Principles of Security and Trust: 7th International Conference, POST 2018, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2018, Thessaloniki, Greece, April 14-20, 2018, Proceedings

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Formal Template-Based Generation of Attack–Defence Trees for Automated Security Analysis

Systems that integrate cyber and physical aspects to create cyber-physical systems (CPS) are becoming increasingly complex, but demonstrating the security of CPS is hard and security is frequently compromised. These compromises can lead to safety failures, putting lives at risk. Attack Defense Trees with sequential conjunction (ADS) are an approach to identifying attacks on a system and identifying the interaction between attacks and the defenses that are present within the CPS. We present a semantic model for ADS and propose a methodology for generating ADS automatically. The methodology takes as input a CPS system model and a library of templates of attacks and defenses. We demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of the ADS generation methodology using an example from the automotive domain

Efficient and Generic Algorithms for Quantitative Attack Tree Analysis

Numerous analysis methods for quantitative attack tree analysis have been proposed. These algorithms compute relevant security metrics, i.e. performance indicators that quantify how good the security of a system is; typical metrics being the most likely attack, the cheapest, or the most damaging one. However, existing methods are only geared towards specific metrics or do not work on general attack trees. This paper classifies attack trees in two dimensions: proper trees vs. directed acyclic graphs (i.e. with shared subtrees); and static vs. dynamic gates. For three out of these four classes, we propose novel algorithms that work over a generic attribute domain, encompassing a large number of concrete security metrics defined on the attack tree semantics; dynamic attack trees with directed acyclic graph structure are left as an open problem. We also analyse the computational complexity of our methods.Comment: Funding: ERC Consolidator (Grant Number: 864075), and European Union (Grant Number: 101067199-ProSVED), in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2022. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2105.0751

On Quantitative Analysis of Attack-Defense Trees with Repeated Labels

International audienc