6,366 research outputs found
The Reliability of Memory: An Argument from the Armchair
The âproblem of memoryâ in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, or at least justification, for trusting our apparent memories. I defend an inductive solutionâmore precisely, an abductive solutionâto the problem. A natural worry is that any such solution would be circular, for it would have to depend on memory. I argue that belief in the reliability of memory can be justified from the armchair, without relying on memory. The justification is, roughly, that my having the sort of experience that my apparent memory should lead me to expect is best explained by the hypothesis that my memories are reliable. My solution is inspired by Harrodâs (1942) inductive solution. Coburn (1960) argued that Harrodâs solution contains a fatal flaw. I show that my solution is not vulnerable to Coburnâs objection, and respond to a number of other, recent and likely objections
Justifying Inference to the Best Explanation as a Practical Meta-Syllogism on Dialectical Structures
This article discusses how inference to the best explanation (IBE) can be justified as a practical meta-argument. It is, firstly, justified as a *practical* argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in--and relative to--a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one's position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a *meta*-argument. My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars' well-known justification of inductive reasoning (Sellars 1969); it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation (Betz 2010, 2011)
Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion
Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called âepistemic gapâ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains
Epistemological Realism and Onto-Relations
The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterionâdoes the belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-relationship of between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic context
The all-too-flexible abductive method:ATOM's normative status
The author discusses the abductive theory of method (ATOM) by Brian Haig from a philosophical perspective, connecting his theory with a number of issues and trends in contemporary philosophy of science. It is argued that as it stands, the methodology presented by Haig is too permissive. Both the use of analogical reasoning and the application of exploratory factor analysis leave us with too many candidate theories to choose from, and explanatory coherence cannot be expected to save the day. The author ends with some suggestions to remedy the permissiveness and lack of normative force in ATOM, deriving from the experimental practice within which psychological data are produced. (c) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc
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A comparative survey of integrated learning systems
This paper presents the duction framework for unifying the three basic forms of inference - deduction, abduction, and induction - by specifying the possible relationships and influences among them in the context of integrated learning. Special assumptive forms of inference are defined that extend the use of these inference methods, and the properties of these forms are explored. A comparison to a related inference-based learning frame work is made. Finally several existing integrated learning programs are examined in the perspective of the duction framework
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