On the epistemic foundations of agent theories

We argue that none of the existing epistemic logics can adequately serve the needs of agent theories. We suggest a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge and argue that this is the notion we need to formalize agents in Distributed Artificial Intelligence. A logic of the new concept is developed which is formally and practically adequate in the following sense: first, it does not suffer from any kind of logical omniscience. Second, it can account for the intuition that agents are rational, though not hyper-rational. Third, it is expressive enough. The advantages of the new logic over other formalisms is demonstrated by showing that none of the existing systems can fulfill all these requirements simultaneously

On the epistemic foundations of agent theories

We argue that none of the existing epistemic logics can adequately serve the needs of agent theories. We suggest a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge and argue that this is the notion we need to formalize agents in Distributed Artificial Intelligence. A logic of the new concept is developed which is formally and practically adequate in the following sense: first, it does not suffer from any kind of logical omniscience. Second, it can account for the intuition that agents are rational, though not hyper-rational. Third, it is expressive enough. The advantages of the new logic over other formalisms is demonstrated by showing that none of the existing systems can fulfill all these requirements simultaneously

On the epistemic foundations of agent theories

We argue that none of the existing epistemic logics can adequately serve the needs of agent theories. We suggest a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge and argue that this is the notion we need to formalize agents in Distributed Artificial Intelligence. A logic of the new concept is developed which is formally and practically adequate in the following sense: first, it does not suffer from any kind of logical omniscience. Second, it can account for the intuition that agents are rational, though not hyper-rational. Third, it is expressive enough. The advantages of the new logic over other formalisms is demonstrated by showing that none of the existing systems can fulfill all these requirements simultaneously