Government and private sector joint venturing in natural resource development: The Queensland plantation forestry joint venture scheme

This paper examines the role of joint ventures between government and resource owners to develop natural resources, with particular reference for forestry plantations. Findings of a survey of landholders participating or expressing interest in the Queensland Plantation Joint Venture Scheme are presented. Joint venture arrangements are found to overcome investment constraints, particularly with respect to capital, technical knowledge and resource security. Complementarities between resource supplies of joint venture partners lead to increased output relative to wholly owned investments. Participants expressed a high degree of satisfaction with this program, although making some suggestions for changes in arrangements. Plantation joint ventures can contribute towards timber self-sufficiency and to ecologically sustainable land-use. Opportunities exist for joint ventures between government and private firms with respect to other natural-resource-based enterprises where market failure is apparent

Overcoming India’s Food Security Challenges: The Role of Intellectual Property Management and Technology Transfer Capacity Building

The growth of the Indian economy after Independence has had little impact on the food security of the country. The paper analyses the development of advanced crop varieties through the use of agricultural technologies (hereinafter agbiotech ) within the technology transfer system, a framework which comprises of the interactions of intellectual property rights law and agricultural research and development in India. Through this, the author argues that agricultural innovation in India is failing due to the absence of connections within the technology transfer system and advocates for the creation of a national program aimed at advancing IP and tech-transfer capacity in agbiotech

Synthesis of Public-Private Partnerships: Potential Issues and Best Practices for Program and Project Implementation and Administration

Public-private partnerships (P3s or PPPs) offer an innovative procurement method for the public sector. P3s involve collaborations between the public and private sectors to finance, develop or maintain transportation infrastructure. In an era of shrinking budgets and increased demand for transportation infrastructure, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) can analyze experiences in other states to determine a best path forward on the issue of P3s. The objective of this study is to examine benefits and drawbacks of using P3s, current trends and past performance of P3s in the procurement of state transportation infrastructure projects, and common legislative statutes relating to P3s. The team reviewed literature that broadly related to privatization. Then they defined P3s according to the parameters laid out by the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA). This report contains: 1) guidance and best practices that can be used to help ensure successful P3 implementation, 2) case studies that describe P3 experiences and lessons learned, 3) a list of factors that policymakers should consider as they deliberate on whether a P3 is the best procurement option for specific projects. The research conclusively demonstrated that P3s have become more widely used for transportation infrastructure projects in the United States in recent years. Policymakers must thoughtfully weigh risks and benefits before approving P3 agreements. If Kentucky moves ahead with a transportation P3 program, future research would be geared toward studying the performance of projects and toward gathering lessons learned

Corn Stover for Ethanol Production: Potential and Pitfalls

Analyzes the environmental and economic effects, including increased erosion and greenhouse gas emissions, of harvesting agricultural residues for ethanol production under different practices and policies. Includes policy recommendations

Information, accounting, and the regulation of concessioned infrastructure monopolies

Economists often characterize the regulation of monopolies as a"game"(between the regulator and the service provider) in which the two players do not share the same information. The regulator is assumed to have poorer information than the service provider about the scope of future efficiency gains and the size and timing of future investment plans. Over time, the regulator must increase its information base so that regulatory targets become more realistic - but this is a costly process. The authors examine the ways such information can and should be generated, especially throughthe accounting requirements a regulator can impose on private operators of infrastructure concessions. (They view concessioning and regulation as complementary, not substitute, activities.) Concessionaires should provide regulators with the information they need to: 1) Compare outcomes with expectations. 2) Evaluate the cost of adverse shocks that may warrant relaxed regulations. 3) Evaluate whether lower costs than expected are the result of better performance or diminished output. 4) Properly evaluate the asset base and charge for the consumption of capital. Information that regulators get from private operators of infrastructure monopolies should be used to make both regulators and concessionaires accountable. In Chile, for example, the privatization of monopolies led to significant efficiency gains, but it took a long time for these gains to be passed on to users because neither the firms nor the regulators were held accountable - until Congress expressed reluctance to endorse further privatization because earlier waves of privatization had not benefited consumers. In other words, information should be used to make regulatory decisions more transparent and to reduce the risk of the private providers"capturing"the regulators.Labor Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform

Modeling interactions between institutions of housing markets based on nonlinear functions of costs

Objective: to study the optimal pricing strategies of firms in the “realtor - bank - insurer” system under nonlinear cost functions.Methods: game theory, supply chain coordination, multi-criteria optimization. Results: the housing market is one of the most dynamically developing segments of the economy. Pricing patterns in this market are not always subject to market laws, since they are influenced by other factors, such as the availability of loans, the presence of agents, the rates in the insurance market, etc. To analyze the pricing processes, the authors consider a vertically integrated system of interaction of agents “realtor - bank - insurer”. A system of optimality conditions for housing market agents (realtor, bank, and insurer) under nonlinear cost functions is derived, corresponding to different types of scale effects. The results of numerical experiments are presented, showing the nature of price interdependencies in these markets in cases of convexity or concavity of the agents’ cost functions.Scientific novelty: in contrast to the “realtor - bank - insurer” system with linear cost functions, our study demonstrates the following insights: first, if all agents have concave cost functions, then the housing price, mortgage interest rate, and insurance rate are lower compared to the situation in which agents have convex cost functions; second, an increase in the intra-system commission rate leads to an increase in the price of the agent who pays the commission, and a decrease in the price of the agent who receives it; third, an increase in the commission rate causes a sharper reduction in the agent’s price if the agent has a convex cost function and the counterparty has a concave one, than in the opposite case.Practical significance: the results can be applied in the elaboration of state programs for the development of the housing market, mortgage subsidies and regulation of the insurance market; in addition, on the basis of our recommendations, firms in the “realtor - bank - insurer” system can make mutually beneficial decentralized decisions

Agricultural risk management in Europe

Replaced with revised version of paper 11/18/08Risk management policy, agricultural insurance, calamity funds, ad-hoc aids, natural disaster, Production Economics, Risk and Uncertainty,

Selecting the Internationalization Strategy for Russian Healthcare Market Entry with Special Reference to International Service Template for Occupational Healthcare

The objective of the study was to examine appropriate internationalization strategies for Russian healthcare market entry and determine the one with the highest potential. The work was commissioned by the International Service Template for Occupational Healthcare (OCCSET) project. The theoretical information on the foreign market entry strategies was collected from literature, articles and various web-sources. The internationalization strategy selection was implemented with the help of Russian healthcare market experts. Interviews were arranged to obtain their expert opinion on the current market situation and its possible influence on a market entry. Also, experts were asked to assess the market entry alternatives for revealing the best appropriate one. Based on findings, the entry strategy with the highest potential in the conditions of the current market was determined. The results can be applied to any foreign medical company, aiming to enter the Russian healthcare market. The information on the most appropriate entry strategies, its assessment by the local experts, as well as market specifications, opportunities and challenges can be obtained from this thesis