10 research outputs found
Inferring Internet AS Relationships Based on BGP Routing Policies
The type of business relationships between the Internet autonomous systems
(AS) determines the BGP inter-domain routing. Previous works on inferring AS
relationships relied on the connectivity information between ASes. In this
paper we infer AS relationships by analysing the routing polices of ASes
encoded in the BGP attributes Communities and the Locpref. We accumulate BGP
data from RouteViews, RIPE RIS and the public Route Servers in August 2010 and
February 2011. Based on the routing policies extracted from data of the two BGP
attributes, we obtain AS relationships for 39% links in our data, which include
all links among the Tier-1 ASes and most links between Tier-1 and Tier-2 ASes.
We also reveal a number of special AS relationships, namely the hybrid
relationship, the partial-transit relationship, the indirect peering
relationship and the backup links. These special relationships are relevant to
a better understanding of the Internet routing. Our work provides a profound
methodological progress for inferring the AS relationships.Comment: 8 pages and 3 figure
Inferring hidden features in the Internet (PhD thesis)
The Internet is a large-scale decentralized system that is composed of thousands of independent networks. In this system, there are two main components, interdomain routing and traffic, that are vital inputs for many tasks such as traffic engineering, security, and business intelligence. However, due to the decentralized structure of the Internet, global knowledge of both interdomain routing and traffic is hard to come by. In this dissertation, we address a set of statistical inference problems with the goal of extending the knowledge of the interdomain-level Internet.
In the first part of this dissertation we investigate the relationship between the interdomain topology and an individual network’s inference ability. We first frame the questions through abstract analysis of idealized topologies, and then use actual routing measurements and topologies to study the ability of real networks to infer traffic flows.
In the second part, we study the ability of networks to identify which paths flow through their network. We first discuss that answering this question is surprisingly hard due to the design of interdomain routing systems where each network can learn only a limited set of routes. Therefore, network operators have to rely on observed traffic. However, observed traffic can only identify that a particular route passes through its network but not that a route does not pass through its network. In order to solve the routing inference problem, we propose a nonparametric inference technique that works quite accurately. The key idea behind our technique is measuring the distances between destinations. In order to accomplish that, we define a metric called Routing State Distance (RSD) to measure distances in terms of routing similarity.
Finally, in the third part, we study our new metric, RSD in detail. Using RSD we address an important and difficult problem of characterizing the set of paths between networks. The collection of the paths across networks is a great source to understand important phenomena in the Internet as path selections are driven by the economic and performance considerations of the networks. We show that RSD has a number of appealing properties that can discover these hidden phenomena
A system for the detection of limited visibility in BGP
Mención Internacional en el tÃtulo de doctorThe performance of the global routing system is vital to thousands of entities operating
the Autonomous Systems (ASes) which make up the Internet. The Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) is currently responsible for the exchange of reachability information and
the selection of paths according to their specified routing policies. BGP thus enables
traffic to flow from any point to another connected to the Internet. The manner traffic
flows if often influenced by entities in the Internet according to their preferences. The
latter are implemented in the form of routing policies by tweaking BGP configurations.
Routing policies are usually complex and aim to achieve a myriad goals, including technical,
economic and political purposes. Additionally, individual network managers need to
permanently adapt to the interdomain routing changes and, by engineering the Internet
traffic, optimize the use of their network.
Despite the flexibility offered, the implementation of routing policies is a complicated
process in itself, involving fine-tuning operations. Thus, it is an error-prone task and
operators might end up with faulty configurations that impact the efficacy of their strategies
or, more importantly, their revenues. Withal, even when correctly defining legitimate
routing policies, unforeseen interactions between ASes have been observed to cause important
disruptions that affect the global routing system. The main reason behind this
resides in the fact that the actual inter-domain routing is the result of the interplay of
many routing policies from ASes across the Internet, possibly bringing about a different
outcome than the one expected.
In this thesis, we perform an extensive analysis of the intricacies emerging from the
complex netting of routing policies at the interdomain level, in the context of the current
operational status of the Internet. Abundant implications on the way traffic flows in
the Internet arise from the convolution of routing policies at a global scale, at times
resulting in ASes using suboptimal ill-favored paths or in the undetected propagation of configuration errors in routing system. We argue here that monitoring prefix visibility
at the interdomain level can be used to detect cases of faulty configurations or backfired
routing policies, which disrupt the functionality of the routing system. We show that the
lack of global prefix visibility can offer early warning signs for anomalous events which,
despite their impact, often remain hidden from state of the art tools. Additionally, we show that such unintended Internet behavior not only degrades the efficacy of the routing
policies implemented by operators, causing their traffic to follow ill-favored paths, but
can also point out problems in the global connectivity of prefixes.
