This paper discusses the processes by which conversants in a dialogue can
infer whether their assertions and proposals have been accepted or rejected by
their conversational partners. It expands on previous work by showing that
logical consistency is a necessary indicator of acceptance, but that it is not
sufficient, and that logical inconsistency is sufficient as an indicator of
rejection, but it is not necessary. I show how conversants can use information
structure and prosody as well as logical reasoning in distinguishing between
acceptances and logically consistent rejections, and relate this work to
previous work on implicature and default reasoning by introducing three new
classes of rejection: {\sc implicature rejections}, {\sc epistemic rejections}
and {\sc deliberation rejections}. I show how these rejections are inferred as
a result of default inferences, which, by other analyses, would have been
blocked by the context. In order to account for these facts, I propose a model
of the common ground that allows these default inferences to go through, and
show how the model, originally proposed to account for the various forms of
acceptance, can also model all types of rejection.Comment: 37 pages, uses fullpage, lingmacros, name