Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Standpoint Logic: A Logic for Handling Semantic Variability, with Applications to Forestry Information

It is widely accepted that most natural language expressions do not have precise universally agreed definitions that fix their meanings. Except in the case of certain technical terminology, humans use terms in a variety of ways that are adapted to different contexts and perspectives. Hence, even when conversation participants share the same vocabulary and agree on fundamental taxonomic relationships (such as subsumption and mutual exclusivity), their view on the specific meaning of terms may differ significantly. Moreover, even individuals themselves may not hold permanent points of view, but rather adopt different semantics depending on the particular features of the situation and what they wish to communicate. In this thesis, we analyse logical and representational aspects of the semantic variability of natural language terms. In particular, we aim to provide a formal language adequate for reasoning in settings where different agents may adopt particular standpoints or perspectives, thereby narrowing the semantic variability of the vague language predicates in different ways. For that purpose, we present standpoint logic, a framework for interpreting languages in the presence of semantic variability. We build on supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, which explain linguistic indeterminacy in terms of a collection of possible interpretations of the terms of the language (precisifications). This is extended by adding the notion of standpoint, which intuitively corresponds to a particular point of view on how to interpret vague terminology, and may be taken by a person or institution in a relevant context. A standpoint is modelled by sets of precisifications compatible with that point of view and does not need to be fully precise. In this way, standpoint logic allows one to articulate finely grained and structured stipulations of the varieties of interpretation that can be given to a vague concept or a set of related concepts and also provides means to express relationships between different systems of interpretation. After the specification of precisifications and standpoints and the consideration of the relevant notions of truth and validity, a multi-modal logic language for describing standpoints is presented. The language includes a modal operator for each standpoint, such that \standb{s}\phi means that a proposition $\phi$ is unequivocally true according to the standpoint $s$ --- i.e.\ $\phi$ is true at all precisifications compatible with $s$. We provide the logic with a Kripke semantics and examine the characteristics of its intended models. Furthermore, we prove the soundness, completeness and decidability of standpoint logic with an underlying propositional language, and show that the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. We subsequently illustrate how this language can be used to represent logical properties and connections between alternative partial models of a domain and different accounts of the semantics of terms. As proof of concept, we explore the application of our formal framework to the domain of forestry, and in particular, we focus on the semantic variability of `forest'. In this scenario, the problematic arising of the assignation of different meanings has been repeatedly reported in the literature, and it is especially relevant in the context of the unprecedented scale of publicly available geographic data, where information and databases, even when ostensibly linked to ontologies, may present substantial semantic variation, which obstructs interoperability and confounds knowledge exchange

The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of _Better Than_

The Rachels–Temkin spectrum arguments against the transitivity of better than involve good or bad experiences, lives, or outcomes that vary along multiple dimensions—e.g., duration and intensity of pleasure or pain. This paper presents variations on these arguments involving combinations of good and bad experiences, which have even more radical implications than the violation of transitivity. These variations force opponents of transitivity to conclude that something good is worse than something that isn’t good, on pain of rejecting the good altogether. That is impossible, so we must reject the spectrum arguments

Gradable adjectives and the semantics of locatives

This dissertation develops a semantic model of gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’, ‘good’, ‘big’, ‘heavy’, etc., within a formal semantic theory of locatives we call Locative Structure Semantics (LSS). Our central hypothesis is that gradable adjectives are, semantically, a species of locative expression. The view of gradable adjectives as locatives is inspired by the vector-based semantic models of Vector Space Semantics (VSS), as well as the notion of perspective or point of view, as found in Leonard Talmy’s research on spatial expressions (Talmy [153]) and the tradition of Situation Semantics (cf. Barwise and Perry [9, p. 39]). Following Barwise and Seligman [11], we construe the contextual variability that characterises gradable adjectives in terms of shifts in cognitive perspective. We argue that perspectives are a formal part of a semantic representational structure that is shared by expressions from several different domains, which we refer to as a locative structure (L-structure). The notion of an L-structure is influenced by Reichenbach’s notion of tense, and can be thought of as a generalisation of the Reichenbachian notion of tense to the realm of concepts. Reichenbach [134] proposed that each temporal expression is associated with three time points: a speech point, S, an event point, E, and reference point, R, where E refers to the time point corresponding to the event described by the tensed clause, S is (usually) taken to be the speaker’s time of utterance, and R is a temporal reference point relevant to the utterance. In LSS we extend this tripartite scheme to locative expressions in general, to which we assign a ternary structure comprising a Perspective, a Figure, and a Ground, represented symbolically as P, F, and G, and which are generalisations of the Reichenbachian S, E, and R, respectively. We show that a formal semantics based on L-structures enables us to capture important crosscategorial similarities between gradable adjectives, tenses, and spatial prepositions