We further observe that majority of prefixes suffering from limited visibility at the
interdomain level is a set of more-specific prefixes, often used by network operators to
fulfill binding traffic engineering needs. One important task achieved through the use
of routing policies for traffic engineering is the control and optimization of the routing
function in order to allow the ASes to engineer the incoming traffic. The advertisement
of more-specific prefixes, also known as prefix deaggregation, provides network operators
with a fine-grained method to control the interdomain ingress traffic, given that the
longest-prefix match rule over-rides any other routing policy applied to the covering lessspecific
prefixes.
Nevertheless, however efficient, this traffic engineering tool comes with a cost, which
is usually externalized to the entire Internet community. Prefix deaggregation is a known
reason for the artificial inflation of the BGP routing table, which can further affect the
scalability of the global routing system. Looking past the main motivation for deploying
deaggregation in the first place, we identify and analyze here the economic impact of
this type of strategy. We propose a general Internet model to analyze the effect that
advertising more-specific prefixes has on the incoming transit traffic burstiness. We show
that deaggregation combined with selective advertisements (further defined as strategic
deaggregation) has a traffic stabilization side-effect, which translates into a decrease of the
transit traffic bill. Next, we develop a methodology for Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
to monitor general occurrences of deaggregation within their customer base. Furthermore,
the ISPs can detect selective advertisements of deaggregated prefixes, and thus identify customers which may impact the business of their providers. We apply the proposed
methodology on a complete set of data including routing, traffic, topological and billing
information provided by an operational ISP and we discuss the obtained results.Programa Oficial de Doctorado en IngenierÃa TelemáticaPresidente: Arturo Azcorra Saloña.- Secretario: Steffano Vissichio.- Vocal: Kc. Claff
A pragmatic approach toward securing inter-domain routing
Internet security poses complex challenges at different levels, where even the basic requirement of availability of Internet connectivity becomes a conundrum sometimes. Recent Internet service disruption events have made the vulnerability of the Internet apparent, and exposed the current limitations of Internet security measures as well. Usually, the main cause of such incidents, even in the presence of the security measures proposed so far, is the unintended or intended exploitation of the loop holes in the protocols that govern the Internet. In this thesis, we focus on the security of two different protocols that were conceived with little or no security mechanisms but play a key role both in the present and the future of the Internet, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Locator Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP).
The BGP protocol, being the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet, plays a crucial role in current communications. Due to lack of any intrinsic security mechanism, it is prone to a number of vulnerabilities that can result in partial paralysis of the Internet. In light of this, numerous security strategies were proposed but none of them were pragmatic enough to be widely accepted and only minor security tweaks have found the pathway to be adopted. Even the recent IETF Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) Working Group (WG) efforts including, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Route Origin authorizations (ROAs), and BGP Security (BGPSEC) do not address the policy related security issues, such as Route Leaks (RL). Route leaks occur due to violation of the export routing policies among the Autonomous Systems (ASes). Route leaks not only have the potential to cause large scale Internet service disruptions but can result in traffic hijacking as well. In this part of the thesis, we examine the route leak problem and propose pragmatic security methodologies which a) require no changes to the BGP protocol, b) are neither dependent on third party information nor on third party security infrastructure, and c) are self-beneficial regardless of their adoption by other players. Our main contributions in this part of the thesis include a) a theoretical framework, which, under realistic assumptions, enables a domain to autonomously determine if a particular received route advertisement corresponds to a route leak, and b) three incremental detection techniques, namely Cross-Path (CP), Benign Fool Back (BFB), and Reverse Benign Fool Back (R-BFB). Our strength resides in the fact that these detection techniques solely require the analytical usage of in-house control-plane, data-plane and direct neighbor relationships information. We evaluate the performance of the three proposed route leak detection techniques both through real-time experiments as well as using simulations at large scale. Our results show that the proposed detection techniques achieve high success rates for countering route leaks in different scenarios.
