How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem

Our contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional empirical knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth

Non-Pickwickian Belief and 'the Gettier Problem'

That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier's protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If they would not, the examples are not counter-examples to the traditional analysis. I go on to discuss a number of examples inspired by Gettier's and argue that they, too, fail to be counter-examples either for reasons similar to those I have urged or because it is not clear that their subject does not know

Offline and online data: on upgrading functional information to knowledge

This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional information to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically well-formed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal epistemology of information theories is crucial to solve the debate on the veridical nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard strongly semantic information, defined as well-formed, meaningful and true data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses a contextual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect functional to semantic information, avoiding Gettierization and decoupling from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional information uses the machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this way the conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology debates, such as the explanation of knowledge process acquisition from information retrieval systems, and open data repositories

Observaciones polianas a la definición del conocimiento: un posible diálogo con la epistemología contemporánea.

A partir del desafio que los ejemplos formulados por Gettier presentan a la habitual definición del conocimiento, se ofrece una comparación de la epistemología contemporánea con la teoría del conocimiento desarrollada por Polo. La crítica a la definición del conocimiento se articula en torno a la profundización en cada uno de los tres elementos que la componen y se muestra cómo pueden articularse internamente entre sí, profundizando en el valor ontológico del conocimiento, insistiendo en una comprensión más completa de la verdad y su valor antropológico y avanzando en el valor científico de la justificación

The explanation game: a formal framework for interpretable machine learning

We propose a formal framework for interpretable machine learning. Combining elements from statistical learning, causal interventionism, and decision theory, we design an idealised explanation game in which players collaborate to find the best explanation(s) for a given algorithmic prediction. Through an iterative procedure of questions and answers, the players establish a three-dimensional Pareto frontier that describes the optimal trade-offs between explanatory accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Multiple rounds are played at different levels of abstraction, allowing the players to explore overlapping causal patterns of variable granularity and scope. We characterise the conditions under which such a game is almost surely guaranteed to converge on a (conditionally) optimal explanation surface in polynomial time, and highlight obstacles that will tend to prevent the players from advancing beyond certain explanatory thresholds. The game serves a descriptive and a normative function, establishing a conceptual space in which to analyse and compare existing proposals, as well as design new and improved solutions

Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma

Metaphilosophy, EarlyView

Por una filosofía de la información

La filosofía de la Información (FI) es una nueva disciplina filosófica que trata acerca de: A) la investigación crítica sobre la naturaleza conceptual y los principios básicos de la información, incluso de su dinámica (concretamente: la computación, es decir, la manipulación mecánica de los datos, y el flujo informacional, a saber, los diversos procesos de recogida, almacenamiento e intercambio de informaciones), su utilización (la denominada information ethics (o ética de la información') y sus ciencias; y B) la elaboración de metodologías teorético-informacionales y computacionales susceptibles de ser aplicables a los problemas filosóficos.