Bayesian belief network model for the safety assessment of nuclear computer-based systems

The formalism of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) is being increasingly applied to probabilistic modelling and decision problems in a widening variety of fields. This method provides the advantages of a formal probabilistic model, presented in an easily assimilated visual form, together with the ready availability of efficient computational methods and tools for exploring model consequences. Here we formulate one BBN model of a part of the safety assessment task for computer and software based nuclear systems important to safety. Our model is developed from the perspective of an independent safety assessor who is presented with the task of evaluating evidence from disparate sources: the requirement specification and verification documentation of the system licensee and of the system manufacturer; the previous reputation of the various participants in the design process; knowledge of commercial pressures;information about tools and resources used; and many other sources. Based on these multiple sources of evidence, the independent assessor is ultimately obliged to make a decision as to whether or not the system should be licensed for operation within a particular nuclear plant environment. Our BBN model is a contribution towards a formal model of this decision problem. We restrict attention to a part of this problem: the safety analysis of the Computer System Specification documentation. As with other BBN applications we see this modelling activity as having several potential benefits. It employs a rigorous formalism as a focus for examination, discussion, and criticism of arguments about safety. It obliges the modeller to be very explicit about assumptions concerning probabilistic dependencies, correlations, and causal relationships. It allows sensitivity analyses to be carried out. Ultimately we envisage this BBN, or some later development of it, forming part of a larger model, which might well take the form of a larger BBN model, covering all sources of evidence about pre-operational life-cycle stages. This could provide an integrated model of all aspects of the task of the independent assessor, leading up to the final judgement about system safety in a particular context. We expect to offer some results of this further work later in the DeVa project

Asymptotically idempotent aggregation operators for trust management in multi-agent systems

The study of trust management in multi-agent system, especially distributed, has grown over the last years. Trust is a complex subject that has no general consensus in literature, but has emerged the importance of reasoning about it computationally. Reputation systems takes into consideration the history of an entity’s actions/behavior in order to compute trust, collecting and aggregating ratings from members in a community. In this scenario the aggregation problem becomes fundamental, in particular depending on the environment. In this paper we describe a technique based on a class of asymptotically idempotent aggregation operators, suitable particulary for distributed anonymous environments

Software reliability and dependability: a roadmap

Shifting the focus from software reliability to user-centred measures of dependability in complete software-based systems. Influencing design practice to facilitate dependability assessment. Propagating awareness of dependability issues and the use of existing, useful methods. Injecting some rigour in the use of process-related evidence for dependability assessment. Better understanding issues of diversity and variation as drivers of dependability. Bev Littlewood is founder-Director of the Centre for Software Reliability, and Professor of Software Engineering at City University, London. Prof Littlewood has worked for many years on problems associated with the modelling and evaluation of the dependability of software-based systems; he has published many papers in international journals and conference proceedings and has edited several books. Much of this work has been carried out in collaborative projects, including the successful EC-funded projects SHIP, PDCS, PDCS2, DeVa. He has been employed as a consultant t

Reasoning about the Reliability of Diverse Two-Channel Systems in which One Channel is "Possibly Perfect"

This paper considers the problem of reasoning about the reliability of fault-tolerant systems with two "channels" (i.e., components) of which one, A, supports only a claim of reliability, while the other, B, by virtue of extreme simplicity and extensive analysis, supports a plausible claim of "perfection." We begin with the case where either channel can bring the system to a safe state. We show that, conditional upon knowing pA (the probability that A fails on a randomly selected demand) and pB (the probability that channel B is imperfect), a conservative bound on the probability that the system fails on a randomly selected demand is simply pA.pB. That is, there is conditional independence between the events "A fails" and "B is imperfect." The second step of the reasoning involves epistemic uncertainty about (pA, pB) and we show that under quite plausible assumptions, a conservative bound on system pfd can be constructed from point estimates for just three parameters. We discuss the feasibility of establishing credible estimates for these parameters. We extend our analysis from faults of omission to those of commission, and then combine these to yield an analysis for monitored architectures of a kind proposed for aircraft