5,704 research outputs found
Psychic embedding â vision and delusion
The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition and delusive ideation. We speculate that the task at which delusional schizophrenic patients falter is not necessarily of perception, but rather of model selection. Failure of the psychotic patient to correctly choose the embedding parameters may readily lead to misinterpretation of an accurate perception through an altered reconstructed of the object perceived
The Language of Mental Illness
This paper surveys some philosophical issues with the language surrounding mental illness, but is especially focused on pejoratives relating to mental illness. I argue that though 'crazy' and similar mental illness-based epithets (MI-epithets) are not best understood as slurs, they do function to isolate, exclude, and marginalize members of the targeted group in ways similar to the harmfulness of slurs more generally. While they do not generally express the hate/contempt characteristic of weaponized uses of slurs, MI-epithets perpetuate epistemic injustice by portraying sufferers of mental illness as deserving minimal credibility. After outlining the ways in which these epithets can cause harm, I examine available legal and social remedies, and suggest that the best path going forward is to pursue a reclamation project rather than aiming to censure the use of MI-epithets
The bridge between classical and âsyntheticâ/chemical psychoses: towards a clinical, psychopathological and therapeutic perspective
© 2019 Orsolini, Chiappini, Papanti, De Berardis, Corkery and Schifano. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.The critical spread and dissemination of novel psychoactive substances (NPS), particularly among the most vulnerable youngsters, may pose a further concern about the psychotic trajectories related to the intake of new synthetic drugs. The psychopathological pattern of the ânew psychosesâ appears to be extremely different from the classical presentation. Therefore, clinicians need more data on these new synthetic psychoses and recommendations on how to manage them. The present mini-review aims at deepening both the clinical, psychopathological features of synthetic/chemical NPS-induced psychoses and their therapeutic strategies, according to the different NPS classes implicated, by underlining the main differences with the âclassicalâ psychoses. A comprehensive review was conducted using the PubMed/Medline database by combining the search strategy of free-text terms and exploding a range of MESH headings relating to the topics of novel psychoactive substances and synthetic/chemical psychoses as follows: {(Novel Psychoactive Substances[Title/Abstract]) AND Psychosis[Title/Abstract])} and for each NPS categories as well, focusing on synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones, without time and/or language restrictions. Finally, an overview of the main clinical and psychopathological features between classical versus NPS-induced chemical/synthetic psychoses is provided for clinicians working with dual disorders and addiction psychiatry. Further insight is given here on therapeutic strategies and practical guidelines for managing patients affected with synthetic/chemical NPS-induced psychoses.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio
Intentional Minds: A Philosophical Analysis of Intention Tested through fMRI Experiments Involving People with Schizophrenia, People with Autism, and Healthy Individuals
In this paper we show how we empirically tested one of the most relevant topics in philosophy of mind through a series of fMRI experiments: the classification of different types of intention. To this aim, firstly we trace a theoretical distinction among private, prospective, and communicative intentions. Second, we propose a set of predictions concerning the recognition of these three types of intention in healthy individuals, and we report the experimental results corroborating our theoretical model of intention. Third, we derive from our model predictions relevant for the domain of psychopathological functioning. In particular, we treat the cases of both hyper-intentionality (as in paranoid schizophrenia) and hypo-intentionality (as in autistic spectrum disorders). Our conclusion is that the theoretical model of intention we propose contributes to enlarge our knowledge on the neurobiological bases of intention processing, in both healthy people and in people with impairments to the neurocognitive system that underlies intention recognition
A Logical Defence of Maher's Model of Polythematic Delusions
We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequacy with Brendan Maher's account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is respectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model
A second-person model to anomalous social cognition
Reports of patients with schizophrenia show a fragmented and anomalous subjective experience. This pathological subjective experience, we suggest, can be related to the fact that disembodiment inhibits the possibility of intersubjective experience, and more importantly of common sense. In this paper, we ask how to investigate the anomalous experience both from qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. To our knowledge, few studies have focused on a clinical combination of both first- phenomenological assessment and third-person biological methods, especially for Schizophrenia, or ASD therapeutics and diagnosis. We will thus attempt to bring forward a second-person scientific design, accounting for both the first-person subjective experiential aspects, and respective third-person neurobiological correlates of embodied aesthetics in anomalous experience. From this proposal, we further explore the consequences to clinical and research practice
Ontologies, Mental Disorders and Prototypes
As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces
Th.o.m.a.s.: An exploratory assessment of Theory of Mind in schizophrenic subjects
A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first vs. second order, first vs. third person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM. Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM
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Mental illness and recovery: an interpretative phenomenological analysis of the experiences of Black African service users in England
Background: Research conceptualising recovery is predominantly Eurocentric. This paper develops the conceptualisation of recovery by Black African service users.
Aims: Our aim was to explore Black African service usersâ experiences of recovery from mental illness and to understand how they conceptualise recovery. Methods: Using a qualitative research approach and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 Black African service users recovering from mental illness in England.
Results: Participants conceptualised recovery as a pragmatic and subjective concept distributed across a continuum of clinical, functional and spiritual dimensions, resilience, identity and their social and cultural backgrounds.
Conclusions: It seems critical for all stakeholders to ensure that these components are embedded in recovery-oriented services for Black African service users
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