251 research outputs found

    On the (In)security of SNARKs in the Presence of Oracles

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    International audienceIn this work we study the feasibility of knowledge extraction for succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) in a scenario that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been analyzed before. While prior work focuses on the case of adversarial provers that may receive (statically generated) auxiliary information, here we consider the scenario where adversarial provers are given access to an oracle. For this setting we study if and under what assumptions such provers can admit an extractor. Our contribution is mainly threefold. First, we formalize the question of extraction in the presence of oracles by proposing a suitable proof of knowledge definition for this setting. We call SNARKs satisfying this definition O-SNARKs. Second, we show how to use O-SNARKs to obtain formal and intuitive security proofs for three applications (ho-momorphic signatures, succinct functional signatures, and SNARKs on authenticated data) where we recognize an issue while doing the proof under the standard proof of knowledge definition of SNARKs. Third, we study whether O-SNARKs exist, providing both negative and positive results. On the negative side, we show that, assuming one way functions, there do not exist O-SNARKs in the standard model for every signing oracle family (and thus for general oracle families as well). On the positive side, we show that when considering signature schemes with appropriate restrictions on the message length O-SNARKs for the corresponding signing oracles exist, based on classical SNARKs and assuming extraction with respect to specific distributions of auxiliary input. This article is based on an earlier article which appears in the proceedings of TCC 2016-B, c IACR 2016

    Plumo: An Ultralight Blockchain Client

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    Syncing the latest state of a blockchain can be a resource-intensive task, driving (especially mobile) end users towards centralized services offering instant access. To expand full decentralized access to anyone with a mobile phone, we introduce a consensus-agnostic compiler for constructing ultralight clients, providing secure and highly efficient blockchain syncing via a sequence of SNARK-based state transition proofs, and prove its security formally. Instantiating this, we present Plumo, an ultralight client for the Celo blockchain capable of syncing the latest network state summary in just a few seconds even on a low-end mobile phone. In Plumo, each transition proof covers four months of blockchain history and can be produced for just $25 USD of compute. Plumo achieves this level of efficiency thanks to two new SNARK-friendly constructions, which may also be of independent interest: a new BLS-based offline aggregate multisignature scheme in which signers do not have to know the members of their multisignature group in advance, and a new composite algebraic-symmetric cryptographic hash function

    Functional signatures

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    Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-42).In this thesis, we introduce the notion of functional signatures. In a functional signature scheme, in addition to a master signing key that can be used to sign any message, there are signing keys for a function f, which allow one to sign any message in the range of f. An immediate application of functional signature scheme is the delegation by a master authority to a third party of the ability to sign a restricted set of messages. We also show applications of functional signature in constructing succinct non-interactive arguments and delegation schemes. We give several constructions for this primitive, and describe the trade-offs between them in terms of the assumptions they require and the size of the signatures.by Ioana Ivan.S.M

    Snarky Signatures: Minimal Signatures of Knowledge from Simulation-Extractable SNARKs

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    We construct a pairing based simulation-extractable SNARK (SE-SNARK) that consists of only 3 group elements and has highly efficient verification. By formally linking SE-SNARKs to signatures of knowledge, we then obtain a succinct signature of knowledge consisting of only 3 group elements. SE-SNARKs enable a prover to give a proof that they know a witness to an instance in a manner which is: (1) succinct - proofs are short and verifier computation is small; (2) zero-knowledge - proofs do not reveal the witness; (3) simulation-extractable - it is only possible to prove instances to which you know a witness, even when you have already seen a number of simulated proofs. We also prove that any pairing based signature of knowledge or SE-NIZK argument must have at least 3 group elements and 2 verification equations. Since our constructions match these lower bounds, we have the smallest size signature of knowledge and the smallest size SE-SNARK possible

    Plumo: An Ultralight Blockchain Client

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    Syncing the latest state of a blockchain can be a resource-intensive task, driving (especially mobile) end users towards centralized services offering instant access. To expand full decentralized access to anyone with a mobile phone, we introduce a consensus-agnostic compiler for constructing {\em ultralight clients}, providing secure and highly efficient blockchain syncing via a sequence of SNARK-based state transition proofs, and prove its security formally. Instantiating this, we present Plumo, an ultralight client for the Celo blockchain capable of syncing the latest network state summary in just a few seconds even on a low-end mobile phone. In Plumo, each transition proof covers four months of blockchain history and can be produced for just $25 USD of compute. Plumo achieves this level of efficiency thanks to two new SNARK-friendly constructions, which may also be of independent interest: a new BLS-based offline aggregate multisignature scheme in which signers do not have to know the members of their multisignature group in advance, and a new composite algebraic-symmetric cryptographic hash function

    A Unified Framework for Non-Universal SNARKs

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    We propose a general framework for non-universal SNARKs. It contains (1) knowledge-sound and non-black-box any-simulation-extractable (ASE), (2) zero-knowledge and subversion-zero knowledge SNARKs for the well-known QAP, SAP, QSP, and QSP constraint languages that all by design have \emph{relatively} simple security proofs. The knowledge-sound zero-knowledge SNARK is similar to Groth\u27s SNARK from EUROCRYPT 2016, except having fewer trapdoors, while the ASE subversion-zero knowledge SNARK relies on few additional conditions. We prove security in a weaker, more realistic version of the algebraic group model. We characterize SAP, SSP, and QSP in terms of QAP; this allows one to use a SNARK for QAP directly for other languages. Our results allow us to construct a family of SNARKs for different languages and with different security properties following the same proof template. Some of the new SNARKs are more efficient than prior ones. In other cases, the new SNARKs cover gaps in the landscape, e.g., there was no previous ASE or Sub-ZK SNARK for SSP or QSP

    Succinct Publicly-Certifiable Proofs (or: Can a Blockchain Verify a Designated-Verifier Proof?)

