277,843 research outputs found
Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics between Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Logic under Coherence
Recently, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is
weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover, probabilistic
entailment under coherence is a generalization of default entailment in System
P. In this paper, we continue this line of research by presenting probabilistic
generalizations of more sophisticated notions of classical default entailment
that lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic
entailment under coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly generalize
their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they are weaker than
model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and they are stronger than
probabilistic entailment under coherence. The new formalisms are useful
especially for handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning
on zero events. They can also be applied for probabilistic belief revision.
More generally, in the same spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper
sheds light on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond the
well-known standard ones.Comment: 10 pages; in Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on
Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR-2002), Special Session on Uncertainty Frameworks
in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 265-274, Toulouse, France, April 200
The Complexity of Reasoning for Fragments of Default Logic
Default logic was introduced by Reiter in 1980. In 1992, Gottlob classified
the complexity of the extension existence problem for propositional default
logic as \SigmaPtwo-complete, and the complexity of the credulous and
skeptical reasoning problem as SigmaP2-complete, resp. PiP2-complete.
Additionally, he investigated restrictions on the default rules, i.e.,
semi-normal default rules. Selman made in 1992 a similar approach with
disjunction-free and unary default rules. In this paper we systematically
restrict the set of allowed propositional connectives. We give a complete
complexity classification for all sets of Boolean functions in the meaning of
Post's lattice for all three common decision problems for propositional default
logic. We show that the complexity is a hexachotomy (SigmaP2-, DeltaP2-, NP-,
P-, NL-complete, trivial) for the extension existence problem, while for the
credulous and skeptical reasoning problem we obtain similar classifications
without trivial cases.Comment: Corrected versio
A Plausibility Semantics for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
We propose and investigate a simple ranking-measure-based extension semantics
for abstract argumentation frameworks based on their generic instantiation by
default knowledge bases and the ranking construction semantics for default
reasoning. In this context, we consider the path from structured to logical to
shallow semantic instantiations. The resulting well-justified JZ-extension
semantics diverges from more traditional approaches.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic
Reasoning (NMR 2014). This is an improved and extended version of the
author's ECSQARU 2013 pape
The lexicographic closure as a revision process
The connections between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are
well-known. A central problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning is the
problem of default entailment, i.e., when should an item of default information
representing "if A is true then, normally, B is true" be said to follow from a
given set of items of such information. Many answers to this question have been
proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have attempted any explicit
connection to belief revision. The aim of this paper is to give an example of
how such a connection can be made by showing how the lexicographic closure of a
set of defaults may be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision by sets
of sentences. Specifically we use the revision process of Nayak.Comment: 7 pages, Nonmonotonic Reasoning Workshop 2000 (special session on
belief change), at KR200
Implementing Default and Autoepistemic Logics via the Logic of GK
The logic of knowledge and justified assumptions, also known as logic of
grounded knowledge (GK), was proposed by Lin and Shoham as a general logic for
nonmonotonic reasoning. To date, it has been used to embed in it default logic
(propositional case), autoepistemic logic, Turner's logic of universal
causation, and general logic programming under stable model semantics. Besides
showing the generality of GK as a logic for nonmonotonic reasoning, these
embeddings shed light on the relationships among these other logics. In this
paper, for the first time, we show how the logic of GK can be embedded into
disjunctive logic programming in a polynomial but non-modular translation with
new variables. The result can then be used to compute the extension/expansion
semantics of default logic, autoepistemic logic and Turner's logic of universal
causation by disjunctive ASP solvers such as claspD(-2), DLV, GNT and cmodels.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic
Reasoning (NMR 2014
Inferring Acceptance and Rejection in Dialogue by Default Rules of Inference
This paper discusses the processes by which conversants in a dialogue can
infer whether their assertions and proposals have been accepted or rejected by
their conversational partners. It expands on previous work by showing that
logical consistency is a necessary indicator of acceptance, but that it is not
sufficient, and that logical inconsistency is sufficient as an indicator of
rejection, but it is not necessary. I show how conversants can use information
structure and prosody as well as logical reasoning in distinguishing between
acceptances and logically consistent rejections, and relate this work to
previous work on implicature and default reasoning by introducing three new
classes of rejection: {\sc implicature rejections}, {\sc epistemic rejections}
and {\sc deliberation rejections}. I show how these rejections are inferred as
a result of default inferences, which, by other analyses, would have been
blocked by the context. In order to account for these facts, I propose a model
of the common ground that allows these default inferences to go through, and
show how the model, originally proposed to account for the various forms of
acceptance, can also model all types of rejection.Comment: 37 pages, uses fullpage, lingmacros, name
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