Policy Driven Licensing Model for Component Software

Today, it is almost inevitable that software is licensed, rather than sold outright. As a part of the licensing policy, some protection mechanisms, whether hardware, legal or code-based, are invariably built into the license. The application of such mechanisms has primarily been in the realm of off-the-shelf, packaged, consumer software. However, as component-based software gradually becomes mainstream in software development, new component-oriented licensing systems are required. This paper proposes an enterprise component licensing model for the management of software component licenses. The model provides a comprehensive license management framework allowing for extensibility and flexibility. Furthermore, we identify differences between stand-alone software and component software, describe a high level model for policy driven component licensing, and discuss both the benefits and drawbacks of the enterprise component licensing model for the management of software component licenses

Are Universities Patent Trolls?

Hold-up is a primary component of patent litigation and patent licensing today. Universities are engaged in an unprecedented surge in patenting. At the confluence of these seemingly unrelated developments is a growing frustration on the part of industry with the role of universities as patent owners. Time and again, when I talk to people in a variety of industries, their view is that universities are the new patent trolls. In this article, I argue that universities should take a broader view of their role in technology transfer. University technology transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely maximizing the university’s licensing revenue. Sometimes those goals will coincide with the university’s short-term financial interests. Sometimes universities will maximize the impact of an invention on society by granting exclusive licenses for substantial revenue to a company that will take the invention and commercialize it. Sometimes, but not always. At other times a non-exclusive license, particularly on a basic enabling technology, will ultimately maximize the invention’s impact on society by allowing a large number of people to commercialize in different areas, to try out different things and see if they work, and the like. University policies might be made more nuanced than simply a choice between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses. For example, they might grant fieldspecific exclusivity, or exclusivity only for a limited term, or exclusivity only for commercial sales while exempting research, and they might condition continued exclusivity on achievement of certain dissemination goals. Particularly in the software context, there are many circumstances in which the social impact of technology transfer is maximized either by the university not patenting at all or by granting licenses to those patents on a royalty-free basis to all comers. Finally, I think we can learn something about the raging debate over who is a patent troll and what to do about trolls by looking at university patents. Universities are non-practicing entities. They share some characteristics with trolls, at least if the term is broadly defined, but they are not trolls. Asking what distinguishes universities from trolls can actually help us figure out what concerns us about trolls. What we ought to do is abandon the search for a group of individual companies to define as bad actors. In my view, troll is as troll does. Universities will sometimes be bad actors. So will non-manufacturing patent owners. So will manufacturing patent owners. Instead of singling out bad actors, we should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them possible

Markets for technology (why do we see them, why don't we see more of them and why we should care)

This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy

Licensing and Business Models

License affects software companies’ business activities. While proprietary software vendors create custom licenses, open source companies have less flexibility. The Open Source Initiative (OSI) defines a list of 72 licenses as open source (“OSI approved”). For a project to follow open source licensing, it has to pick licenses from this set. Logically, we expect that an open source company defines its business model around the license that it selects. Thus, we can assume that business model decisions follow license choice. In our research we find that in some cases open source companies remove these license constraints for business reasons. We observed cases of open source companies moving from one OSI-approved license to another or companies innovating by adding additional terms. In all these cases, the decision of change is based on the license being a poor fit with their business goals. Not all open source companies are entitled to change the license because this option is available only to companies that own intellectual property. If they do not, they can try to reshape their business model, but that remains a suboptimal option. Whether cognizant of it or not, organizations are implicitly choosing a business model when they select a license. Therefore, it is very important to address licensing and business model decisions as one system instead of a disjointed two-step process. For this purpose we introduce (1) an evolutionary model where license selection and business model impact each other and (2) a taxonomy that addresses both licensing and business models. Our approach helps practitioners include revenue considerations in the licensing choice and researchers to more accurately study the antecedents and consequences of license choice.

Developing strategic learning alliances: partnerships for the provision of global education and training solutions

The paper describes a comprehensive model for the development of strategic alliances between education and corporate sectors, which is required to ensure effective provision of education and training programmes for a global market. Global economic forces, combined with recent advances in information and communication technologies, have provided unprecedented opportunities for education providers to broaden the provision of their programmes both on an international scale and across new sectors. Lifelong learning strategies are becoming increasingly recognized as an essential characteristic of a successful organization and therefore large organizations have shown a preparedness to invest in staff training and development. The demands for lifelong learning span a wide range of training and educational levels from school-level and vocational courses to graduate-level training for senior executive

Generating Value Through Open Source: Software Service Market Regulation and Licensing Policy

In the software industry, commercial open-source software vendors have recognized that providing services to help businesses derive greater value in the implementation of open source–based systems can be a profitable business model. Moreover, society may greatly benefit when software originators choose an open-source development strategy as their products become widely available, readily customizable, and open to community contributions. In this study, we present an economic model to study how software licensing attributes affect a software originator’s decisions, aiming to provide policy makers with insights into how welfare-improving, open-source outcomes can be incentivized. We show that when a competing contributor is apt at reaping the benefits of software development investment, a less restrictive open source license (e.g., Berkeley Software Distribution, or BSD style) can improve welfare. On the other hand, when the originator is better at leveraging investment and service costs are high, a more restrictive license (e.g., General Public License, or GPL style) can be best for social welfare even when a contributor can cost-efficiently develop the software. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2017.0726

The Abertay Code Bar – unlocking access to university-generated computer games intellectual poperty

Progress report on a digital platform and dual licensing model developed to unlock access to a University repository of new and legacy computer games based Intellectual Property (IP) assets for educational and commercial use. The digital creative industries have been identified by a number of governments as a priority area in delivering sustainable economic growth. Code Bar is an innovation that allows digital products to be commercially successful beyond the end of the Dare competition or coursework submission. To be selected for Code Bar, game products must be well designed for both player and market; technically robust (i.e. operating consistently and reliably on a single/multiple platforms), and be free from ambiguity around 3rd party IP. We describe various technical, pedagogic and legal challenges in developing the digital platform, licensing model and packaging of computer games products for release through the platform. The model is extendable beyond computer games to other software products

Concurrentie, innovatie en intellectuele eigendomsrechten in software markten

This study analyzes under which circumstances it may be desirable for the government to stimulate open source software as a response to market failures in software markets. To consider whether policy intervention can increase dynamic efficiency, we discuss the differences between proprietary software and open source software with respect to the incentives to innovate and market failures that may occur. The document proposes guidelines to determine which types of policy intervention may be suitable. Our most important finding is that directly stimulating open source software, e.g. by acting as a lead customer, can improve dynamic efficiency if (i) there is a serious customer lock-in problem, while (ii) to develop the software, there is no need to purchase specific, complementary inputs at a substantial cost, and (iii) follow-on innovations are socially valuable but there are impediments to contractual agreements between developers that aim at realizing such innovations. This publication is in Dutch.

JISC Preservation of Web Resources (PoWR) Handbook

Handbook of Web Preservation produced by the JISC-PoWR project which ran from April to November 2008. The handbook specifically addresses digital preservation issues that are relevant to the UK HE/FE web management community”. The project was undertaken jointly by UKOLN at the University of Bath and ULCC Digital Archives department