A half century of progress towards a unified neural theory of mind and brain with applications to autonomous adaptive agents and mental disorders

Invited article for the book Artificial Intelligence in the Age of Neural Networks and Brain Computing R. Kozma, C. Alippi, Y. Choe, and F. C. Morabito, Eds. Cambridge, MA: Academic PressThis article surveys some of the main design principles, mechanisms, circuits, and architectures that have been discovered during a half century of systematic research aimed at developing a unified theory that links mind and brain, and shows how psychological functions arise as emergent properties of brain mechanisms. The article describes a theoretical method that has enabled such a theory to be developed in stages by carrying out a kind of conceptual evolution. It also describes revolutionary computational paradigms like Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing that constrain the kind of unified theory that can describe the autonomous adaptive intelligence that emerges from advanced brains. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, is one of the core models that has been discovered in this way. ART proposes how advanced brains learn to attend, recognize, and predict objects and events in a changing world that is filled with unexpected events. ART is not, however, a “theory of everything” if only because, due to Complementary Computing, different matching and learning laws tend to support perception and cognition on the one hand, and spatial representation and action on the other. The article mentions why a theory of this kind may be useful in the design of autonomous adaptive agents in engineering and technology. It also notes how the theory has led to new mechanistic insights about mental disorders such as autism, medial temporal amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia, along with mechanistically informed proposals about how their symptoms may be ameliorated

Cognitive Illusion, Lucid Dreaming, and the Psychology of Metaphor in Tibetan Buddhist Dzogchen Contemplative Practices

A classic set of eight similes of illusion (sgyu ma’i dpe brgyad) are employed recurrently throughout Indian and Tibetan Buddhist literature to illustrate the operations of cognition, its correlative perceptions, and experiences that emerge. To illustrate a Buddhist psychology of metaphor, the fourteenth century Tibetan scholar and synthesizer of the Dzogchen (rdzogs chen) or Great Perfection system, Longchen Rabjam Drimé Ödzer (1308-1363), composed his poetic text, Being at Ease with Illusion. This work on illusion is the third volume in Longchenpa’s Trilogy of Being at Ease (Ngal gso skor gsum) in which he presents a series of Dzogchen instructions on how to settle totally at ease. To complement each volume in his trilogy, Longchenpa composed auxiliary contemplative guidance instructions on their meaning (don khrid). This article contextualizes Longchenpa’s meditation manual on Being at Ease with Illusion, a translation of which is included in the appendix. Special attention is given to Dzogchen practices of lucid dreaming and working with cognitive illusions to spotlight underlying contemplative dynamics and correlative psychological effects. To analogically map these Tibetan language instructions in translation, this article interprets Buddhist psychological understandings of cognitive and perceptual processes in dialogue with current theories in the cognitive sciences

Perceptual Characterization: On Perceptual Learning and Perspectival Sedimentation

In her analysis of perspectival effects on perception, Susanna Siegel has argued that perceptual experience is directly rationally assessable and can thereby justify perceptual beliefs, save for in cases of epistemic downgrade or perceptual hijacking; I contend that the recalcitrance of known illusions poses an insurmountable problem for Siegel’s thesis. In its place, I argue that a model of perceptual learning informed by the dual-aspect framework of base-level cognitive architecture proposed by Elisabeth Camp successfully answers the questions motivating Siegel’s project in a manner that avoids such issues

