Variable types for meaning assembly: a logical syntax for generic noun phrases introduced by most

This paper proposes a way to compute the meanings associated with sentences with generic noun phrases corresponding to the generalized quantifier most. We call these generics specimens and they resemble stereotypes or prototypes in lexical semantics. The meanings are viewed as logical formulae that can thereafter be interpreted in your favourite models. To do so, we depart significantly from the dominant Fregean view with a single untyped universe. Indeed, our proposal adopts type theory with some hints from Hilbert \epsilon-calculus (Hilbert, 1922; Avigad and Zach, 2008) and from medieval philosophy, see e.g. de Libera (1993, 1996). Our type theoretic analysis bears some resemblance with ongoing work in lexical semantics (Asher 2011; Bassac et al. 2010; Moot, Pr\'evot and Retor\'e 2011). Our model also applies to classical examples involving a class, or a generic element of this class, which is not uttered but provided by the context. An outcome of this study is that, in the minimalism-contextualism debate, see Conrad (2011), if one adopts a type theoretical view, terms encode the purely semantic meaning component while their typing is pragmatically determined

Decidability of quantified propositional intuitionistic logic and S4 on trees

Quantified propositional intuitionistic logic is obtained from propositional intuitionistic logic by adding quantifiers \forall p, \exists p over propositions. In the context of Kripke semantics, a proposition is a subset of the worlds in a model structure which is upward closed. Kremer (1997) has shown that the quantified propositional intuitionistic logic H\pi+ based on the class of all partial orders is recursively isomorphic to full second-order logic. He raised the question of whether the logic resulting from restriction to trees is axiomatizable. It is shown that it is, in fact, decidable. The methods used can also be used to establish the decidability of modal S4 with propositional quantification on similar types of Kripke structures.Comment: v2, 9 pages, corrections and additions; v1 8 page

From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio

Hyperlogic: A System for Talking about Logics

Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, including attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics. It is shown that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with propositional quantifiers, which are necessary for regimenting some logic talk. Second, it develops an alternative framework based on logical expressivism, which explains logic talk using shifting conventions. When combined with the standard S5π+ semantics for propositional quantifiers, this framework results in a well-behaved system that does not face the problems of the impossible worlds semantics. It can also be naturally extended with hybrid operators to regiment a broader range of logic talk, e.g., claims about what laws hold according to other logics. The resulting system, called hyperlogic, is therefore a better framework for modeling logic talk than previous accounts

Undecidability of first-order modal and intuitionistic logics with two variables and one monadic predicate letter

We prove that the positive fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic in the language with two variables and a single monadic predicate letter, without constants and equality, is undecidable. This holds true regardless of whether we consider semantics with expanding or constant domains. We then generalise this result to intervals [QBL, QKC] and [QBL, QFL], where QKC is the logic of the weak law of the excluded middle and QBL and QFL are first-order counterparts of Visser's basic and formal logics, respectively. We also show that, for most "natural" first-order modal logics, the two-variable fragment with a single monadic predicate letter, without constants and equality, is undecidable, regardless of whether we consider semantics with expanding or constant domains. These include all sublogics of QKTB, QGL, and QGrz -- among them, QK, QT, QKB, QD, QK4, and QS4.Comment: Pre-final version of the paper published in Studia Logica,doi:10.1007/s11225-018-9815-

Ecumenical modal logic

The discussion about how to put together Gentzen's systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system is back in fashion. Indeed, recently Prawitz and others have been discussing the so called Ecumenical Systems, where connectives from these logics can co-exist in peace. In Prawitz' system, the classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the universal quantifier, conjunction, negation, and the constant for the absurd, but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction, and implication, with different meanings. Prawitz' main idea is that these different meanings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by both parties. In a recent work, Ecumenical sequent calculi and a nested system were presented, and some very interesting proof theoretical properties of the systems were established. In this work we extend Prawitz' Ecumenical idea to alethic K-modalities

Fixed-point elimination in the intuitionistic propositional calculus

It is a consequence of existing literature that least and greatest fixed-points of monotone polynomials on Heyting algebras-that is, the algebraic models of the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus-always exist, even when these algebras are not complete as lattices. The reason is that these extremal fixed-points are definable by formulas of the IPC. Consequently, the $\mu$-calculus based on intuitionistic logic is trivial, every $\mu$-formula being equivalent to a fixed-point free formula. We give in this paper an axiomatization of least and greatest fixed-points of formulas, and an algorithm to compute a fixed-point free formula equivalent to a given $\mu$-formula. The axiomatization of the greatest fixed-point is simple. The axiomatization of the least fixed-point is more complex, in particular every monotone formula converges to its least fixed-point by Kleene's iteration in a finite number of steps, but there is no uniform upper bound on the number of iterations. We extract, out of the algorithm, upper bounds for such n, depending on the size of the formula. For some formulas, we show that these upper bounds are polynomial and optimal