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    We study zero-knowledge arguments where proofs are: of knowledge, short, publicly-verifiable and produced without interaction. While zkSNARKs satisfy these requirements, we build such proofs in a constrained theoretical setting: in the standard-model---i.e., without a random oracle---and without assuming public-verifiable SNARKs (or even NIZKs, for some of our constructions) or primitives currently known to imply them. We model and construct a new primitive, SPuC (Succinct Publicly-Certifiable System), where: a party can prove knowledge of a witness ww by publishing a proof π0\pi_0; the latter can then be certified non-interactively by a committee sharing a secret; any party in the system can now verify the proof through its certificates; the total communication complexity should be sublinear in w|w|. We construct SPuCs generally from (leveled) Threshold FHE, homomorphic signatures and linear-only encryption, all instantiatable from lattices and thus plausibly quantum-resistant. We also construct them in the two-party case replacing TFHE with the simpler primitive of homomorphic secret-sharing. Our model has practical applications in blockchains and in other protocols where there exist committees sharing a secret and it is necessary for parties to prove knowledge of a solution to some puzzle. We show that one can construct a version of SPuCs with robust proactive security from similar assumptions. In a proactively secure model the committee reshares its secret from time to time. Such a model is robust if the committee members can prove they performed this resharing step correctly. Along the way to our goal we define and build Proactive Universal Thresholdizers, a proactive version of the Universal Thresholdizer defined in Boneh et al. [Crypto 2018]

    On Privacy Preserving Blockchains and zk-SNARKs

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    Viimastel aastatel on krüptoraha ja plokiahela tehnoloogia leidnud suurt tähelepanu nii kaubanduslikust kui ka teaduslikust vaatenurgast. Krüptoraha kujutab endast digitaalseid münte, mis kasutades krüptograafilisi vahendeid võimaldab turvalisi tehinguid võrdvõrkudes. Bitcoin on kõige tuntum krüptoraha, mis võimaldab otsetehinguid kasutajate pseudonüümide vahel ilma, et oleks vaja kolmandaid osapooli. Paraku kui kasutaja pseudonüüm on seotud tema identiteediga, on kõik tema tehingud jälgitavad ning kaob privaatsus.Selle lahendamiseks on välja pakutud erinevaid privaatsust säilitavaid krüptorahasi, mis kasutavad anonüümsete tehingute saavutamiseks krüptograafilisi tööriistu. Zerocash on üks populaarseimatest privaatsetest krüptorahadest, mis kasutab iga tehingu allika, sihtkoha ja väärtuse varjamiseks nullteadmustõestust.Antud töö koosneb kahest peamisest osast.Esimeses osas kirjeldame, pärast lühikest ülevaadet mõnest privaatsest krüptorahast (Bitcoin, Monero ja Zerocoin), Zerocashi konstruktsiooni ja anname intuitsiivse seletuse selle tööpõhimõttele. Me tutvustame kasutuselevõetud primitiive ja arutleme iga primitiivi rolli üle mündi konstruktsioonis. Erilist tähelepanu pöörame kompaktsetele nullteadmustõestusetele (zk-SNARKidele), millel on peamine roll Zerocashis.Kuna nullteadmustõestus on niivõrd olulisel kohal Zerocashis (ja teistes privaatsetes rakendustes) siis töö teises osas pakume välja uue variatsiooni Grothi 2016. aasta zk-SNARKile, mis on seni kõige tõhusam.Erinevalt Grothi konstruktsioonist, meie variatsioonis ei ole võimalik tõestusi modifitseerida.Muudatused mõjutavad nullteadmustõestuse tõhusust vaid minimaalselt ning meie konstruktsioon on kiirem kui Grothi ja Malleri 2017. nullteadmustõestus, mis samuti välistab muudetavuse.During last few years, along with blockchain technology, cryptocurrencies have found huge attention from both commercial and scientific perspectives. Cryptocurrencies are digital coins which use cryptographic tools to allow secure peer-to-peer monetary transactions. Bitcoin is the most well-known cryptocurrency that allows direct payments between pseudonyms without any third party. If a user's pseudonym is linked to her identity, all her transactions will be traceable, which will violate her privacy. To address this, various privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies have been proposed that use different cryptographic tools to achieve anonymous transactions. Zerocash is one of the most popular ones that uses zero-knowledge proofs to hide the source, destination and value of each transaction. This thesis consists of two main parts. In the first part, after a short overview of some cryptocurrencies (precisely Bitcoin, Monero and Zerocoin), we will explain the construction of Zerocash cryptocurrency and discuss the intuition behind the construction. More precisely, we will introduce the deployed primitives and will discuss the role of each primitive in the construction of the coin. In particular, we explain zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (a.k.a. zk-SNARKs) that play the main role in achieving strong privacy in Zerocash. Due to the importance of zk-SNARKs in privacy-preserving applications, in the second part of the thesis, we will present a new variation of Groth's 2016 zk-SNARK that currently is the most efficient pairing-based scheme. The main difference between the proposed variation and the original one is that unlike the original version, new variation guarantees non-malleability of generated proofs. Our analysis shows that the proposed changes have minimal effects on the efficiency of the original scheme and particularly it outperforms Groth and Maller's 2017 zk-SNARK that also guarantees non-malleability of proofs
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