Affective value in the predictive mind

Although affective value is fundamental in explanations of behavior, it is still a somewhat alien concept in cognitive science. It implies a normativity or directionality that mere information processing models cannot seem to provide. In this paper we trace how affective value can emerge from information processing in the brain, as described by predictive processing. We explain the grounding of predictive processing in homeostasis, and articulate the implications this has for the concept of reward and motivation. However, at first sight, this new conceptualization creates a strong tension with conventional ideas on reward and affective experience. We propose this tension can be resolved by realizing that valence, a core component of all emotions, might be the reflection of a specific aspect of predictive information processing, namely the dynamics in prediction errors across time and the expectations we, in turn, form about these dynamics. Specifically, positive affect seems to be caused by positive rates of prediction error reduction, while negative affect is induced by a shift in a state with lower prediction errors to one with higher prediction errors (i.e., a negative rate of error reduction). We also consider how intense emotional episodes might be related to unexpected changes in prediction errors, suggesting that we also build (meta)predictions on error reduction rates. Hence in this account emotions appear as the continuous non-conceptual feedback on evolving —increasing or decreasing—uncertainties relative to our predictions. The upshot of this view is that the various emotions, from “basic” ones to the non-typical ones such as humor, curiosity and aesthetic affects, can be shown to follow a single underlying logic. Our analysis takes several cues from existing emotion theories but deviates from them in revealing ways. The account on offer does not just specify the interactions between emotion and cognition, rather it entails a deep integration of the two

Planning at the edge - aspects on inter-municipal and border related spatial planning in a new Swedish geography

This licentiate thesis investigates how municipal division and local borders may affect spatial planning and the possibilities for coordination of inter-municipal and cross-border planning issues, which has become increasingly important in recent decades as a result of, amongst other things, regional enlargement and an emerging need for increased environmental consideration and climate change adaptation. The overall question, which derives from the author's many years of professional experience as a planning architect, is examined through two studies, presented in two different papers: The first paper explores the problem from a municipal perspective through a case study of two municipalities, Hallsberg and Kumla, with a long history of border related conflicts and collaborations, while the second paper examines the question primarily from a state perspective by investigating the Swedish planning system and municipal division in relation to certain recent geographical changes. Generally, the findings indicate that municipal borders are increasingly suboptimal due to the discrepancy between the emerging new geography and the “old” geography that has formed the basis of both municipal division and the planning legislation. Local geography and territorial conditions are thereby being increasingly influential to the process and outcome of spatial planning. On a theoretical note, the thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of the complex local border geography and helps to bring the discussion on planning back to a geographical, and territorial context

Data-Driven Constitutional Avoidance

This article uses a case study to explain how empirical analysis can promote judicial modesty. In Matal v. Tam, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked the First Amendment to strike down the Lanham Act\u27s bar on federal registration of disparaging trademarks. The Tam decision has great constitutional significance. It expands First Amendment coverage into a new field of economic regulation, and it deepens the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint-based speech regulations. This article contends that empirical analysis could have given the Court a narrower basis for the Tam result, one that would have avoided the fraught First Amendment issues the Court decided. The Tam challenge came from an Asian-American rock band that calls itself The Slants -as a means to re-appropriate an anti-Asian slur. The authors performed an original empirical study of how Americans understand the term slants. The data show that both Asian-Americans and non-Asian-Americans understand the term variably based on its context. Both groups recognize the term\u27s derogatory meaning, but they also understand the use of the term by an Asian-American band as an effort to re-appropriate the derogatory term. This contextual variation in how Americans understand the term slants exposes the incoherence of the Lanham Act\u27s flat treatment of certain terms as uniformly disparaging. That incoherence supports the legal conclusion that the disparagement bar is unconstitutionally vague. A finding of vagueness in Tam would have achieved relative constitutional avoidance, invalidating the disparagement bar on a narrower, less constitutionally significant ground than the actual decision\u27s First Amendment analysis. Constitutional avoidance serves judicial modesty values that courts and our broader legal culture tend to portray favorably. This article\u27s study and analysis provide a model for other situations in which empirical data can give courts a path to constitutional avoidance

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