Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding Infinite-Duration Games

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply determinacy for every pair of initial budgets

Ageing as a price of cooperation and complexity: Self-organization of complex systems causes the ageing of constituent networks

The analysis of network topology and dynamics is increasingly used for the description of the structure, function and evolution of complex systems. Here we summarize key aspects of the evolvability and robustness of the hierarchical network-set of macromolecules, cells, organisms, and ecosystems. Listing the costs and benefits of cooperation as a necessary behaviour to build this network hierarchy, we outline the major hypothesis of the paper: the emergence of hierarchical complexity needs cooperation leading to the ageing of the constituent networks. Local cooperation in a stable environment may lead to over-optimization developing an ‘always-old’ network, which ages slowly, and dies in an apoptosis-like process. Global cooperation by exploring a rapidly changing environment may cause an occasional over-perturbation exhausting system-resources, causing rapid degradation, ageing and death of an otherwise ‘forever-young’ network in a necrosis-like process. Giving a number of examples we explain how local and global cooperation can both evoke and help successful ageing. Finally, we show how various forms of cooperation and consequent ageing emerge as key elements in all major steps of evolution from the formation of protocells to the establishment of the globalized, modern human society. Thus, ageing emerges as a price of complexity, which is going hand-in-hand with cooperation enhancing each other in a successful community

Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding Infinite-Duration Games

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply determinacy for every pair of initial budgets

Boltzmann Exploration Done Right

Boltzmann exploration is a classic strategy for sequential decision-making under uncertainty, and is one of the most standard tools in Reinforcement Learning (RL). Despite its widespread use, there is virtually no theoretical understanding about the limitations or the actual benefits of this exploration scheme. Does it drive exploration in a meaningful way? Is it prone to misidentifying the optimal actions or spending too much time exploring the suboptimal ones? What is the right tuning for the learning rate? In this paper, we address several of these questions in the classic setup of stochastic multi-armed bandits. One of our main results is showing that the Boltzmann exploration strategy with any monotone learning-rate sequence will induce suboptimal behavior. As a remedy, we offer a simple non-monotone schedule that guarantees near-optimal performance, albeit only when given prior access to key problem parameters that are typically not available in practical situations (like the time horizon $T$ and the suboptimality gap $\Delta$). More importantly, we propose a novel variant that uses different learning rates for different arms, and achieves a distribution-dependent regret bound of order $\frac{K\log^2 T}{\Delta}$ and a distribution-independent bound of order $\sqrt{KT}\log K$ without requiring such prior knowledge. To demonstrate the flexibility of our technique, we also propose a variant that guarantees the same performance bounds even if the rewards are heavy-tailed

Towards representing human behavior and decision making in Earth system models. An overview of techniques and approaches

Today, humans have a critical impact on the Earth system and vice versa, which can generate complex feedback processes between social and ecological dynamics. Integrating human behavior into formal Earth system models (ESMs), however, requires crucial modeling assumptions about actors and their goals, behavioral options, and decision rules, as well as modeling decisions regarding human social interactions and the aggregation of individuals’ behavior. Here, we review existing modeling approaches and techniques from various disciplines and schools of thought dealing with human behavior at different levels of decision making. We demonstrate modelers’ often vast degrees of freedom but also seek to make modelers aware of the often crucial consequences of seemingly innocent modeling assumptions. After discussing which socioeconomic units are potentially important for ESMs, we compare models of individual decision making that correspond to alternative behavioral theories and that make diverse modeling assumptions about individuals’ preferences, beliefs, decision rules, and foresight. We review approaches to model social interaction, covering game theoretic frameworks, models of social influence, and network models. Finally, we discuss approaches to studying how the behavior of individuals, groups, and organizations can aggregate to complex collective phenomena, discussing agent-based, statistical, and representative-agent modeling and economic macro-dynamics. We illustrate the main ingredients of modeling techniques with examples from land-use dynamics as one of the main drivers of environmental change bridging local to global scales

Self-Evaluation Applied Mathematics 2003-2008 University of Twente

This report contains the self-study for the research assessment of the Department of Applied Mathematics (AM) of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) at the University of Twente (UT). The report provides the information for the Research Assessment Committee for Applied Mathematics, dealing with mathematical sciences at the three universities of technology in the Netherlands. It describes the state of affairs pertaining to the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008

Achilles And The Tortoise: Some Caveats To Mathematical Modeling In Biology

Mathematical modeling has recently become a much-lauded enterprise, and many funding agencies seek to prioritize this endeavor. However, there are certain dangers associated with mathematical modeling, and knowledge of these pitfalls should also be part of a biologist\u27s training in this set of techniques. (1) Mathematical models are limited by known science; (2) Mathematical models can tell what can happen, but not what did happen; (3) A model does not have to conform to reality, even if it is logically consistent; (4) Models abstract from reality, and sometimes what they eliminate is critically important; (5) Mathematics can present a Platonic ideal to which biologically organized matter strives, rather than a trial-and-error bumbling through evolutionary processes. This “Unity of Science” approach, which sees biology as the lowest physical science and mathematics as the highest science, is part of a Western belief system, often called the Great Chain of Being (or Scala Natura), that sees knowledge emerge as one passes from biology to chemistry to physics to mathematics, in an ascending progression of reason being purification from matter. This is also an informal model for the emergence of new life. There are now other informal models for integrating development and evolution, but each has its limitations