On the Messy “Utopophobia vs Factophobia” Controversy

In recent years, political philosophers have been fiercely arguing over the virtues and vices of utopian vs realistic theorizing. Partly due to the lack of a common and consistently used vocabulary, these debates have become rather confusing. In this chapter, I attempt to bring some clarity to them and, in doing so, I offer a conciliatory perspective on the “utopian vs realistic theorizing” controversy. I argue that, once the notion of a normative or evaluative theory is clearly defined and distinguished from the desiderata that any good theory should satisfy, many of the disagreements between supporters and opponents of “utopian” or “ideal” theorizing can be easily dissolved. I conclude that, in general, political philosophers should be cautious when theorizing at the extreme ends of the “utopian-realistic” spectrum, but that, setting extremes aside, the correct level of realism or idealism depends on the particular question a theory aims to address

Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy

There is an important sense in which our Constitution\u27s structure is not what it appears to be--a set of activities or functions or geographies, the \u27judicial or the executive or the legislative power, the truly local and the truly national. Indeed, it is only if we put these notions to the side that we can come to grips with the importance of the generative provisions of the Constitution: the provisions that actually create our federal government; that bind citizens, through voting, to a House of Representatives, to a Senate, to a President, and even, indirectly, to a Supreme Court. In this article, the author contends that the deep structure of the Constitution is not a set of functions or geographies, but rather a political economy of relations between the governed and the governing. Based on standard assumptions common in institutional economics, she argues that these relations create incentives that can help us predict real (rather than simply theoretical) risks to structural change in actual cases involving both the separation of powers and federalism. By considering the risk from shifting relations not to activity-description but instead to majorities and minorities, we may come closer to understanding real risks to shifting power, from states to nation and from one national department to another. To this end, against the backdrop of constitutional law, the author brings to bear the converging meanings of history, political science, and lost constitutional text, all of which reveal that the canonical view of our Constitution is quite partial to courts and provides an incomplete picture of our Constitution as a whole

Derivation of Morality from Prudence

This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy this prudential interest. It then uses these findings to defend a new derivation of my (2016) theory of morality, Rightness as Fairness, showing how the derivation successfully defends Rightness as Fairness against a variety of objections. The chapter also details how this book’s theory helps to substantiate the claim that Rightness as Fairness unifies a variety of competing moral frameworks: deontology, consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics. Finally, the chapter shows how Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails some revisions to Rightness as Fairness, including the adoption of a series of Rawlsian original positions to settle moral and social-political issues under ideal and nonideal circumstances—thus entailing a unified normative and descriptive psychological framework for prudence, morality, and justice

Michael Smith and the daleks: reason, morality, and contingency

Smith has defended the rationalist's conceptual claim that moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by possessing only an internal, contextual justification or that they need presuppose any expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance. His claim that this rationalistic understanding of metaethics is required for the intelligibility of moral disagreement is also found to be inadequately supported. It is further proposed that the rationalist's substantive claims - that there are such categorical requirements of reason and that our actual moral commitments are a case in point - are liable to disappointment; and that the conceptual claim is fatally undermined by reflection on how we might best respond to such disappointment

Introverted Metaphysics: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation

This paper pulls together three debates fundamental in metaphysics and proposes a novel unified approach to them. The three debates are (i) between bundle theory and substrate theory about the nature of objects, (ii) dispositionalism and categoricalism about the nature of properties, and (iii) regularity theory and production theory about the nature of causation. The first part of the paper (§§2-4) suggests that although these debates are metaphysical, the considerations motivating the competing approaches in each debate tend to be epistemological. The second part (§§5-6) argues that the two underlying epistemological pictures supporting competing views lead to highly unsatisfying conceptions of the world. The final part (§§7-10) proposes an alternative epistemological picture, which I call ‘introverted empiricism,’ and presents the way it provides for a more satisfying grasp of the ultimate nature of objects, properties, and causation. It is a consequence of this alternative picture that there is a kind of intimate self-understanding that underlies our understanding of the deep nature of reality

Collective Action and Social Innovation in the Energy Sector: A Mobilization Model Perspective

This conceptual paper applies a mobilization model to Collective Action Initiatives (CAIs) in the energy sector. The goal is to synthesize aspects of sustainable transition theories with social movement theory to gain insights into how CAIs mobilize to bring about niche-regime change in the context of the sustainable energy transition. First, we demonstrate how energy communities, as a representation of CAIs, relate to social innovation. We then discuss how CAIs in the energy sector are understood within both sustainability transition theory and institutional dynamics theory. While these theories are adept at describing the role energy CAIs have in the energy transition, they do not yet offer much insight concerning the underlying social dimensions for the formation and upscaling of energy CAIs. Therefore, we adapt and apply a mobilization model to gain insight into the dimensions of mobilization and upscaling of CAIs in the energy sector. By doing so we show that the expanding role of CAIs in the energy sector is a function of their power acquisition through mobilization processes. We conclude with a look at future opportunities and challenges of CAIs in the energy transition.This research was conducted under the COMETS (Collective action Models for Energy Transition and Social Innovation) project, funded by the Horizon 2020 Framework Program of the European Commission, grant number 837722

`Iconoclastic', Categorical Quantum Gravity

This is a two-part, `2-in-1' paper. In Part I, the introductory talk at `Glafka--2004: Iconoclastic Approaches to Quantum Gravity' international theoretical physics conference is presented in paper form (without references). In Part II, the more technical talk, originally titled ``Abstract Differential Geometric Excursion to Classical and Quantum Gravity'', is presented in paper form (with citations). The two parts are closely entwined, as Part I makes general motivating remarks for Part II.Comment: 34 pages, in paper form 2 talks given at ``Glafka--2004: Iconoclastic Approaches to Quantum Gravity'' international theoretical physics conference, Athens, Greece (summer 2004