Computing the Least-core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on the least-core and nucleolus of threshold cardinality matching games (TCMG). A TCMG is defined on a graph $G=(V,E)$ and a threshold $T$, in which the player set is $V$ and the profit of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is 1 if the size of a maximum matching in $G[S]$ meets or exceeds $T$, and 0 otherwise. We first show that for a TCMG, the problems of computing least-core value, finding and verifying least-core payoff are all polynomial time solvable. We also provide a general characterization of the least core for a large class of TCMG. Next, based on Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in matching theory, we give a concise formulation of the nucleolus for a typical case of TCMG which the threshold $T$ equals $1$. When the threshold $T$ is relevant to the input size, we prove that the nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial time in bipartite graphs and graphs with a perfect matching

Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications

We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many moments

Matching under Preferences

Matching theory studies how agents and/or objects from different sets can be matched with each other while taking agents\u2019 preferences into account. The theory originated in 1962 with a celebrated paper by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), in which they proposed the Stable Marriage Algorithm as a solution to the problem of two-sided matching. Since then, this theory has been successfully applied to many real-world problems such as matching students to universities, doctors to hospitals, kidney transplant patients to donors, and tenants to houses. This chapter will focus on algorithmic as well as strategic issues of matching theory. Many large-scale centralized allocation processes can be modelled by matching problems where agents have preferences over one another. For example, in China, over 10 million students apply for admission to higher education annually through a centralized process. The inputs to the matching scheme include the students\u2019 preferences over universities, and vice versa, and the capacities of each university. The task is to construct a matching that is in some sense optimal with respect to these inputs. Economists have long understood the problems with decentralized matching markets, which can suffer from such undesirable properties as unravelling, congestion and exploding offers (see Roth and Xing, 1994, for details). For centralized markets, constructing allocations by hand for large problem instances is clearly infeasible. Thus centralized mechanisms are required for automating the allocation process. Given the large number of agents typically involved, the computational efficiency of a mechanism's underlying algorithm is of paramount importance. Thus we seek polynomial-time algorithms for the underlying matching problems. Equally important are considerations of strategy: an agent (or a coalition of agents) may manipulate their input to the matching scheme (e.g., by misrepresenting their true preferences or underreporting their capacity) in order to try to improve their outcome. A desirable property of a mechanism is strategyproofness, which ensures that it is in the best interests of an agent to behave truthfully

Minimizing Submodular Functions on Diamonds via Generalized Fractional Matroid Matchings

In this paper we show the first polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of minimizing submodular functions on the product of diamonds. This submodular function minimization problem is reduced to the membership problem for an associated polyhedron, which is equivalent to the optimization problem over the polyhedron, based on the ellipsoid method. The latter optimization problem is solved by polynomial number of solutions of subproblems, each being a generalization of the weighted fractional matroid matching problem. We give a combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for this optimization problem by extending the result by Gijswijt and Pap [D.~Gijswijt and G.~Pap, An algorithm for weighted fractional matroid matching, J.\ Combin.\ Theory, Ser.~B 103 (2013), 509--520]

Partitioning Perfect Graphs into Stars

The partition of graphs into "nice" subgraphs is a central algorithmic problem with strong ties to matching theory. We study the partitioning of undirected graphs into same-size stars, a problem known to be NP-complete even for the case of stars on three vertices. We perform a thorough computational complexity study of the problem on subclasses of perfect graphs and identify several polynomial-time solvable cases, for example, on interval graphs and bipartite permutation graphs, and also NP-complete cases, for example, on grid graphs and chordal graphs.Comment: Manuscript accepted to Journal of Graph Theor

A simple algorithm for finding a maximum triangle-free 2-matching in subcubic graphs

AbstractIn this paper, we consider the problem of finding a maximum weight 2-matching containing no cycle of a length of at most three in a weighted simple graph, which we call the weighted triangle-free 2-matching problem. Although the polynomial solvability of this problem is still open in general graphs, a polynomial-time algorithm is given by Hartvigsen and Li for the problem in subcubic graphs, i.e., graphs with a maximum degree of at most three. Our contribution is to provide another polynomial-time algorithm for the weighted triangle-free 2-matching problem in subcubic graphs. Our algorithm consists of two basic algorithms: a steepest ascent algorithm and a classical maximum weight2-matching algorithm, and is justified by fundamental results from the theory of discrete convex functions on jump systems