4 research outputs found
On the Possibility of Non-Interactive E-Voting in the Public-key Setting
In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decentralized e-voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication. Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication. Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS) in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of one-round elections. We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the number of votes for each candidate is counted. Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections. Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate. Our constructions are based on bilinear groups of prime order. As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and conference management systems
BVOT: Self-Tallying Boardroom Voting with Oblivious Transfer
A boardroom election is an election with a small number of voters carried out
with public communications. We present BVOT, a self-tallying boardroom voting
protocol with ballot secrecy, fairness (no tally information is available
before the polls close), and dispute-freeness (voters can observe that all
voters correctly followed the protocol).
BVOT works by using a multiparty threshold homomorphic encryption system in
which each candidate is associated with a masked unique prime. Each voter
engages in an oblivious transfer with an untrusted distributor: the voter
selects the index of a prime associated with a candidate and receives the
selected prime in masked form. The voter then casts their vote by encrypting
their masked prime and broadcasting it to everyone. The distributor does not
learn the voter's choice, and no one learns the mapping between primes and
candidates until the audit phase. By hiding the mapping between primes and
candidates, BVOT provides voters with insufficient information to carry out
effective cheating. The threshold feature prevents anyone from computing any
partial tally---until everyone has voted. Multiplying all votes, their
decryption shares, and the unmasking factor yields a product of the primes each
raised to the number of votes received.
In contrast to some existing boardroom voting protocols, BVOT does not rely
on any zero-knowledge proof; instead, it uses oblivious transfer to assure
ballot secrecy and correct vote casting. Also, BVOT can handle multiple
candidates in one election. BVOT prevents cheating by hiding crucial
information: an attempt to increase the tally of one candidate might increase
the tally of another candidate. After all votes are cast, any party can tally
the votes
On the Possibility of Non-Interactive E-Voting in the Public-key Setting
In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decentralized e-voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication. Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication. Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS) in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of one-round elections. We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the number of votes for each candidate is counted. Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections. Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate. Our constructions are based on bilinear groups of prime order. As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and conference management systems