How sketches work: a cognitive theory for improved system design

Evidence is presented that in the early stages of design or composition the mental processes used by artists for visual invention require a different type of support from those used for visualising a nearly complete object. Most research into machine visualisation has as its goal the production of realistic images which simulate the light pattern presented to the retina by real objects. In contrast sketch attributes preserve the results of cognitive processing which can be used interactively to amplify visual thought. The traditional attributes of sketches include many types of indeterminacy which may reflect the artist's need to be "vague". Drawing on contemporary theories of visual cognition and neuroscience this study discusses in detail the evidence for the following functions which are better served by rough sketches than by the very realistic imagery favoured in machine visualising systems. 1. Sketches are intermediate representational types which facilitate the mental translation between descriptive and depictive modes of representing visual thought. 2. Sketch attributes exploit automatic processes of perceptual retrieval and object recognition to improve the availability of tacit knowledge for visual invention. 3. Sketches are percept-image hybrids. The incomplete physical attributes of sketches elicit and stabilise a stream of super-imposed mental images which amplify inventive thought. 4. By segregating and isolating meaningful components of visual experience, sketches may assist the user to attend selectively to a limited part of a visual task, freeing otherwise over-loaded cognitive resources for visual thought. 5. Sequences of sketches and sketching acts support the short term episodic memory for cognitive actions. This assists creativity, providing voluntary control over highly practised mental processes which can otherwise become stereotyped. An attempt is made to unite the five hypothetical functions. Drawing on the Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory, it is speculated that the five functions may be related to a limited capacity monitoring mechanism which makes tacit visual knowledge explicitly available for conscious control and manipulation. It is suggested that the resources available to the human brain for imagining nonexistent objects are a cultural adaptation of visual mechanisms which evolved in early hominids for responding to confusing or incomplete stimuli from immediately present objects and events. Sketches are cultural inventions which artificially mimic aspects of such stimuli in order to capture these shared resources for the different purpose of imagining objects which do not yet exist. Finally the implications of the theory for the design of improved machine systems is discussed. The untidy attributes of traditional sketches are revealed to include cultural inventions which serve subtle cognitive functions. However traditional media have many short-comings which it should be possible to correct with new technology. Existing machine systems for sketching tend to imitate nonselectively the media bound properties of sketches without regard to the functions they serve. This may prove to be a mistake. It is concluded that new system designs are needed in which meaningfully structured data and specialised imagery amplify without interference or replacement the impressive but limited creative resources of the visual brain

What is neurorepresentationalism?:From neural activity and predictive processing to multi-level representations and consciousness

This review provides an update on Neurorepresentationalism, a theoretical framework that defines conscious experience as multimodal, situational survey and explains its neural basis from brain systems constructing best-guess representations of sensations originating in our environment and body (Pennartz, 2015)

Interdisciplinary Engagements with the Experience of Film

There is great potential for study of the experience of film by incorporating scientific research into the theorising process. In this work I outline my own values for theoretical work and provide discussion of the methodological goals and practices I will employ to utilise scientific research in film theorising and to meaningfully engage with that work. This includes a focus on strong argumentation, engagement with a broad scope of study on film, the production of applicable and assessable theories as well as robust theory construction. In addition to a description of practical applications towards these goals, the thesis will detail ways that a theorist may engage scientific work without being an expert in that field themselves. The work will examine the concept of ‘persistence of vision’ as a historical case study of the relationship between film theorising and scientific work. This includes a detailed examination of the evolution of different explanations for phenomena related to visual persistence and motion perception. Following this is a critique of the use of ‘persistence of vision’ within historical film theories as well as a description of a number of individuals who valued the incorporation of scientific work in the film theorising process

The Neural and Behavioral Correlates of Auditory Streaming

Perceptual representations of auditory stimuli—which are called auditory streams or objects—are derived from the auditory system\u27s ability to segregate and group stimuli based upon spectral, temporal, and spatial features. However, it remains unclear how our auditory system encodes these auditory streams at the level of the single neuron. In order to address this question directly, we first validated an animal model of auditory streaming. Specifically, we trained rhesus macaques to report their streaming percept using methodologies and controls similar to those presented in previous human studies. We found that the monkeys\u27 behavioral reports were qualitatively consistent with those of human listeners. Next, we recorded from neurons in the primary auditory cortex while monkeys simultaneously reported their streaming percepts. We found that A1 neurons had frequency-tuned responses that habituated, independent of frequency content, as the auditory sequence unfolded over time; and we report for the first time that firing rate of A1 neurons was modulated by the monkeys’ choices. This modulation increased with listening time and was independent of the frequency difference between consecutive tone bursts. Overall, our results suggest that A1 activity contributes to the sensory evidence underlying the segregation and grouping of acoustic stimuli into distinct auditory streams. However, because we observe choice-related activity based upon firing rate alone, our data are at partially at odds with Micheyl et al.’s (2005) prominent hypothesis, which argued that frequency-dependent habituation may be a coding mechanism for the streaming percept