Incentive-driven QoS in peer-to-peer overlays

A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software, hardware and configuration of peers. Thus, each peer can selfishly adapt its behaviour to maximise its benefit from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives, while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay. The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services. This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive mechanism by providing efficient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lagsensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions. When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microeconomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required, along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions. Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely allocate their traffic flows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares fitting of the cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP profit maximisation

PAYING FOR A PUBLIC GOOD IN MONEY OR TIME: IS THERE A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE? AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSUMERS' PREFERENCES FOR COMMUNITY-WIDE RECYCLING

This paper investigates consumers willingness to pay money (WTPM) and willingness to pay time (WTPT) for an improvement in a public good. Joint estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the value of time, in the context of an increase in community-wide recycling, suggests that consumers have a higher money-equivalent WTP when they are directly involved in the provision of the public good, through their time effort. We conclude that the "payment currency" matters. This may have important implications for the design and promotion of public programs aimed at producing improved public good provision.Public Economics,

See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams

Transparency in teams can facilitate cooperation. We study contribution decisions by agents when previous decisions can be observed. We find that an information chain, in which each agent directly observes only the decision of her immediate predecessor, is at least as effective as a fully-transparent protocol in inducing cooperation under increasing returns to scale. In a comparable social dilemma, the information chain leads to high cooperation both in early movers when compared to a non-transparent protocol and in late movers when compared to a fully-transparent protocol. we conclude that information chains facilitate cooperation by balancing positive and negative reciprocity.team production, public goods, incentives, externality, information, transparency, conditional cooperation

Social Software, Groups, and Governance

Formal groups play an important role in the law. Informal groups largely lie outside it. Should the law be more attentive to informal groups? The paper argues that this and related questions are appearing more frequently as a number of computer technologies, which I collect under the heading social software, increase the salience of groups. In turn, that salience raises important questions about both the significance and the benefits of informal groups. The paper suggests that there may be important social benefits associated with informal groups, and that the law should move towards a framework for encouraging and recognizing them. Such a framework may be organized along three dimensions by which groups arise and sustain themselves: regulating places, things, and stories

What\u27s Your Currency and How Do You Use It? Exploring the Ways Staff on Campus Use Non-Monetary Forms of Payment: A Grounded Theory Study of Nonmaterial Culture

The purpose of this grounded theory study was to create a model that illustrates different types of personal currency among staff at Freedom One University (a pseudonym) and how that currency is being used, by exploring motives for this behavior and gathering information on awareness of this behavior. A constructivist grounded theory approach was utilized as it allows for the analysis of data to construct what is needed from the next set of gathered data (Cooney, 2011). Through grounded theory, a reason for an event, or possibly the cause for an event will become clear, which a theory will explain (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). This research and its findings fill a gap in the literature by way of empirical report of university culture centered on a metaphor of currency. The theories guiding this research are those that have an impact on, what (self-determination theory) (Ryan & Deci, 2000) motivates adults to make decisions within a peer culture, and why an informal rewards system (social learning theory) (Bandura, 1977) contributes to staff using their skills, personality, and influence to persuade the employee’s environment. The data analysis strategy used in this study is borrowed from Braun and Clark’s thematic analysis which reminds this experimenter to be strict about explaining the reasons for every action performed (Braun & Clark, 2006). A question of this study is, “How is one to influence, compel, be awarded favor, be liked, socially bond with peers, obtain advancement, or receive favors at work, in an environment where money is not a suitable form of exchange?” This research generated a model that shows what types of currency staff are using on campus at Freedom One University and which of their talents and skills are being traded with one another

Collaborative production and the transformation of publishing: The case of Wattpad

This chapter investigates the social reading and writing platform Wattpad as a site of collaborative production and consumption. I consider Wattpad as a community of readers and writers engaging in a process of creative dialogue and collaborative production of a shared commons and also as a transactional marketplace in which these readers and writers engage in the creation and circulation of value and exchange of services. I then go on to examine the various ways in which Wattpad, as both community and marketplace, articulates with the world of traditional publishing and the wider field of commerce: providing a launch pad for fledgling writers, an audience development opportunity for established writers and a marketing service for brands. Having considered these aspects, I argue that Wattpad’s fan community represents an emerging economic force and model within publishing. Furthermore, drawing on the work of Berlant and Arvidsson, I consider the extent to which this community might have the potential to function as a ‘productive consumer public’ and to exercise social and political as well as economic influence

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON