PALs for Pals: The U.S. and Pakistan

Of all the nuclear arsenals in the world, Pakistan’s faces the most risk. With over forty terrorist organizations active within the country, frequent power fluxes between the military, government and intelligence agencies, and a history of security breaches plaguing its nuclear program, Pakistan makes North Korea seem secure and stable. With all the challenges that face the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, it still lacks one basic security technology, Permissive Action Links (PALs), which are use control devices that make it virtually impossible for any unauthorized person to detonate a nuclear weapon. Over the years, there have been barriers that have prevented Pakistan from integrating PALs into their arsenal, regardless of how much they will improve safety. Most of these reasons have revolved around the legality of a technology transfer; however, these legal obstructions are simply caused by inefficient rules left over from the Cold War. An investigation shows that these barriers are not insurmountable, and that PAL technology could in fact promote a much-needed modernization of international nonproliferation law

Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice

The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologies—nuclear, biological, cyber—that can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University

The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law

This Article will focus on the narrower questions of whether obtaining secret intelligence-that is, without the consent of the state that controls the information-is subject to international legal norms or constraints, and what restrictions, if any, control the use of this information once obtained. Traditional approaches to the question of the legitimacy of spying, when even asked, typically settle on one of two positions: either collecting secret intelligence remains illegal despite consistent practice, or apparent tolerance has led to a deep but reluctant admission of the lawfulness of such intelligence gathering, when conducted within customary normative limits.” Other writers have examined possible consequences in terms of state responsibility of intelligence activities that may amount to violations of international law. Given the ongoing importance to states of both intelligence and counterintelligence, such issues may never be resolved conclusively. There is little prospect, for example, of concluding a convention defining the legal boundaries of intelligence gathering, if only because most states would be unwilling to commit themselves to any standards they might wish to impose on others

The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law

This Article will focus on the narrower questions of whether obtaining secret intelligence-that is, without the consent of the state that controls the information-is subject to international legal norms or constraints, and what restrictions, if any, control the use of this information once obtained. Traditional approaches to the question of the legitimacy of spying, when even asked, typically settle on one of two positions: either collecting secret intelligence remains illegal despite consistent practice, or apparent tolerance has led to a deep but reluctant admission of the lawfulness of such intelligence gathering, when conducted within customary normative limits.” Other writers have examined possible consequences in terms of state responsibility of intelligence activities that may amount to violations of international law. Given the ongoing importance to states of both intelligence and counterintelligence, such issues may never be resolved conclusively. There is little prospect, for example, of concluding a convention defining the legal boundaries of intelligence gathering, if only because most states would be unwilling to commit themselves to any standards they might wish to impose on others

U.S. AND PRC STRATEGIC COMPETITION: CYBER AND RISK AVERSION

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) altered its calculations from the aftermath of the 1990 Persian Gulf war and placed emphasis on the importance of technology and information. The PRC created the Strategic Support Force (SSF), which became operational in 2015, and includes space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities under one command. Meanwhile, the U.S. has wrapped itself in structural and cultural limitations, which hinder operational tempo. This thesis examined how the Department of Defense can adjust its positions on Cyber Titles, authorities, permissions, and risk aversion in leadership to maintain a competitive edge against the threat of the PRC’s SSF in the cyber domain. This thesis used system dynamics to model the economies of both the U.S. and the PRC into cyber capabilities, which resulted in an understanding that allocating additional money alone will not solve the core issue. Understanding the limitations of cultural biases, and using decision-making tools such as prospect theory, leaders can make more effective decisions. Through proper education of staff officers about cyber capabilities and their effects, integration of cyber operations at combat training centers, and pushing permissions and rules of engagements down to Task Force Commanders, the U.S. can overcome the structural and cultural obstacles.Major, United States ArmyMajor, United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Space Systems: Emerging Technologies and Operations

