16 research outputs found
Playing Stackelberg Opinion Optimization with Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in
social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been
studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define
a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by
letting the player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed
opinions by doing so-called "internal opinion design", knowing that the other
adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also
conducting her own internal opinion design.
We propose for the min player to play the "follow-the-perturbed-leader"
algorithm in such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other
adversarial player's play. Since our strategy of subset selection is
combinatorial in nature, the probabilities in a distribution over all the
strategies would be too many to be enumerated one by one. Thus, we design a
randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized) pure strategy. We show that the
strategy output by the randomized algorithm for the min player is essentially
an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other adversarial player
General Opinion Formation Games with Social Group Membership (Short Paper)
Modeling how agents form their opinions is of paramount importance for designing marketing and electoral campaigns. In this work, we present a new framework for opinion formation which generalizes the well-known Friedkin-Johnsen model by incorporating three important features: (i) social group membership, that limits the amount of influence that people not belonging to the same group may lead on a given agent; (ii) both attraction among friends, and repulsion among enemies; (iii) different strengths of influence lead from different people on a given agent, even if the social relationships among them are the same. We show that, despite its generality, our model always admits a pure Nash equilibrium which, under opportune mild conditions, is even unique. Next, we analyze the performances of these equilibria with respect to a social objective function defined as a convex combination, parametrized by a value λ ∈ [0, 1], of the costs yielded by the untruthfulness of the declared opinions and the total cost of social pressure. We prove bounds on both the price of anarchy and the price of stability which show that, for not-too-extreme values of λ, performance at equilibrium are very close to optimal ones. For instance, in several interesting scenarios, the prices of anarchy and stability are both equal to (Equation presented) which never exceeds 2 for λ ∈ [1/5, 1/2]
On the Voting Time of the Deterministic Majority Process
In the deterministic binary majority process we are given a simple graph
where each node has one out of two initial opinions. In every round, every node
adopts the majority opinion among its neighbors. By using a potential argument
first discovered by Goles and Olivos (1980), it is known that this process
always converges in rounds to a two-periodic state in which every node
either keeps its opinion or changes it in every round.
It has been shown by Frischknecht, Keller, and Wattenhofer (2013) that the
bound on the convergence time of the deterministic binary majority
process is indeed tight even for dense graphs. However, in many graphs such as
the complete graph, from any initial opinion assignment, the process converges
in just a constant number of rounds.
By carefully exploiting the structure of the potential function by Goles and
Olivos (1980), we derive a new upper bound on the convergence time of the
deterministic binary majority process that accounts for such exceptional cases.
We show that it is possible to identify certain modules of a graph in order
to obtain a new graph with the property that the worst-case
convergence time of is an upper bound on that of . Moreover, even
though our upper bound can be computed in linear time, we show that, given an
integer , it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an initial opinion
assignment for which it takes more than rounds to converge to the
two-periodic state.Comment: full version of brief announcement accepted at DISC'1
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially
desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination.
Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different
intrinsic preferences but they stand to gain if others choose the same strategy
as them. For non-trivial versions of our game, stable solutions like Nash
Equilibrium may not exist, or may be socially inefficient even when they do
exist. This motivates us to focus on designing efficient algorithms to compute
(almost) stable solutions like Approximate Equilibrium that can be realized if
agents are provided some additional incentives. Our results apply in many
settings like adoption of new products, project selection, and group formation,
where a central authority can direct agents towards a strategy but agents may
defect if they have better alternatives. We show that for any given instance,
we can either compute a high quality approximate equilibrium or a near-optimal
solution that can be stabilized by providing small payments to some players. We
then generalize our model to encompass situations where player relationships
may exhibit complementarities and present an algorithm to compute an
Approximate Equilibrium whose stability factor is linear in the degree of
complementarity. Our results imply that a little influence is necessary in
order to ensure that selfish players coordinate and form socially efficient
solutions.Comment: A preliminary version of this work will appear in AAAI-14:
Twenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligenc
Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks
It is often observed that agents tend to imitate the behavior of their
neighbors in a social network. This imitating behavior might lead to the
strategic decision of adopting a public behavior that differs from what the
agent believes is the right one and this can subvert the behavior of the
population as a whole.
In this paper, we consider the case in which agents express preferences over
two alternatives and model social pressure with the majority dynamics: at each
step an agent is selected and its preference is replaced by the majority of the
preferences of her neighbors. In case of a tie, the agent does not change her
current preference. A profile of the agents' preferences is stable if the
preference of each agent coincides with the preference of at least half of the
neighbors (thus, the system is in equilibrium).
We ask whether there are network topologies that are robust to social
pressure. That is, we ask if there are graphs in which the majority of
preferences in an initial profile always coincides with the majority of the
preference in all stable profiles reachable from that profile. We completely
characterize the graphs with this robustness property by showing that this is
possible only if the graph has no edge or is a clique or very close to a
clique. In other words, except for this handful of graphs, every graph admits
at least one initial profile of preferences in which the majority dynamics can
subvert the initial majority. We also show that deciding whether a graph admits
a minority that becomes majority is NP-hard when the minority size is at most
1/4-th of the social network size.Comment: To appear in WINE 201
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or
projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation
function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project
k. We study the following classic problem in this setting: "how should the
agents divide the value that they collectively create?". One traditional
approach in cooperative game theory is to study core stability with the
implicit assumption that there are infinite copies of one project, and agents
can partition themselves into any number of coalitions. In contrast, we
consider a model with a finite number of non-identical projects; this makes
computing both high-welfare solutions and core payments highly non-trivial.
The main contribution of this paper is a black-box mechanism that reduces the
problem of computing a near-optimal core stable solution to the purely
algorithmic problem of welfare maximization; we apply this to compute an
approximately core stable solution that extracts one-fourth of the optimal
social welfare for the class of subadditive valuations. We also show much
stronger results for several popular sub-classes: anonymous, fractionally
subadditive, and submodular valuations, as well as provide new approximation
algorithms for welfare maximization with anonymous functions. Finally, we
establish a connection between our setting and the well-studied simultaneous
auctions with item bidding; we adapt our results to compute approximate pure
Nash equilibria for these auctions.Comment: Under Revie