Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field

Fault-tolerant routing in peer-to-peer systems

We consider the problem of designing an overlay network and routing mechanism that permits finding resources efficiently in a peer-to-peer system. We argue that many existing approaches to this problem can be modeled as the construction of a random graph embedded in a metric space whose points represent resource identifiers, where the probability of a connection between two nodes depends only on the distance between them in the metric space. We study the performance of a peer-to-peer system where nodes are embedded at grid points in a simple metric space: a one-dimensional real line. We prove upper and lower bounds on the message complexity of locating particular resources in such a system, under a variety of assumptions about failures of either nodes or the connections between them. Our lower bounds in particular show that the use of inverse power-law distributions in routing, as suggested by Kleinberg (1999), is close to optimal. We also give efficient heuristics to dynamically maintain such a system as new nodes arrive and old nodes depart. Finally, we give experimental results that suggest promising directions for future work.Comment: Full version of PODC 2002 paper. New version corrects missing conditioning in Lemma 9 and some related details in the proof of Theorem 10, with no changes to main result

Symmetric Replication for Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems

Structured peer-to-peer systems rely on replication as a basic means to provide fault-tolerance in presence of high churn. Most select replicas using either multiple hash functions, successor-lists, or leaf-sets. We show that all three alternatives have limitations. We present and provide full algorithmic speci¯cation for a generic replication scheme called symmetric replication which only needs O(1) message for every join and leave operation to maintain any replication degree. The scheme is applicable to all existing structured peer-to-peer systems, and can be implemented on-top of any DHT. The scheme has been implemented in our DKS system, and is used to do load-balancing, end-to-end fault-tolerance, and to increase the security by using distributed voting. We outline an extension to the scheme, implemented in DKS, which adds routing proximity to reduce latencies. The scheme is particularly suitable for use with erasure codes, as it can be used to fetch a random subset of the replicas for decoding

Estimating Self-Sustainability in Peer-to-Peer Swarming Systems

Peer-to-peer swarming is one of the \emph{de facto} solutions for distributed content dissemination in today's Internet. By leveraging resources provided by clients, swarming systems reduce the load on and costs to publishers. However, there is a limit to how much cost savings can be gained from swarming; for example, for unpopular content peers will always depend on the publisher in order to complete their downloads. In this paper, we investigate this dependence. For this purpose, we propose a new metric, namely \emph{swarm self-sustainability}. A swarm is referred to as self-sustaining if all its blocks are collectively held by peers; the self-sustainability of a swarm is the fraction of time in which the swarm is self-sustaining. We pose the following question: how does the self-sustainability of a swarm vary as a function of content popularity, the service capacity of the users, and the size of the file? We present a model to answer the posed question. We then propose efficient solution methods to compute self-sustainability. The accuracy of our estimates is validated against simulation. Finally, we also provide closed-form expressions for the fraction of time that a given number of blocks is collectively held by peers.Comment: 27 pages, 5 figure

Bootstrapping the Long Tail in Peer to Peer Systems

We describe an efficient incentive mechanism for P2P systems that generates a wide diversity of content offerings while responding adaptively to customer demand. Files are served and paid for through a parimutuel market similar to that commonly used for betting in horse races. An analysis of the performance of such a system shows that there exists an equilibrium with a long tail in the distribution of content offerings, which guarantees the real time provision of any content regardless of its popularity

Robust peer-to-peer systems

textPeer-to-peer (p2p) approaches are an increasingly effective way to deploy services. Popular examples include BitTorrent, Skype, and KaZaA. These approaches are attractive because they can be highly fault-tolerant, scalable, adaptive, and less expensive than a more centralized solution. Cooperation lies at the heart of these strengths. Yet, in settings where working together is crucial, a natural question is: "What if users stop cooperating?" After all, cooperative services are typically deployed over multiple administrative domains, and thus vulnerable to Byzantine failures and users who may act selfishly. This dissertation explores how to construct p2p systems to tolerate Byzantine participants while also incentivizing selfish participants to contribute resources. We describe how to balance obedience against choice in building a robust p2p live streaming system. Imposing obedience is desirable as it leaves little room for peers to attack or cheat the system. However, providing choice is also attractive as it allows us to engineer flexible and efficient solutions. We first focus on obedience by using Nash equilibria to drive the design of BAR Gossip, the first gossip protocol that is resilient to Byzantine and selfish nodes. BAR Gossip relies on verifiable pseudo-random partner selection to eliminate non-determinism, which can be used to game the system, while maintaining the robustness and rapid convergence of traditional gossip. A novel fair enough exchange primitive entices cooperation among selfish peers on short timescales, thereby avoiding the need for distributed reputation schemes. We next focus on tempering obedience with choice by using approximate equilibria to guide the construction of a novel p2p live streaming system. These equilibria allow us to design incentives to limit selfish behavior rigorously, yet provide sufficient flexibility to build practical systems. We show the advantages of using an [element of]-Nash equilibrium, instead of an exact Nash, to design and implement FlightPath, our live streaming system that uses bandwidth efficiently, absorbs flash crowds, adapts to sudden peer departures, handles churn, and tolerates malicious activity.Computer Science