The People’s Republic of China (PRC) altered its calculations from the aftermath of the 1990 Persian Gulf war and placed emphasis on the importance of technology and information. The PRC created the Strategic Support Force (SSF), which became operational in 2015, and includes space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities under one command. Meanwhile, the U.S. has wrapped itself in structural and cultural limitations, which hinder operational tempo. This thesis examined how the Department of Defense can adjust its positions on Cyber Titles, authorities, permissions, and risk aversion in leadership to maintain a competitive edge against the threat of the PRC’s SSF in the cyber domain. This thesis used system dynamics to model the economies of both the U.S. and the PRC into cyber capabilities, which resulted in an understanding that allocating additional money alone will not solve the core issue. Understanding the limitations of cultural biases, and using decision-making tools such as prospect theory, leaders can make more effective decisions. Through proper education of staff officers about cyber capabilities and their effects, integration of cyber operations at combat training centers, and pushing permissions and rules of engagements down to Task Force Commanders, the U.S. can overcome the structural and cultural obstacles.Major, United States ArmyMajor, United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited
