2,425 research outputs found
Probabilistic Reasoning with Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
Abstract argumentation offers an appealing way of representing and evaluating arguments
and counterarguments. This approach can be enhanced by considering probability
assignments on arguments, allowing for a quantitative treatment of formal argumentation.
In this paper, we regard the assignment as denoting the degree of belief that an agent
has in an argument being acceptable. While there are various interpretations of this, an
example is how it could be applied to a deductive argument. Here, the degree of belief that
an agent has in an argument being acceptable is a combination of the degree to which it
believes the premises, the claim, and the derivation of the claim from the premises. We
consider constraints on these probability assignments, inspired by crisp notions from classical
abstract argumentation frameworks and discuss the issue of probabilistic reasoning
with abstract argumentation frameworks. Moreover, we consider the scenario when assessments
on the probabilities of a subset of the arguments are given and the probabilities
of the remaining arguments have to be derived, taking both the topology of the argumentation
framework and principles of probabilistic reasoning into account. We generalise
this scenario by also considering inconsistent assessments, i.e., assessments that contradict
the topology of the argumentation framework. Building on approaches to inconsistency
measurement, we present a general framework to measure the amount of conflict of these
assessments and provide a method for inconsistency-tolerant reasoning
A Labelling Framework for Probabilistic Argumentation
The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new
accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new
theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests,
probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different
frameworks, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with
respect to diverse types of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty on the
credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which arguments to consider,
and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements.
Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a
labelling-oriented framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based
argumentation and its (semi-) abstract account, along with diverse types of
uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of various kinds of
uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question
assertions from the literature
Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole
Relevance and Conditionals: A Synopsis of Open Pragmatic and Semantic Issues
Recently several papers have reported relevance effects on the cognitive assessments of indicative conditionals, which pose an explanatory challenge to the Suppositional Theory of conditionals advanced by David Over, which is influential in the psychology of reasoning. Some of these results concern the “Equation” (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)), others the de Finetti truth table, and yet others the uncertain and-to-inference task. The purpose of this chapter is to take a Birdseye view on the debate and investigate some of the open theoretical issues posed by the empirical results. Central among these is whether to count these effects as belonging to pragmatics or semantics
Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: the case of imprecise Markov trees
We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian
nets to imprecise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence
commonly used in credal nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance,
which is arguably more suited for a behavioural theory of probability. Focusing
on directed trees, we show how to combine the given local uncertainty models in
the nodes of the graph into a global model, and we use this to construct and
justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a
variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is linear in the number of nodes, is
formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions, and is shown to
satisfy a number of rationality requirements. We supply examples of the
algorithm's operation, and report an application to on-line character
recognition that illustrates the advantages of our approach for prediction. We
comment on the perspectives, opened by the availability, for the first time, of
a truly efficient algorithm based on epistemic irrelevance.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, 1 tabl
Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts
“The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com”. Copyright Springer DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9410-yThe paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes’ theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid.Peer reviewe
A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency
This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, one’s prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and may indeed serve to correct, the informal understanding and applications of the RSA criteria concerning their conceptual dependence, their function as update-thresholds, and their status as obligatory rather than permissive norms, but also show how these formal and informal normative approachs can in fact align
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