The motivation behind LISP protocol has shifted over time from solving routing scalability issues in the core Internet to a set of vital use cases for which LISP stands as a technology enabler. The IETF's LISP WG has recently started to work toward securing LISP, but the protocol still lacks end-to-end mechanisms for securing the overall registration process on the mapping system ensuring RLOC authorization and EID authorization. As a result LISP is unprotected against different attacks, such as RLOC spoofing, which can cripple even its basic functionality. For that purpose, in this part of the thesis we address the above mentioned issues and propose practical solutions that counter them. Our solutions take advantage of the low technological inertia of the LISP protocol. The changes proposed for the LISP protocol and the utilization of existing security infrastructure in our solutions enable resource authorizations and lay the foundation for the needed end-to-end security
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On Inferring and Characterizing Internet Routing Policies
Border Gateway Protocol allows Autonomous Systems (ASs) to apply diverse routing policies for selecting routes and for propagating reachability information to other ASs. Al- though a signicant number of studies have been focused on the Internet topology, little is known about what routing policies network operators employ to congure their net- works. In this paper, we infer and characterize routing poli- cies employed in the Internet. We nd that routes learned from customers are preferred over those from peers and providers, and those from peers are typically preferred over those from providers. We present an algorithm for infer- ring and characterizing export policies. We show that ASs announce their prexes to a selected subset of providers. The main reasons behind the selective announcement are the trac engineering strategy for controlling incoming trac. The impact of these routing policies might be signicant. For example, many Tier-1 ASs reach their (direct or indi- rect) customers via their peers instead of customers. Fur- thermore, the selective announcement routing policies imply that there are much less available paths in the Internet than shown in the AS connectivity graph. We hope that our nd- ings will caution network operators in choosing the selective announcement routing policy for trac engineering. Finally, we study export policies to peers and nd that ASs tend to announce all of their prexes to other peers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study on systematically understanding routing policies applied in the Internet
Towards Practical Privacy-Preserving Protocols
Protecting users' privacy in digital systems becomes more complex and challenging over time, as the amount of stored and exchanged data grows steadily and systems become increasingly involved and connected. Two techniques that try to approach this issue are Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Private Information Retrieval (PIR), which aim to enable practical computation while simultaneously keeping sensitive data private. In this thesis we present results showing how real-world applications can be executed in a privacy-preserving way. This is not only desired by users of such applications, but since 2018 also based on a strong legal foundation with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, that forces companies to protect the privacy of user data by design.
This thesis' contributions are split into three parts and can be summarized as follows:
MPC Tools
Generic MPC requires in-depth background knowledge about a complex research field. To approach this, we provide tools that are efficient and usable at the same time, and serve as a foundation for follow-up work as they allow cryptographers, researchers and developers to implement, test and deploy MPC applications. We provide an implementation framework that abstracts from the underlying protocols, optimized building blocks generated from hardware synthesis tools, and allow the direct processing of Hardware Definition Languages (HDLs). Finally, we present an automated compiler for efficient hybrid protocols from ANSI C.
MPC Applications
MPC was for a long time deemed too expensive to be used in practice. We show several use cases of real-world applications that can operate in a privacy-preserving, yet practical way when engineered properly and built on top of suitable MPC protocols. Use cases presented in this thesis are from the domain of route computation using BGP on the Internet or at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). In both cases our protocols protect sensitive business information that is used to determine routing decisions. Another use case focuses on genomics, which is particularly critical as the human genome is connected to everyone during their entire lifespan and cannot be altered. Our system enables federated genomic databases, where several institutions can privately outsource their genome data and where research institutes can query this data in a privacy-preserving manner.
PIR and Applications
Privately retrieving data from a database is a crucial requirement for user privacy and metadata protection, and is enabled amongst others by a technique called Private Information Retrieval (PIR). We present improvements and a generalization of a well-known multi-server PIR scheme of Chor et al., and an implementation and evaluation thereof. We also design and implement an efficient anonymous messaging system built on top of PIR. Furthermore we provide a scalable solution for private contact discovery that utilizes ideas from efficient two-server PIR built from Distributed Point Functions (DPFs) in combination with Private Set Intersection (PSI)
On Inferring and Characterizing Internet Routing Policies
Border Gateway Protocol allows Autonomous Systems (ASs) to apply diverse routing policies for selecting routes and for propagating reachability information to other ASs. Although a significant number of studies have been focused on the Internet topology, little is known about what routing policies network operators employ to configure their networks. In this paper, we infer and characterize routing policies employed in the Internet. We find that routes learned from customers are preferred over those from peers and providers, and those from peers are typically preferred over those from providers. We present an algorithm for inferring and characterizing export policies. We show that ASs announce their prefixes to a selected subset of providers. The main reasons behind the selective announcement are the tra#c engineering strategy for controlling incoming tra#c. The impact of these routing policies might be significant. For example, many Tier-1 ASs reach their (direct or indirect) customers via their peers instead of customers. Furthermore, the selective announcement routing policies imply that there are much less available paths in the Internet than shown in the AS connectivity graph. We hope that our findings will caution network operators in choosing the selective announcement routing policy for tra#c engineering. Finally, we study export policies to peers and find that ASs tend to announce all of their prefixes to other peers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on systematically understanding routing policies applied in the Internet