura secondaria (in particolare tedesca) riguardante la filosofia apeliana. Lo scopo finale del lavoro è quello di evidenziare l’originalità, i punti di forza e i punti deboli della pragmatica trascendentale sviluppata da Apel, la quale si sostanzia nell’ambizioso tentativo di rinnovare la filosofia trascendentale partendo dalle irrinunciabili acquisizioni della svolta linguistica che ha caratterizzato il pensiero filosofico del XX secolo. Il primo capitolo ha come oggetto il concetto più peculiare della riflessione apeliana: quello di fondazione ultima (Letztbegründung). Tale concetto è centrale sia in riferimento alla filosofia teoretica sia in riferimento alla filosofia pratica, e per questa ragione la sua analisi precede la trattazione specifica della teoria della verità e dell’etica del discorso. Nella prima parte del capitolo si illustra l’evoluzione del concetto negli scritti apeliani, in particolare il significato che assume la nozione di “riflessione” negli anni Ottanta, in seguito all’influenza esercitata sulla filosofia di Apel dalle analisi di Wolfgang Kuhlmann in riferimento alla fondazione ultima. Apel riprende da Kuhlmann la problematica nozione di fondazione ultima strettamente riflessiva, con la quale i due autori tentano di superare le numerose obiezioni che sono state rivolte alla Letztbegründung. Dopo l’esposizione delle principali critiche a tale nozione e l’illustrazione di una possibile alternativa alla fondazione ultima strettamente riflessiva, nell’ultima parte del capitolo si analizza più nel dettaglio l’argomento trascendentale sviluppato da Apel e si chiariscono ulteriormente le ambiguità del concetto di riflessione che egli adopera. Infine, si propone una ridefinizione degli argomenti trascendentali e, a partire da ciò, si traggono le conseguenze per la filosofia apeliana. Nel secondo capitolo, dopo la disamina del fondamentale rapporto tra la questione circa la giustificazione di validità della conoscenza e la questione concernente la costituzione del senso dell’oggettività all’interno del pensiero di Apel, si entra nel dettaglio della sua concezione del linguaggio. La corrente filosofica dominante lungo l’intera storia del pensiero occidentale privilegia la funzione rappresentativa del linguaggio, relegando la dimensione comunicativa di esso a oggetto di studio di discipline esterne alla filosofia. Secondo il pensatore tedesco, invece, l’aspetto distintivo del linguaggio umano è costituito dalla sua doppia struttura performativo-proposizionale. Nel capitolo si ricostruisce la teoria del significato che emerge dalle riflessioni apeliane, la quale si fonda su una particolare interpretazione della teoria degli atti linguistici sviluppata da Austin e Searle, e da cui emerge un’ambiguità di fondo rispetto al rapporto tra semantica e pragmatica. Successivamente, di conseguenza, si approfondisce tale rapporto ricorrendo alle considerazioni di altri autori sul tema, in particolare Wilfrid Sellars e Robert Brandom. Nell’ultima parte del capitolo si analizza la teoria della verità e della realtà sviluppata da Apel, Più nello specifico, si affrontano le critiche che sono state rivolte all’identificazione di verità e consenso argomentativo nella comunità ideale della comunicazione, e alla concezione del consenso ideale come un’idea regolativa che è implicita nella pratica argomentativa e senza la quale le nostre asserzioni perderebbero il loro senso. L’aspetto maggiormente problematico riguarda il ruolo del consenso come criterio determinante di verità. Infine, si approfondisce la dicotomia nominalismo-realismo concettuale per comprendere pienamente il peculiare realismo apeliano, che egli riprende da Peirce. Nel terzo capitolo e ultimo capitolo si affronta il tema dell’etica del discorso. Nella prima parte, dopo aver illustrato la strategia di Apel volta alla fondazione post-metafisica di un’etica universale, si analizzano le obiezioni fondamentali che sono state mosse contro di essa, in particolare riguardo alla possibilità di fondare norme morali partendo dai presupposti del discorso argomentativo e circa il rapporto tra dimensione volitiva e dimensione cognitiva nella riflessione etica di Apel. Nella seconda parte del capitolo, dopo la disamina della distinzione tra la parte A dell’etica del discorso, riguardante la fondazione di norme morali fondamentali, e la parte B, concernente l’applicazione delle norme nelle situazioni storiche concrete, si approfondisce il rapporto tra morale, diritti umani e democrazia che caratterizza il pensiero apeliano. Da questo punto di vista il confronto con Habermas risulta illuminante. Nell’ultima parte del capitolo, infine, si mettono in luce le criticità della parte B dell’etica del discorso di Apel, in particolare del tentativo di fondare la parte B derivandola dalla parte A, e si propone una strategia alternativa che consenta di valorizzare la proposta etica apeliana evitando il pericolo di un eccesso di formalismo

Четвертые Лойфмановские чтения. Философское мировоззрение и картина мира : материалы Всероссийской научной конференции. Т. 1.

Печатается по решению Межвузовского центра проблем непрерывного гуманитарного образования. Выпуск серии «Лойфмановские чтения» осуществляется при участии д-ра филос. наук В. В. Кима и канд. филос. наук Л. П. Чуриной. Редакционная коллегия выражает особую благодарность гуманитарно- политологическому центру «Стратегия» (президент Г. Э. Бурбулис) за содействие в издании серии