SPACE SYSTEMS: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND OPERATIONS is our seventh textbook in a series covering the world of UASs / CUAS/ UUVs. Other textbooks in our series are Drone Delivery of CBNRECy – DEW Weapons: Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD); Disruptive Technologies with applications in Airline, Marine, Defense Industries; Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations On Air, Sea, Land; Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations; Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition; and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain Protecting USA\u27s Advanced Air Assets, 1st edition. Our previous six titles have received considerable global recognition in the field. (Nichols & Carter, 2022) (Nichols et al., 2021) (Nichols R. K. et al., 2020) (Nichols R. et al., 2020) (Nichols R. et al., 2019) (Nichols R. K., 2018) Our seventh title takes on a new purview of Space. Let\u27s think of Space as divided into four regions. These are Planets, solar systems, the great dark void (which fall into the purview of astronomers and astrophysics), and the Dreamer Region. The earth, from a measurement standpoint, is the baseline of Space. It is the purview of geographers, engineers, scientists, politicians, and romantics. Flying high above the earth are Satellites. Military and commercial organizations govern their purview. The lowest altitude at which air resistance is low enough to permit a single complete, unpowered orbit is approximately 80 miles (125 km) above the earth\u27s surface. Normal Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite launches range between 99 miles (160 km) to 155 miles (250 km). Satellites in higher orbits experience less drag and can remain in Space longer in service. Geosynchronous orbit is around 22,000 miles (35,000 km). However, orbits can be even higher. UASs (Drones) have a maximum altitude of about 33,000 ft (10 km) because rotating rotors become physically limiting. (Nichols R. et al., 2019) Recreational drones fly at or below 400 ft in controlled airspace (Class B, C, D, E) and are permitted with prior authorization by using a LAANC or DroneZone. Recreational drones are permitted to fly at or below 400 ft in Class G (uncontrolled) airspace. (FAA, 2022) However, between 400 ft and 33,000 ft is in the purview of DREAMERS. In the DREAMERS region, Space has its most interesting technological emergence. We see emerging technologies and operations that may have profound effects on humanity. This is the mission our book addresses. We look at the Dreamer Region from three perspectives:1) a Military view where intelligence, jamming, spoofing, advanced materials, and hypersonics are in play; 2) the Operational Dreamer Region; whichincludes Space-based platform vulnerabilities, trash, disaster recovery management, A.I., manufacturing, and extended reality; and 3) the Humanitarian Use of Space technologies; which includes precision agriculture wildlife tracking, fire risk zone identification, and improving the global food supply and cattle management. Here’s our book’s breakdown: SECTION 1 C4ISR and Emerging Space Technologies. C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Four chapters address the military: Current State of Space Operations; Satellite Killers and Hypersonic Drones; Space Electronic Warfare, Jamming, Spoofing, and ECD; and the challenges of Manufacturing in Space. SECTION 2: Space Challenges and Operations covers in five chapters a wide purview of challenges that result from operations in Space, such as Exploration of Key Infrastructure Vulnerabilities from Space-Based Platforms; Trash Collection and Tracking in Space; Leveraging Space for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Bio-threats to Agriculture and Solutions From Space; and rounding out the lineup is a chapter on Modelling, Simulation, and Extended Reality. SECTION 3: Humanitarian Use of Space Technologies is our DREAMERS section. It introduces effective use of Drones and Precision Agriculture; and Civilian Use of Space for Environmental, Wildlife Tracking, and Fire Risk Zone Identification. SECTION 3 is our Hope for Humanity and Positive Global Change. Just think if the technologies we discuss, when put into responsible hands, could increase food production by 1-2%. How many more millions of families could have food on their tables? State-of-the-Art research by a team of fifteen SMEs is incorporated into our book. We trust you will enjoy reading it as much as we have in its writing. There is hope for the future.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1047/thumbnail.jp

Fiscal Year 2000

Sandia recently completed an updated strategic plan, the essence of which is presented in chapter 4. Sandia`s Strategic Plan 1994 takes its direction from DOE`s Fueling a Competitive Economy: Strategic Plan and provides tangible guidance for Sandia`s programs and operations. Although it is impossible to foresee precisely what activities Sandia will pursue many years from now, the strategic plan makes one point clear: the application of our scientific and engineering skills to the stewardship of the nation`s nuclear deterrent will be central to our service to the nation. We will provide the necessary institutional memory and continuity, experience base, and technical expertise to ensure the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. As a multiprogram laboratory, Sandia will also continue to focus maximum effort on a broad spectrum of other topics consistent with DOE`s enduring core mission responsibilities: Defense (related to nuclear weapons), Energy, Environment (related to waste management and environmental remediation), and Basic Science

End-to-end security in active networks

Active network solutions have been proposed to many of the problems caused by the increasing heterogeneity of the Internet. These ystems allow nodes within the network to process data passing through in several ways. Allowing code from various sources to run on routers introduces numerous security concerns that have been addressed by research into safe languages, restricted execution environments, and other related areas. But little attention has been paid to an even more critical question: the effect on end-to-end security of active flow manipulation. This thesis first examines the threat model implicit in active networks. It develops a framework of security protocols in use at various layers of the networking stack, and their utility to multimedia transport and flow processing, and asks if it is reasonable to give active routers access to the plaintext of these flows. After considering the various security problem introduced, such as vulnerability to attacks on intermediaries or coercion, it concludes not. We then ask if active network systems can be built that maintain end-to-end security without seriously degrading the functionality they provide. We describe the design and analysis of three such protocols: a distributed packet filtering system that can be used to adjust multimedia bandwidth requirements and defend against denial-of-service attacks; an efficient composition of link and transport-layer reliability mechanisms that increases the performance of TCP over lossy wireless links; and a distributed watermarking servicethat can efficiently deliver media flows marked with the identity of their recipients. In all three cases, similar functionality is provided to designs that do not maintain end-to-end security. Finally, we reconsider traditional end-to-end arguments in both networking and security, and show that they have continuing importance for Internet design. Our watermarking work adds the concept of splitting trust throughout a network to that model; we suggest further applications of this idea