2,235 research outputs found
Suhrawardi's Modal Syllogisms
Suhrawardiâs logic of the Hikmat al-Ishraq is basically modal. So to understand his modal logic one first has to know the non-modal part upon which his modal logic is built. In my previous paper âSuhrawardi on Syllogismsâ(3) I discussed the former in detail. The present paper is an exposition of his treatment of modal syllogisms. On the basis of some reasonable existential presuppositions and a number of controversial metaphysical theses, and also by confining his theory to alethic modality, Suhrawardi makes his modal syllogism simple in a way that is without precedent
Absoluteness of Truth and the LvovâWarsaw School (Twardowski, KotarbiĆski, LeĆniewski, Ćukasiewicz, Tarski, KokoszyĆska)
According to Twardowski, truth is if it is independent of temporal coordinates. This understanding was one of the main arguments against truth-relativism. KotarbiĆski rejected this view as far the issue concerns sentences about the future, but he did not elaborated this idea from a logical point of view. LeĆniewski offered an argument that truth is eternal if and only if it is sempiternal; Twardowski shared this opinion. Ćukasiewicz rejected sempiternality but retained eternality. His main novelty consisted in applying three-valued logic to explain how it is possible that truth is not sempiternal. Ćukasiewicz also pointed out that bivalence together with the principle of causality implies radical determinism. KotarbiĆski accepted LeĆniewskiâs criticism and he defended Twardowskiâs view in Elementy. Tarski did not explicitly addressed to the problem of absoluteness or temporality of truth. On the other hand, KokoszyĆska proposed an interpretation of the semantic theory of truth as absolute. It is possible to justify absoluteness of truth in semantics cum the principle of bivalence and show that bivalence does not imply determinism
Harnessing Higher-Order (Meta-)Logic to Represent and Reason with Complex Ethical Theories
The computer-mechanization of an ambitious explicit ethical theory, Gewirth's
Principle of Generic Consistency, is used to showcase an approach for
representing and reasoning with ethical theories exhibiting complex logical
features like alethic and deontic modalities, indexicals, higher-order
quantification, among others. Harnessing the high expressive power of Church's
type theory as a meta-logic to semantically embed a combination of quantified
non-classical logics, our work pushes existing boundaries in knowledge
representation and reasoning. We demonstrate that intuitive encodings of
complex ethical theories and their automation on the computer are no longer
antipodes.Comment: 14 page
Metaphysical and absolute possibility
It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is âabsoluteâ possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201â215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453â492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity ânecessity in the highest degreeâ. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible âtout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible periodâŠ. possib without qualification.â And Stalnaker writes, âwe can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.â What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it
From one to many: recent work on truth
In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theoryâKevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated interface between metaphysical and formal truth theories, pointing to several promising questions that arise here
An Epistemicist Solution to Curry's Paradox
This paper targets a series of potential issues for the discussion of, and modal resolution to, the alethic paradoxes advanced by Scharp (2013). I aim, then, to provide a novel, epistemicist treatment to Curry's Paradox. The epistemicist solution that I advance enables the retention of both classical logic and the traditional rules for the alethic predicate: truth-elimination and truth-introduction
Relativism, Faultlessness and Parity
Some philosophers, like Mark Richard and Paul Boghossian, have argued against relativism that it cannot account for the possibility of faultless disagreement. However, I will contend that the objections they moved against relativism do not target its ability to account for the possibility of faultless disagreement per se. Ra- ther, they should be taken to challenge its capacity to account for another element of our folk conception of disagreement in certain areas of discourseâwhat Cris- pin Wright has dubbed parity. What parity demands is to account for the possibil- ity of coherently appreciating, within a committed perspective, that our oppo- nentâs contrary judgement is somehow on a par with our own judgement. Under- stood in this way, Boghossianâs and Richardâs objections put indeed considerable pressure on relativismâor so I will argue. I will consider John MacFarlaneâs at- tempt to resist their objections and I will show that, once their arguments are properly understood as targeting parity, the attempt is not successful. In the last section of the paper I will offer a diagnosis of what is at the heart of the relativist inability to account for parityânamely its assumption of a monistic conception of the normativity of truth
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