Mechanism Design With Approximate Player Types

We investigate mechanism design when the players do not exactly know their types, but have instead only partial information about them

Imitation in Large Games

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imitation rules. In the setting of games of infinite duration on finite graphs with preference orderings on outcomes for player types, we explore the possibility of imitation as a viable strategy. In our setup, the optimising players play bounded memory strategies and the imitators play according to specifications given by automata. We present algorithmic results on the eventual survival of types

Complexity of coalition structure generation

We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem for all coalitional games provided that player types are known and the number of player types is bounded by a constant. As a corollary, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal partition for weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and for coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills. We also consider well-studied and well-motivated coalitional games defined compactly on combinatorial domains. For these games, we characterize the complexity of computing an optimal coalition structure by presenting polynomial-time algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inapproximability lower bounds.Comment: 17 page

Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

The proceeding at: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place 2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.Publicad

Getting Down in the MUDs: A Ludological Perspective on Arguers

Dan Cohen (2018) and Michael Gilbert (1997) have variously emphasized the need for argumentation theorists to pay attention to ‘arguers’ and not just ‘arguments.’ Following Yong-Set (2016), this paper will suggest that ‘games’ can be leveraged to enrich an understanding of the ‘person’ aspect of argumentation. Ludology is the academic and critical study of games qua games, especially in terms of system design, player experience and the socio-cultural dynamics of gaming. By drawing upon and extending the lessons learned from ludologist Bartle’s (1996, 2012) analysis of the relation between player-types and games that successfully implement Multi-User-Dungeons (MUDs), I argue that a healthy ‘ecosystem for argument’ requires different ‘player types.’ The preferred activities that differentiate the player types each require the success of other player types to prosper. If a goal is to understand how real argumentation functions so that it can be bettered, one cannot define the scope of argumentation narrowly or reductively. This highlights the importance of adopting a conceptual framework – such as Gilbert’s “4 Modes of Argument” – that is rich and versatile enough to deal with the diversity necessarily found in the range of activities that involve arguers and the arguments in which they produce and share evidence

Dynamic multilateral markets

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from intra-coalitional bargaining. The latter is modeled as the ultimatum game with exogenous (time-invariant) recognition probabilities and unanimity acceptance rule. Players in agreeing coalitions leave the market and are replaced by their replicas, which keeps the pool of market participants constant over time. In this infinite game, we establish payoff uniqueness of stationary equilibria and the emergence of endogenous cooperation structures when traders experience some degree of (heterogeneous) bargaining frictions. When we focus on market games with different player types, we derive, under mild conditions, an explicit formula for each type's equilibrium payoff as the market frictions vanish

Player Types: A Meta-synthesis

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