1,760 research outputs found
Asymmetric majority pillage games
This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, âPillage and propertyâ), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage gamesâ predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agentsâ intrinsic contributions to a coalitionâs power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable setâs existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory
Rational expectations and farsighted stability
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional âmovesâ in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Nor does it restrict coalitions to hold common expectations regarding the continuation path from every state. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We resolve this difficulty by requiring all coalitions to have common rational expectations about the transition from one outcome to another. This leads to two related concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stabilit
Rational expectations and farsighted stability
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional âmovesâ in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We restrict coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate maximality regarding the continuation path. This leads to two related solution concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stabilit
Potentials in Social Environments
We develop and extend notions of potentials for normal-form games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to present a unified approach for the general class of social environments. The different potentials and corresponding social environments can be ordered in terms of their permissiveness. We classify different methods to construct potentials and we characterize potentials for specific examples such as matching problems, vote trading, multilateral trade, TU games, and various pillage games
Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Pillage games (Jordan, 2006a) have two features that make them richer than cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power externalities between coalitions; they allow resources to contribute to coalitionsâ power as well as to their utility. Extending von Neumann and Morgensternâs analysis of three agent games in characteristic function form to anonymous pillage games, we characterise the core for any number of agents; for three agents, all anonymous pillage games with an empty core represent the same dominance relation. When a stable set exists, and the game also satisfies a continuity and a responsiveness axiom, it is unique and contains no more than 15 elements, a tight bound. By contrast, stable sets in three agent games in characteristic or partition function form may not be unique, and may contain continua. Finally, we provide an algorithm for computing the stable set, and can easily decide non-existence. Thus, in addition to offering attractive modelling possibilities, pillage games seem well behaved and analytically tractable, overcoming a difficulty that has long impeded use of cooperative game theoryâs flexibility
Efficient sets are small
AbstractWe introduce efficient sets, a class of sets in Rp in which, in each set, no element is greater in all dimensions than any other. Neither differentiability nor continuity is required of such sets, which include: level sets of utility functions, quasi-indifference classes associated with a preference relation not given by a utility function, meanâvariance frontiers, production possibility frontiers, and Pareto efficient sets. By Lebesgueâs density theorem, efficient sets have p-dimensional measure zero. As Lebesgue measure provides an imprecise description of small sets, we then prove the stronger result that each efficient set in Rp has Hausdorff dimension at most pâ1. This may exceed its topological dimension, with the two notions becoming equivalent for smooth sets. We apply these results to stable sets in multi-good pillage games: for n agents and m goods, stable sets have dimension at most m(nâ1)â1. This implies, and is much stronger than, the result that stable sets have m(nâ1)-dimensional measure zero, as conjectured by Jordan
Stable cores in information graph games
In an information graph situation, a finite set of agents and a source are the set of nodes of an undirected graph with the property that two adjacent nodes can share information at no cost. The source has some information (or technology), and agents in the same component as the source can reach this information for free. In other components, some agent must pay a unitary cost to obtain the information. We prove that the core of the derived information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the information graph is cycle-complete, or equivalently if the game is concave. Otherwise, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. If the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related situation where one edge has been deleted.Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34Generalitat de Catalunya | Ref. 2017SGR778Agencia Estatal de InvestigaciĂłn | Ref. ECO2017-82241-RAgencia Estatal de InvestigaciĂłn | Ref. PID2020-113110GB-I0
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